



Acta Scientarium Ngensis

Defence of Hong Kong 1941
British Forces in Hong Kong

Christopher Watby

Defence of Hong Kong 1941
British Forces in Hong Kong

失落的重光

THE LOST LIBERATION





謹以本專題獻給我們香港
We dedicate this project to our beloved Hong Kong



上圖： 1941年香港保衛戰的精神是「英勇不屈、團結奉獻、堅持希望」，反映了軍民在逆境中同心抵抗侵略守護香港的無私精神。十字架、HKVDC 香港防衛軍領章、臨時加蓋壹圓貨幣，代表我們先輩的歷史印象
圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室藏




《失落的重光》

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九八式軍刀刀身(配上銅錕)圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室藏

[前言：棄身鋒刃端]

「棄身鋒刃端，性命安可懷」這出自三國魏曹植《白馬篇》的名句，來體會二次世界大戰美國羅斯福總統 (Franklin Roosevelt) 所說的「免於恐懼的自由」(Freedom from fear) 來感受蒙難的香港，當人生什麼都失去之時，性命亦已經不再重要，1945年香港前防衛司令莫德庇少將 (Christopher Michael Maltby) 戰後對香港保衛戰的看法，他深知香港守軍兵力薄弱、無法久守，據記錄認為：「如果日本對英國宣戰，香港完全沒有守住或救援的機會。增兵也無補於事，反而會增加損失。」筆者深有同感嘆息，香港的命運似乎一早已經注定，無論你如何抵抗，最終也無力回天！越投入抵抗，亦只會輸得更加慘重，這些教訓是香港人深重的傷痛！

香港重光...這已經是漸漸消失在當下人腦海裏的記憶.....更遑論能汲取幾多教訓呢?！若然說我們紀念歷史事件，倒不如重新反思我們過去走過個的路，對香港未來的主人翁有什麼啟示，香港還有重光紀念日的嗎？香港人已習以為常，甚至連「重光」名字給人換掉也不察覺，確實如此，紀念活動看來沒有多大意義，只是官式在和平紀念碑放個花圈，以及日漸凋零的見證人不再出現，這到令人心酸的畫面，過去80到90年代的電視畫面，每到重光的日子，都見到伯伯伯及老婆婆拉隊，往日本駐香港總領事館門前抗議，領事館必定派職員出來接收信件，要求日本政府處理軍票問題，港台《鏗鏘集》亦會重播些專題節目，了解二戰時受影響的家庭，現在這些題目大家都忘記了，社會變得冷漠，還是政治正確底下香港已變得面目全非！文化思想猶如廢墟一樣，精神面貌被扭曲，香港恐怕已經不是我們昔日的香港？！

二次世界大戰一開打，香港被日軍偷襲，九龍開始就出現一些「勝利友」，這些污合之眾，倒是一班黑幫社團所指使，香港的「勝利友」所指一群在香港英國守軍撤退期間，利用九龍市區治安真空，進行搶掠和為非作歹的華人匪徒所為。其組成多為不同幫派的黑幫成員，當然還有趁亂混水摸魚的流氓，並在街上呼喊「勝利」口號及臂纏上白布作識別，因而得名為「勝利友」，他們使用菜刀、鐵撬等作為武器，聚眾在九龍各處民居勒索搶掠，收取「保護費」，若遇上不從的市民，甚至殺人放火！「勝利友」人數最多時人數可能達數千人以上，嚴重迫得1941年12月12日日軍全面佔領九龍後，首先鎮壓黑幫「勝利友」的問題。香港的憂患往往是內在多於外在。

香港亦只會失算在自己人的手上！能直接告訴這段歷史給我們知道的老人家，一個個地離我們而去，但他們想我們承傳的歷史事實，這個並不會隨着時間飛逝而顯得淡忘！他們耳語相傳的歷史紀錄，我們銘記於心，他們留下來的見證物件，我們一件件地保留着。深怕自己懶惰辜負了他們的囑咐。對歷史的尊重，對逝者的追思。本來這團內心的火，早開始漸漸熄滅，但當回憶起你們的面容時卻又重燃起來！失落的重光與失落在迷惘中的香港，別以為我們在美好的今日，去紀念在苦難中的過去，或許這苦難的過去一直仍在延續下來.....

正如德國哲學家黑格爾 (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel 1770-1831) 所說：「人類從歷史學到的唯一的教訓，就是人類沒有從歷史中吸取任何教訓。」(“What experience and history teach is this — that people and governments never have learned anything from history, or acted on principles deduced from it.”)，只能寄望香港命不該絕。在未來能夠找到光明、見到希望！



楊慕琦 爵士 (Sir Mark Aitchison Young · 1886 -1974)
第廿一任香港總督

一、楊慕琦 總督 (Sir Mark Aitchison Young · 1886 -1974) 生平

楊慕琦生於1886年6月30日，地點是英屬印度。他的家族來自英格蘭伯克郡，父親是威廉·麥克沃思·楊慕琦爵士 (Sir William Mackworth Young)，是印度殖民地官員，曾任邁索爾參政司、古爾格首席專員及旁遮普副總督等職。楊慕琦在家中共有六名兄弟姐妹，排第三。兩位哥哥分別為擔任印度公務員的傑拉德·麥克沃思·楊慕琦和曾任殖民地總督的陸軍少校夏拔·于貝爾·溫思羅普·楊慕琦爵士。三名弟妹中，最小的諾曼·埃傑頓·楊慕琦曾任英政府財政部官員及蘇伊士運河公司董事。他還有堂兄傑弗里·溫思羅普·楊慕琦，是著名攀山專家及教育家。幼年時楊慕琦並未留在印度。他先後就讀著名的伊頓公學 (Eton College)，之後在劍橋大學的英皇學院 (King' s College, Cambridge) 深造，取得古典文學文學士一級榮譽學位畢業。這些嚴謹的學術經歷為他日後成為資深殖民地官員打下基礎。

楊慕琦於1941年9月任香港第21任總督，當時香港面對二戰東亞形勢緊張。原任內尚未有大幅增兵，但隨著珍珠港事件及太平洋戰爭爆發，12月8日日軍突襲香港，啟德機場遭轟炸，英軍被迅速壓制。在隨後的18天港島戰事中，楊慕琦作為港督兼三軍總司令，領導英軍組織防禦，並兩度拒絕日軍的投降要求。香港防守激烈，特別是12月18日日軍登陸香港島及黃泥涌峽戰鬥尤為慘烈。儘管即使邱吉爾1941年12月21日發電報鼓勵守軍堅守到底，但英軍兵力弱勢，防線逐漸崩潰。楊慕琦投降決策的背景主要是由於當時香港面對日軍強大兵力和裝備優勢，守軍處於孤立無援的劣勢。日軍從12月初開始連續攻擊英軍防線，英軍防守於葵涌、金山及醉酒灣等地均被突破，守軍退守至香港島後日軍多次勸降但被楊慕琦堅決拒絕。然而，隨著香港島激烈的巷戰及炮轟，守軍陷入彈盡糧絕，加上日軍在淺水灣及聖士提反書院屠殺戰俘與護士，令情勢更加悲觀。

守軍司令莫德庇於12月25日下午向楊慕琦表示守軍已無法扭轉敗局，繼續戰鬥只會白白犧牲更多士兵和平民。經與輔政司及政府高層商議後，楊慕琦決定無條件投降，目的是減少無謂的傷亡，當晚他在半島酒店內面對昏暗燭光下簽署了投降書，此日因而被稱為「黑色聖誕」。此外，有學者指出，英國首相邱吉爾亦對投降有所暗示，認為香港作為殖民地的特殊地位和後續國際政治考量，是影響決策的因素之一。楊慕琦的投降決策是在軍事現實壓力與拯救生命的兩難間作出的理性判斷，並秘密安排軍政要員撤離香港。至12月25日「黑色聖誕節」，在守軍主帥莫德庇請求下，楊慕琦決定無條件投降，以減少士兵和平民傷亡。當晚與日方在半島酒店以燭光下簽署投降書，香港由此淪陷，楊慕琦隨即成為日軍戰俘，後被囚禁於香港赤柱監獄、台灣及滿洲和滿洲奉天市等地，楊慕琦的香港保衛戰過程體現了堅守職責與理性判斷，即使面對不可逆境也選擇保護民眾生命安全。




上圖： 1941年12月25日傍晚楊慕琦與莫德庇抵達半島酒店向第23軍司令酒井隆中將投降

原畫收藏於東京国立近代美術館 / 本印刷畫出版於1943年 伊原宇三郎繪 圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室藏

香港に於ける酒井司令官、ヤング總督の会見伊原宇三郎1943-44 酒井司令官在香港會見楊慕琦總督



上圖： 1941年12月25日傍晚楊慕琦總督向第23軍司令酒井隆中將投降 圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室



上圖：軍旅畫家伊原宇三郎（左圖）原畫收藏於東京国立近代美術館 本印刷畫出版於1943年 圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室藏



左上圖：大英帝國殖民地官服，以白色設計及頭上戴熱帶地區使用的「Pith helmet」（椰殼帽），香港總督及其他官員亦有使用其領章設計亦大至相同，以黑地鑲金線橡葉設計，總督有十二片橡葉（見左上圖）楊慕琦爵士/旁則為莫德庇少將。

右上圖：修頓爵士（Sir Wilfrid Thomas Southorn）1930年代主要以香港輔政司及多次署任香港總督，見其領章約為七片橡葉。

最上圖：二戰時大英帝國殖民地官服鑲金帽章及五片橡葉領章，舊藏於葡屬澳門英國領事館內，現典故暫不可考。
圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室藏



約翰·波納爾·瑞禮士 (John Pownall Reeves · 1909 -1978)
英國駐澳門領事

二、約翰·波納爾·瑞禮士 駐澳門英國領事 (John Pownall Reeves , 1909 -1978) 生平

約翰·波納爾·瑞禮士 (John Pownall Reeves , 1909–1978) 是一位英國外交官，二戰期間在葡萄牙殖民地澳門擔任英國領事 (1941年至1946年)。他出生於倫敦布萊克希斯，曾就讀於劍橋大學，並且在校期間積極參與賽艇和曲棍球運動。1933年加入英國外交部，曾在北京、瀋陽及漢口等地工作，後被派駐澳門。1941年聖誕節香港被日軍佔領，澳門作為葡萄牙殖民地，在二戰期間保持中立，成為亞洲唯一未被日軍佔領的“孤島”。約翰·瑞禮士在這種情況下留守澳門，面對日軍封鎖、糧食短缺和物價飛漲等困難，領導英國領事館提供救援，保護和照顧約9000名從香港逃離來澳門的英國公民及難民。期間，他為難民提供食物、住所和醫療支持，幫助他們度過艱苦的歲月。儘管澳門名義上中立，但日軍特務滲透嚴重，他本人還曾被列為暗殺目標，因此有武裝警衛保護他安全工作。約翰·瑞禮士還須在一個充滿諜報活動的環境下與多方情報機構 (英國、葡萄牙、日本、中國國民黨) 周旋，使得澳門成為遠東版“卡薩布蘭卡”。

二戰時期，澳門作為一個中立區域，被日本佔領的中國包圍。瑞禮士是當時區內唯一的資深盟軍代表，他從事重要的人道救援與情報活動。期間，他建立並管理間諜網絡，收集情報，協助約300人從日治地區逃離，照顧約5000名難民，包括英國國民、印度裔及逃避戰火的華人。雖然他的情報活動有時被部分英國上司認為越權，但他的救援和庇護工作在極端困難的環境下極為重要。瑞禮士因其戰時貢獻於1946年被授予英帝國員佐勳章 (OBE)，並獲葡萄牙政府表彰。

戰後，他曾在戰爭受損的意大利及泗水(印尼)任職。他撰寫了名為《孤獨的旗幟》(The Lone Flag: Memoir of the British Consul in Macao during World War II) 的回憶錄，內容為其澳門任期經歷，該書於1949年完成，因外交部原因最初未出版，直到2014年才得以發行。他於1936年在漢口與羅達·默里·基德 (Rhoda Murray Kidd) 結婚，夫妻育有一女，名叫萊蒂西亞·瑪麗·瑞禮士 (Letitia Mary Reeves)，生於1937年。瑞禮士於1978年逝世於南非。瑞禮士是一位專注且富有資源的外交官，他在二戰期間的中立澳門發揮了重要的人道與情報作用，幫助難民並在危險中進行間諜工作，留下深遠的歷史印記。



上圖：二戰時葡屬澳門英國領事館領事及職員所佩戴的襟章。(右)英國駐澳門領事 約翰·波納爾·瑞禮士
圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室藏



上圖：二戰時葡屬澳門英國領事館領事的原址已拆卸多時，估計在今得勝斜路附近。
右方為特為本專題製作的葡屬澳門英國領事館繪木雕。圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室



上圖：二戰時與葡屬澳門英國領事館同時代建築物現為澳門紐曼樞機藝文館。圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室



莫德庇 少將 (Christopher Michael Maltby · 1891-1980)
香港守軍司令

三、莫德庇 少將 (Christopher Michael Maltby , 1891-1980) 生平

克里斯托弗·邁克爾·莫德庇 Christopher Michael Maltby (舊譯為馬爾比少將 1891年1月13日 - 1980年9月6日) 是英國陸軍高級軍官，曾於第二次世界大戰期間擔任香港守軍司令，也是英屬印度陸軍的重要將領之一。莫德庇於1891年1月13日出生於倫敦，父親在英屬印度茶葉生意，童年曾隨家人長居印度。他先後就讀於國王中學 (king' s school, canterbury) 和貝德福德學校 (bedford school)。19歲時進入皇家軍事學院伍利奇分校成為軍官學員。1910年以皇家薩塞克斯團少尉身份被派駐印度拉瓦爾品第，1911年加入印度陸軍的第95羅素步兵團，參與1913至1914年波斯灣行動，是少數有資格佩帶海軍服役獎章的陸軍軍官之一。第一次世界大戰於中東、印度邊境及俄羅斯等地歷練，1915年在防守恰巴爾時英勇作戰獲頒軍功十字勳章 (military cross)。戰後持續在印度西北邊境服役，1920年代起任職各級參謀及教官，1938年晉升為上校並出任奎達參謀學院高級講師。二戰爆發前曾指揮印度若干步兵旅，1941年7月被任命為中國駐軍總司令 (即香港守軍司令)。

莫德庇於1941年7月20日到達香港，接任駐港英軍司令，接替賈乃錫少將，實際負責指揮駐港英軍的防守行動。他到任後，開始準備防御日軍可能的攻擊。直至12月8日日軍入侵香港，最終在12月25日與香港總督楊慕琦一起向日軍投降成為香港俘，1941年12月日軍入侵香港，莫德庇帶領守軍進行死守。12月19日發動反攻未果，12月25日在皇后碼頭坐船往九龍半島酒店向日軍投降，香港正式淪陷。

戰俘時期：自1941年12月被俘直至日本投降1945年獲釋。被囚期間仍堅持記錄與思考戰爭事務。戰後1946年獲封聖米迦勒及聖喬治勳章 (c b)，榮譽退役後於薩默塞特安享晚年，1970年代被任命為地方法官署副官，莫德庇夫人於1974年去世。1980年於家中辭世，享壽89歲。莫德庇一生有著豐富的印度及殖民地防務經歷，尤其在香港保衛戰中以「孤軍無援」的困境備受後世軍事史家關注。他的戰俘經歷亦顯示出堅毅與專業精神，留有戰俘時期手編雜記本，作為珍貴歷史見證。他的指揮和香港保衛戰的經歷在二戰歷史中具有重要地位。




上圖：1941年莫德庇陪同總督羅富國檢視部隊 圖片來源:延陵科學綜合室

三(a)、莫德庇少將防衛香港策略

20世紀1930年代東亞戰略重心東移新加坡，英國認為香港防守困難，將東亞防禦重心部分轉向新加坡，但仍保留在香港的駐軍，1941年邀請加拿大援兵增強兵力。莫德庇少將於1941年7月20日到任，作為二戰前擔任香港英軍司令，指揮駐港英軍抵抗日本對香港的入侵。他於1941年7月接替賈乃錫少將成為駐港英軍最高指揮官，負責香港防務。由於英軍兵力有限，他只能集中防守香港島，並利用地形設置防禦工事，力圖拖延日軍進攻。在香港防衛中擔任關鍵角色，1941年7月接替賈乃錫少將成為駐港英軍司令，負責實際指揮香港防務。他的軍銜僅次於香港總督楊慕琦，但握有駐港英軍作戰的最高實權。由於駐港英軍兵力極度有限只能集中防守香港島，依靠港島山區的地形設置防禦工事，以拖延日軍的推進。莫德庇對港島的防禦措施主要包括以下幾點：

德庇將港島守軍臨時分為東西兩旅，分別佈陣於不同山頭和防線，然而因時間緊迫，作戰單位缺乏適應新部署的時間，造成指揮協調不足，防禦縱深減弱。防禦策略受制於兵力：莫德庇雖有進取的指揮特點和利用地形優勢的策略，但兵力有限，使得防守行動主要為拖延和消耗敵軍，未能有效阻止日軍從香港島東區登陸及突破防線。決策重視平民安全：當日軍逼近維多利亞城核心區域時，因英軍兵力有限，他集中防守香港島，利用港島的山區地形加強防禦設施，力圖拖延日軍推進。他將守軍分為兩支旅隊，「港島旅」駐守香港島，負責防守港島南岸，阻止日軍從海灘登陸；「大陸旅」部署於九龍和新界，用於拖延日軍南侵。港島旅由加拿大援軍司令羅遜準將指揮，下轄多個步兵營和香港防衛軍，重點布防港島沿岸及南部海灘，並且有多座炮台及海防炮支援，例如摩星嶺炮台、赤柱炮台、鶴咀的博加拉炮台等，阻擋敵軍海上進攻。為了防止日軍在港島南區或西區登陸，他安排士兵分散設立360度的縱深防線，並多次進行演習，但日軍最終選擇在東區登陸，令守軍措手不及，防線被突破。在日軍攻擊期間，莫德庇將港島守軍臨時分為東、西兩旅，佈陣於不同山頭和防線，但因時間緊迫，作戰單位來不及適應新部署，導致指揮協調不足，防禦縱深減弱。香港島北岸設有鐵絲網等障礙物，港島山頭建立多座碉堡和機槍堡，並設有防空區域支持高射炮作戰。總司令部設在域多利兵房（現今香港公園），港島旅指揮部設於最高信山山腰（黃泥涌峽道路），便於指揮和控制，莫德庇嘗試利用山地地形及海防炮兵加強防禦，並設計多層次的防線，包括海灘防守、縱深作戰與防空區域，但由於兵力不足與佈陣時間有限，未能阻止日軍從東區登陸及突破防線。香港防守不僅依賴陸軍，1925年報告明確指出若無艦隊協助防守困難。戰時海空支援的不足，易使陸軍孤立無援，影響防禦持久能力。維多利亞城作為守護香港島為核心目標：莫德庇的防守方案基本沿襲1938年參謀長委員會的決議，將防守重點放在土地易守且戰略重要的香港島。他初期只部署少量兵力於新界和九龍以拖延日軍，主力留在香港島防守。利用有限兵力設置縱深防線拖延敵軍：兵力不足使得他必須依賴港島崎嶇山地地形加強防禦工事，並設置多層次防線、炮台和障礙，力求拖延並消耗日軍攻勢。他預估日軍會從南區或西區登陸，故把守軍分散佈置，形成環繞式縱深防守，但日軍卻從東區突襲，令防線失去預期效果。拖延日軍推進，爭取時間破壞通訊交通：他調整部隊部署於醉酒灣防線以增加拖延時間，試圖破壞日軍前進道路與通訊，但由於準備時間不足，防線很快被攻破。



上圖：(左)早年的莫德庇 (右) 1941年7月被任命為香港駐軍總司令莫德庇 圖片來源:延陵科學綜合室



上圖：莫德庇少將（身著短褲）在抵達香港時接受加拿大軍隊的敬禮。照片拍攝於九龍尖沙咀彌敦道與梳士巴利道交界處的半島酒店 圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室



上圖：閱兵後莫德庇少將與羅遜准將進行會談。 圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室



上圖：1930年代，日軍威脅愈發嚴峻之時，英國開始大規模招募香港華人。到1941年12月，皇家工兵部隊中已有25%是本地華人。圖中是皇家工兵部隊中服役的香港華人
圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室



上圖：香港戰役第一天，日軍在潮灣（今吐露港）登陸。請注意背景中的登陸艇。這些登陸艇隸屬於第20獨立工兵團第一渡河物資連和第二渡河物資連。
圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室



上圖：第230團的士兵們正趕往尖沙咀天星碼頭地區。背景是當時九廣鐵路總站的鐘樓。圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室



上圖：日軍正在香港島推進，時間可能為1941年12月18日至19日。照片下方是北角，背景是九龍半島，面向西北。請注意港口裡的沉船；許多沉船已被擊沉，以防止日軍入侵。這張照片很可能是在寶馬山或畢拿山的低坡上拍攝的。
圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室



上圖：第1941年的維多利亞城。圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室


三(b)、莫德庇與港督在無選擇下投降及戰後回顧

1941年12月8日香港保衛戰爆發後，日軍迅速佔領新界及九龍，莫德庇決定將守軍撤退到防守條件相對有利的香港島，並將守軍臨時分為東西兩旅佈陣。然而，這次變陣未能讓作戰單位充分適應，影響了指揮協調，令香港島中部防禦減弱。隨著日軍突破黃泥涌峽防線並逼近維多利亞城，莫德庇主張謹慎使用兵力，日軍於1941年12月8日的突襲，他指揮駐港的英軍、印度軍及皇家加拿大軍隊抗擊日軍入侵。避免無謂犧牲，同時努力爭取盟軍支援。領導抗戰與戰鬥指揮駐軍進行頑強抵抗，試圖鞏固防線，拖延日軍推進至香港島，最終在兵力耗盡及無法繼續支撐下，於12月25日宣布投降。他在困境中保持沉著和堅定的態度，鼓舞士氣，肯定部隊及下屬的英勇表現，莫德庇作為香港保衛戰期間英軍最高指揮官，扮演了指揮作戰、防守規劃及士氣鼓舞的關鍵角色，雖面臨極度劣勢，他仍力求盡最大努力抵抗日軍，體現了英軍的堅守精神。莫德庇對香港保衛戰的看法是理性而清醒，盡管前景黯淡，也毫不懈怠地履行職責，並十分關注士兵和平民的安危。



保護平民安全與人道主義考量，莫德庇與港督於面臨無法抵抗時選擇投降，以避免無謂的平民傷亡。在極度有限兵力和不完全準備狀況下，戰略目標主要是集中防守香港島，利用地形拖延敵軍，爭取時間破壞敵軍通訊並保全守軍實力，這反映了防守戰中戰略上的權衡與限制。以上分析基於多方歷史資料綜合，莫德庇對香港保衛戰的看法，深知香港守軍兵力薄弱、無法久守，據記錄他本人認為：「如果日本對英國宣戰，香港完全沒有守住或救援的機會。增兵也無補於事，反而會增加損失。」在防守戰打響後，香港守軍盡其努力穩定防線，他曾試圖調動兵力反擊日軍推進，後來只能同意撤退集中到赤柱半島作最後組織反擊，莫德庇戰略目標的現實限制和務實考量。最後最終在日本軍隊強大攻勢下，莫德庇對犧牲的感受，認為若無望久守繼續死撐，只會導致更多無謂傷亡，尤其是平民。他曾在防衛會議上提出，拖延投降會換來更多非必要的死亡。於1941年12月25日下午莫德庇與港督共同決定向日軍投降。

1941年香港保衛戰的精神可以用以形容為，「英勇不屈」香港守軍與民眾在兵力和軍備懸殊的情況下，仍堅持抵抗敵軍攻勢，展現出頑強的抗戰意志和勇氣。「團結合作」守軍由英軍、加拿大軍、英屬印度陸軍、香港義勇防衛軍及民防部隊共同組成，不同背景的人們為守護香港自由齊心協力。「犧牲奉獻」不少軍民捨身戰鬥，甚至用生命換取戰友安全與和平，例如加拿大士兵約翰·羅伯特·奧士本（John Robert Osborn, 1899-1941）以身體掩蓋手榴彈救同袍。「堅持和希望」雖然戰敗和淪陷，但守軍與香港市民未曾放棄，許多人在困苦中延續抵抗精神，為後來的重光努力。這種精神成為香港歷史的分水嶺，提醒後代銘記和平與自由的來之不易，1941年香港保衛戰的精神是「英勇不屈、團結奉獻、堅持希望」，反映了軍民在逆境中同心抵抗侵略、守護香港的無私精神。

戰後有人總結莫德庇無奈與堅守的態度：「He just made up his mind to make the best of a bad job, and although he knew the place to be indefensible, I never once heard him complain. it is entirely due to his courage and determination that we lasted out for eighteen days.」（「他只是下決心盡人事，雖知道此地無法防守，卻從無一句抱怨.....能堅守十八天，全靠他的勇氣和決心」）。



上圖：1945年獲釋後的楊慕琦與莫德庇（右）莫德庇與美軍憲兵人員在一起 圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室





上圖：莫德底少將於1941年12月在戰時所配戴作戰時使用的望遠鏡。上刻有「Christopher Maltby」「Defense of Hong Kong 1941 British Forces in Hong Kong」用為銘記，為莫德底少將生前遺物。圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室藏

Shoreditch
Taunton.

3 May '49

Dear Sir,

Your letter of 27th April
which reached me this morning through
the War Office.

I am afraid I have not kept
any envelopes of the type you ask for,
but I enclose a few that may be of
interest to you.

The unstamped one was from Hong Kong
before the local post office had managed
to get a supply of stamps. The American
one was from the Philippines and came
through their Navy. The other two are
just ordinary air mail and may be of
interest to you. You are welcome to them

but I am afraid they are of little
real interest.

Yours sincerely
Christopher

信函一

Shoreditch Taunton.
3 May '49

Dear Sir,

Your letter of 27th April which reached me this morning through the War Office. I am afraid I have not kept any envelopes of the type you ask for, but I enclose a few that may be of interest to you. The Stamped one was from Hong Kong before the local post office had managed to get a supply of stamps. The American one was from the Philippines and came through their Navy. The other two are just ordinary air mail and may be of interest to you. You are welcome to them. but I am afraid they are of little real interest. Yours sincerely
C. M. Maltby (Christopher Michael Maltby)

信函一

肖爾迪奇 湯頓
1949年5月3日

尊敬的先生：

我於今日早晨經由戰爭辦公室收到了您4月27日的來信。很遺憾，我沒有您所要求的那種類型的信封，不過我隨信附上幾個可能對您有興趣的信封。未貼郵票的信封來自香港，當時當地郵局還未取得郵票供應。美國的信封則是來自菲律賓，經由他們的海軍寄出。其他兩個則是普通的航空信封，或許對您仍有些參考價值。這些信封您可以隨意使用，只是我擔心它們對您的收藏價值不大。謹此致意！C. M. 莫德庇

圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室藏

Greenacre
Shoreditch
Taunton
Somerset
26 May 49

Dear Mr. Hau.

Many thanks for your last 3 letters and enclosures which are interesting though I can not agree with the writers on all points. The man from HMS Sirius was either unlucky or only remembers the worst things of life, and certainly has forgotten the entertainments and weekly dances organised by the "snobbish" ladies of Hong-Kong at the China Fleet Club!

If we wish to I don't think there is any question that we can not hold Hong-Kong against Communist attack, and

personally I don't think they will make any serious attack against the Colony. There will be howls of propaganda and screaming for the return of lost Chinese territory, but they will want to trade and they know that H.K. is the only stable spot in the area. Making a guess I will say that the probability is that there will be the howls I have mentioned above, a land blockade of the Colony with perhaps some faint hosteled attacks, and thence the so-called blockade a roaring trade!

I have had the enclosed envelope recently from Siam. the stamps may be of interest to you

Yours sincerely
C. Maltby

信函二

Greenacre
Shoreditch Taunton Somerset 2
26 May, 49

Dear Mr. Hau,

Many thanks for your last 3 letters and enclosures which are interesting though I can not agree with the writers on all points. The man from HMS Sirius was either unlucky or only remembers the worst things of life, and certainly has forgotten the entertainments and weekly dances organized by the "snobbish" ladies of Hong-Kong at the China Fleet Club! If we wish to I don't think there is any question that we can not hold Hong-Kong against Communist attack, and Personally I don't think they will make any serious attacks against the Colony. There will be howls of propaganda and screams for the return of lost Chinese territory, but they will want to trade and they know that H.K. is the only stable spot in the area. Making a guess I will say that the probability is that there will be the howls I have mentioned above, a land blockade of the Colony with perhaps some faint hosted attacks, and thence the so-called blockade a roaring trade! I have had the enclosed envelope recently from Siam, the stamps may be of interest to you.
Yours sincerely C. M. Maltby (Christopher Michael Maltby)

信函二

格林納克
肖爾迪奇 湯頓 薩默塞特
1949年5月26日

親愛的許先生，

非常感謝您之前寄來的三封信和附件，內容很有趣，儘管我不能同意信中所有人的觀點。那位來自HMS Sirius的先生，要麼是運氣不好，要麼只記得生活中最不愉快的事，他肯定忘了由香港那些「勢利」女士們在中國艦隊俱樂部組織的娛樂活動和每周的舞會！如果我們願意，我認為毫無疑問我們能夠抵禦共產主義的攻擊。就我個人而言，我不認為他們會對香港作出任何嚴重的攻擊。將會有許多宣傳上的嘶吼和對失去中國領土的呼聲，但他們會想做生意，他們也知道香港是該地區唯一穩定的地方。我的猜測是，他們會發出上述嚎叫，對香港施加陸上封鎖，可能還有一些微弱的敵對攻擊，然後通過所謂的封鎖確保貿易興旺！我最近收到了一個來自暹羅的信封，裡面的郵票也許你會感興趣。謹此致意！

C. M. Maltby 圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室藏

ps. 天狼星號（HMS Sirius）是英國皇家海軍的一艘黛朵級輕巡洋艦。她由朴茨茅斯造船廠（英國朴茨茅斯）建造，於1938年4月6日安放龍骨。



華里士 准將 (Cedric Wallis · 1896-1982)
香港保衛戰東旅旅長


四、華里士 准將 (Cedric Wallis · 1896-1982) 生平



上圖：第一次世界大戰 1914年，華里士以18歲之齡加入皇家騎兵衛隊 (Royal Horse Guards)。曾於西歐戰場服役，擔任東蘭開夏郡團 (East Lancashire Regiment) 的初級軍官。在法國的戰鬥受傷導至而失明。華里士備戰的態度十分強朗，不喜歡英軍舉辦的社交活動為浪費時間。華里士被受命擔任大陸旅旅長佈防在醉酒灣防線上
圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室

賽德里克·華里士准將 (Cedric Wallis) 是一位英國職業軍官，出生於1896年3月7日於英格蘭諾丁漢 (Nottingham)，他在英國陸軍和英屬印度陸軍服役，軍銜最高為準將 (Brigadier)，服役生涯由1914年至1946年。早年與第一次世界大戰 1914年，華里士以18歲之齡加入皇家騎兵衛隊 (Royal Horse Guards)。曾於西歐戰場服役，擔任東蘭開夏郡團 (East Lancashire Regiment) 的初級軍官。期間因作戰失去左眼，日後經常佩戴眼罩或單片眼鏡。Cedric Wallis 在第一次世界大戰期間，於1914年加入英國陸軍，最初在法國等地作戰。他曾隨舍伍德林地團 (Sherwood Foresters) 及蘭開夏團 (Lancashire Regiment) 服役。在一次戰鬥中，他左眼受傷失明，之後經常戴著眼罩或單片眼鏡作為標誌。

1917年，他轉調英屬印度陸軍，起初在美索不達米亞 (今伊拉克) 作戰，戰爭末期被任命為摩蘇爾的總政治主任，之後又派往波斯西南部工作。第一次世界大戰結束後，他長期駐守印度南部和緬甸，累積了豐富的軍事與行政經驗。1917年轉調英屬印度陸軍，先後駐守美索不達米亞 (今伊拉克)、波斯、西印度和緬甸。戰後在摩蘇爾 (Mosul) 出任政治主任，並駐守多個地區累積豐富經驗。二次大戰與香港保衛戰。二戰初期，Wallis於孟買指揮內部安全部隊，1940年調赴香港，任第7拉傑普特兵團 (5th Battalion, 7th Rajput Regiment) 指揮官。加拿大駐港部隊到港後，港英軍隊重組，華里士晉升准將，出任「大陸旅」 (Mainland Brigade) 旅長，負責新界及九龍防務。



Acta Scientrium Ngensis



上圖：華里士准將佩用軍飾英屬印度 GUIDES 銀質(或銅質)臂章一對 館藏類別：銅金屬 年代：1910-1940年
圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室

二戰期間1940年調往香港時，指揮第7拉傑普特兵團的5營指揮官，加拿大部隊到港後，港英軍隊重組，華里士晉升為準將（Brigadier），成為「大陸旅」（Mainland Brigade）旅長，負責新界及九龍防務。之後他轉任東旅（East Brigade）旅長，繼續指揮防守港島東部區域。1941年底在香港保衛戰中以准將軍銜領導部隊堅守，日軍1941年12月8日侵港，華里士麾下部隊在九龍及新界抵抗，於12月13日全體撤往港島。旅部撤銷後，他轉任東旅旅長（East Brigade），重組部隊防守赤柱、銅鑼灣、渣甸山一帶。赤柱死守與投降日軍登陸後，東旅與西旅並肩作戰，華里士曾親赴前線指揮反攻，展現帶兵果敢精神。1941年12月25日「黑色聖誕」當天，東旅堅守赤柱最後防線。英軍總司令莫德庇少將下令死守到底。堅守最後防線華里士准將在戰爭後期指揮東旅在赤柱地區死守，他親臨前線指揮反攻，展示了勇於承擔和果斷的領導風範。即使在港英軍總司令莫德庇少將下令死守到底，以及港督決定投降後，華里士仍堅持要有正式書面命令才撤退，使他的部隊成為最後一批投降的守軍。•當日夜間得悉港英已決定無條件投降，但華里士堅持要有書面命令方肯撤退。26日凌晨，他與部隊成為全港最後一批投降的英軍部隊。戰俘生涯及戰後投降後成為日軍戰俘，早期因傷送往醫院，其後轉押於深水埗營、亞皆老街營，後來被押解至台灣白河營，再輾轉押至日本、韓國、滿洲等地。戰俘期間秘密撰寫戰地日記，其後根據記憶重寫，是研究香港保衛戰的重要史料。戰後回到英國，個人特質及爭議華里士以帶兵嚴明、作風果斷見稱，勇於親臨戰線。因戰時日記內與下屬軍官發生衝突，以及事後對戰事評論，有部分爭議。總結而言，華里士一生見證了兩次世界大戰，特別是在香港保衛戰期間以剛毅、堅守到底及高度領導能力著稱，是香港歷史上一位舉足輕重的英軍將領。1982年10月20日於加拿大溫哥華逝世終年86歲。



上圖：日本畫家山口蓬春繪畫的《香港最後總攻擊圖》 圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室藏



上圖：《華里士准將與香港保衛戰特藏》華里士准將(Brigadier Cedric Wallis)佩用軍飾英屬印度 East Lancashire Regiment時朝 銀製章、銅徽章、銅鈕等類型配章。 圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室藏



上圖：英軍「大陸旅」和「東旅」指揮官華里士准將(Brigadier Cedric Wallis 1896-1982) 華里士為英國陸軍及印度陸軍軍官香港保衛戰尾聲，東旅撤退到赤柱半島。華里士生前所配戴的軍章及作戰時使用的望遠鏡。上刻有「Cedric Wallis」望遠鏡左側，見到後加刻上皇家空軍啟德基地飛龍徽章及右邊刻有皇家空軍翼章。 圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室藏



羅遜 准將 (John Kelburne Lawson · 1886-1941)
香港保衛戰西旅旅長

五、羅遜准將 (John Kelburne Lawson · 1886-1941)

約翰·祁本·羅遜 (Brigadier John Kelburne Lawson · 1886 - 1941) 加拿大陸軍軍官，因二戰初期香港保衛戰中擔任西旅 (West Brigade) 旅長而知名，是戰役中陣亡的最高階加拿大軍官。他生於英國東約克郡赫爾河畔京士頓 (Kingston upon Hull)，1914年移民加拿大埃德蒙頓，任哈德遜灣公司文員。第一次世界大戰期間，他迅速從一名士兵晉升至上尉，擔任過多個軍職，包括參與索姆河戰役等重要戰役，並兩次被提及嘉獎，獲授法國十字勳章 (Croix de Guerre)，在戰後成為常備軍軍官。在兩次世界大戰之間，他曾在加拿大多個城市任職，完成了英國昆達的參謀學院訓練，並於1930年派駐倫敦戰爭部門。二戰爆發後，他擔任渥太華軍事訓練院院長，後因資歷被提升為準將，獲委任指揮加拿大皇家來福槍團與溫尼伯榴彈兵團，於1941年率軍赴香港協防。香港保衛戰期間，他指揮西旅防守港島西部，戰事激烈。

1941年12月19日，在香港黃泥涌峽之戰中，歐亞混血士兵組成的第三連 (No 3 Eurasian Company) 參與了激烈的防守戰鬥，是香港保衛戰重要的一部分。該連主要與日軍激烈交火，試圖阻止日軍佔領黃泥涌峽這個港島南北交通的戰略要地。戰鬥中他們經歷了連日殺敵，生還者一部分成功撤退並後續與其他部隊匯合繼續作戰。黃泥涌峽位於港島中部，是連接南北的重要防線，守軍約450人嚴守此地，歐亞混血士兵組成的第三連 (No 3 Eurasian Company) 屬於當時港防軍中的義勇防衛軍第三連，主要駐守在渣甸山附近路段，防止日軍進入黃泥涌峽。他們在日軍進攻時發揮機槍火力，成功壓制敵軍，歐亞混血士兵組成的第三連 (No 3 Eurasian Company) 在黃泥涌峽之戰中，是守軍重要組成，展開激烈防守及反擊，顯示了義勇軍與香港保衛戰中多元民族部隊的英勇抗敵精神。當中指揮官史伊尹少校帶領幸存者後續與米杜息士營聯手作戰。指揮西旅作戰的加拿大羅遜准將 (J.K. Lawson)，被日軍包圍他的指揮所，羅遜准將在撤出防彈掩體後遭日本機槍射中胸，成為香港保衛戰中最高階軍官陣亡者。日軍方面因其勇敢對其遺體予以軍禮安葬。12月19日是最激烈的一天，守軍奮勇抵抗，雙方死傷慘重，超過一千人在此戰中喪生。及後由羅斯上校 (Colonel Henry Barron Rose) 負責代理西旅指揮官一職。日軍雖最終佔領黃泥涌峽，但付出了重大傷亡代價。

此戰結束後，加拿大及義勇軍戰士的英勇事蹟獲得紀念，如加拿大在現場豎立紀念碑表彰羅遜准將與溫尼伯榴彈兵團的英雄行為。戰後，羅遜被重新埋葬於香港西灣戰爭公墓，並於2005年由加拿大政府在戰場遺址設立紀念牌以示敬意。

港英軍總司令莫德庇少將的回憶錄裡記錄下來對戰鬥在黃泥涌峽戰役的評價歐亞三連 (No 3 Eurasian Company) 的表現：「 I should like to place on record the superb gallantry of No 3 (Eurasian) Company at Wong Nai Chung ... 」 (我想為黃泥涌峽歐亞三連的卓越英勇表現立此存照)。



上圖：聖約翰救傷隊紀念碑位於香港黃泥涌峽的紀念碑以紀念在香港保衛戰中犧牲的聖約翰救傷隊隊員等殉難者
圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室



亨利·巴倫·羅斯上校(Colonel Henry Barron Rose)
香港防衛軍司令
代理西旅旅長



上圖：戰後義勇軍團隊旗幟仍保留雙龍徽及冠絕東方格言
圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室藏



上圖：亨利·巴倫·羅斯上校(Colonel Henry Barron Rose)1941年香港保衛戰其間為防衛軍司令。羅遜准將於黃泥涌峽戰役陣亡後，羅斯上校負責代理西旅指揮官一職。
圖片來源：《Second to none: the story of the Hong Kong Volunteers》



上圖：黃泥涌峽戰役的歐亞三連(No 3 Eurasian Company) 圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室




Acta Scientarium Ngensis



上圖 :Members of the First Battery, H.K.V.D.C. pictured in 1940 at Cape D'Aguilar, where the battery manned two converted four-inch naval guns, said to have seen service at the Battle of Jutland in the First World War. (From :Second to None The Story of the Hong Kong Volunteers) / 1940年香港防衛義勇軍第一砲台的成員，在鶴咀拍攝照片，該砲台配備了兩門改裝的四英寸艦炮，據說曾在第一次世界大戰的日德蘭海戰中服役。（引自：冠絕東方 香港義勇軍的故事）右上及下圖：1950年代HKR軍官用帽(service dress cap) 佩上1930年代HKVDC的軍官用帽徽。圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室藏

鶴咀砲台（也稱為德己立砲台.Cape D'Aguilar Battery）是駐港英軍於1939年建造，位於香港島南區鶴咀半島的海防砲台，目的是加強香港島東南部海岸的防守。砲台裝備兩門由皇家海軍提供的4吋後裝海防炮，還設有指揮所、探射燈、彈藥庫、瞭望台及堡壘等設施。它能配合位於赤柱半島和大潭灣的赤柱砲台，加強該區的海防能力，並保護寶加拉砲台的後方。在二戰期間，1939年至1941年，駐港英軍建造並駐守鶴咀砲台，砲台裝備兩門由皇家海軍提供的4吋後裝海防炮，設施包括指揮所、探射燈、彈藥庫、瞭望台及堡壘等，1941年12月香港義勇防衛軍第1砲兵連駐守鶴咀砲台，參與對日軍入侵的香港保衛戰。

鶴咀砲台由香港義勇防衛軍第1砲兵連駐守。砲台有效阻止了日本海軍艦艇靠近香港島，迫使日軍改由北路入侵。由於日本陸軍主力從北面攻勢，鶴咀砲台及南岸多數砲台對戰局影響有限。12月19日英軍為避免被分割孤立，收縮防線將部隊集中赤柱半島，鶴咀砲台守軍撤退並破壞砲台設施防止日軍利用。1945年8月香港重光後廢棄，部分建築保留至今，現被列為香港二級歷史建築。鶴咀砲台在香港防衛中屬於輔助性海防設施，提供東南海岸防禦支援，尤其在二戰中對阻止日軍海上攻勢及配合其他砲台有重要作用。



上右圖：駐港英軍於1939年建造的鶴咀砲台（Cape D'Aguilar Battery）的水彩畫。圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室




上圖：2020年12月的聶高遜山 圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室




上圖：黃泥涌峽到紫羅蘭山徑的山間狹道 圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室



上圖：宮本三郎筆下的1941年聶高遜山之戰 圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室藏



上圖：出版於1944年《宮本三郎南方從軍畫集》圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室藏



上圖：軍旅畫家宮本三郎1942年所繪 原畫收藏於東京国立近代美術館 本書印刷畫出版於1944年《宮本三郎南方從軍畫集》
宮本三郎對1941年聶高遜山之戰的評述 圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室藏

ニールソンは、香港島の中ごろにある大きな山である。その下に五叉路があり、更にすこし行つたところの遺源には貯水池がある。此處は、香港の数戦地で、立派な道路が五叉路に通じてゐる。昭和十六年十二月十八日、九龍から上陸したわが軍は、この山の谷間に到着した。夜が明けてみたら、四方の山に敵がある。山には堅固なトーチが無數に構築されてゐて、一つのトーチカから他のトーチカへと壕によって通り抜けができるやうになつてゐた。

わが軍は、これをつづつ苦勞して占領していつたが、敵軍は、上から下へと穴づたひに逃げまはり、逃げつつ頑強に抵抗するので、わが軍としても、非常な苦戦であつた。やうやく、香港島所在の敵を二分する作戦が数を奏して、勝敗が決定したのであつた。幾重にも重なりあつた敵のトーチカにかこまれた五叉路の谷間の中腹には、谷間で負傷した兵を一時的に收容した壕が無數に残つてゐたが、いといつていくか、上の敵からは、こちらの登つてゆくのが、そのまゝ、見えるといつた有様であつた。われわれの素人をもつてしても、こんな地形の好條件に恵まれながら、どうして敵が手を上げたのか、不思議にたへないほどである。結局それは精神力の問題であらう。マライ戦線でもさうだつたと聞くが、彼等は非常に退路を氣にし、ここでも赤逃げ路ばかりに氣をとられて、敗戦の因を招來したらしいのである。


聶高遜山は香港島中部的一座大山。山下は五岔路口、稍遠一點、源頭處有水庫。這裡曾是香港的戰場之一，有一條好的道路通往五岔路口。1941年12月18日，我軍從九龍登陸，抵達這座山谷。破曉時分，我們發現敵人四面八方。山上遍布堅固的碉堡，碉堡之間有壕溝相通。

我軍費盡心思，一個個攻占了這些據點，但敵軍卻從上到下，一個洞一個洞地逃竄，邊逃邊頑強抵抗，使我軍的戰鬥力極其低迷。最終，將香港島敵軍一分为二的戰略奏效了，我軍取得了勝利。在五岔路口的山谷中央，被眾多敵軍碉堡包圍，留下了無數的戰壕，暫時安置了山谷中的傷者。戰況十分險峻，甚至連上面的敵人都能看到我們往上爬。就連我們這些外行，也不禁納悶，在如此有利的地形下，敵人是如何放棄的？歸根究底，這肯定是意志力的問題。我聽說在馬來亞前線也是如此，他們非常在意自己的退路，而他們對退路的過度關注，似乎也是導致他們失敗的原因。

(宮本三郎)



上圖：添馬艦貨倉內二戰皇家海軍軍旗 經歷戰火而倖存的物品 圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室藏



上圖：1940年英國皇家海軍60英尺動力艇（MTB）在香港水域巡邏。這些艇配備兩門雙聯裝劉易斯機槍，一門向前另一門向後及深水炸彈，以及兩枚後射魚雷。圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室



小林照彦 上尉(1920-1957)
1941年轟炸香港行動日本陸軍飛行隊飛行員

五、小林照彦 上尉(1920-1957)

日本王牌飛行員小林照彦是二戰時期日本陸軍的優秀戰鬥機飛行員，生於1920年（大正9年）東京，1938年從陸軍士官學校第53期畢業並進入軍隊。小林照彦在日本本土防空戰展現出色的戰鬥能力與指揮才華，為日本晚期防空戰力的重要代表。他所駕駛的飛機為「飛燕」戰鬥機，並在戰場上取得卓越成績，受稱讚為王牌飛行員。小林照彦是日本二戰末期陸軍的王牌戰鬥機飛行員及指揮官，生於1920年，畢業後服務於陸軍航空隊，戰績卓著，尤其以本土防空戰聞名，曾擔任日本陸軍飛行第244戰隊隊長。小林照彦為日本陸軍王牌飛行員，於1941年太平洋戰爭開始時期有參與轟炸香港行動。他後來在其他戰場上，如滿洲等地亦有服役，後來駕駛性能優異的五式戰鬥機，空戰能力出眾，曾擔任飛行第244戰隊隊長，是當時日本最年輕的戰隊長之一。他的戰績包括擊落多架敵機，其中包括美軍B-29轟炸機及其他戰鬥機，其部隊以出色的防空作戰聞名。戰後小林照彦晉升為航空自衛隊少校，他視為日本防空戰中的重要英雄。



上圖：1941年12月8日，一支由九八式戰鬥機組成的編隊，正向正西飛行，剛飛過九龍半島。硝煙瀰漫的地方正是深水埗，也就是加拿大軍營所在地。圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室




上圖：1941年日軍侵港航空飛行員 / 陸軍大尉小林照彦遺物/1930年代打火機(機殼上刻有1941. 香港之役. 航空自衛隊等刻字)

館藏類別：銅金屬 年代：1941年 尺寸：7cm X 2.9cm

附註：小林照彦(1920-1957)著名日本皇牌飛行員，1941年被編入第45飛行隊前往齊齊哈爾嫩江，後歸入第一飛行中隊指揮，1941年12月在「花開、花開」偷襲香港進攻中，擔任轟炸任務。1943年12月升任陸軍大尉，擔任高松訓練基地教官。1944年時年僅24歲的小林照彦，為陸軍最年輕的飛行隊長，駕駛戰三式戰機「飛燕」為代表的皇牌飛行員。

圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室藏



曼努埃爾.岡薩加.普拉塔 少尉
(Manuel Gonzaga Prata 1909-1943)
香港防衛軍(HKVDC) 英軍服務團(BAAG)

六、曼努埃爾.岡薩加.普拉塔 少尉 (Manuel Gonzaga Prata 1909-1943)

曼努埃爾.岡薩加.普拉塔 少尉生平 (Manuel Gonzaga Prata 1909-1943) 二戰期間的軍人，身份比較特殊，他是香港義勇防衛軍 (HKVDC) 的成員，也是英軍服務團 (BAAG) 的一員。他隸屬機關槍第6連，兵籍號碼3606。1941年12月日本佔領香港後，普拉塔被囚禁於深水埗戰俘營，於1943年9月14日被日軍殺害，終年僅32歲。他最初葬於赤柱墳場，後於1970年代遷葬到跑馬地聖彌額爾天主教墳場。1945年他被追授太平洋星章、1939-1945星章及1945年戰爭勳章。具有葡萄牙裔血統，服務於保衛香港的義勇軍以及英軍，這也可能是他在戰爭中遇難的原因之一。階是少尉 (Second Lieutenant)。



上圖：(右上角) 1945年戰爭勳章綴帶上有英王英勇嘉許獎狀

葡萄牙裔/香港義勇防衛軍(HKVDC)/英軍服務團(BAAG)/服役編號：3606 曼努埃爾.岡薩加.普拉塔 Manuel Gonzaga Prata (1909 - 1943)，1945年追頒授予~太平洋星章/1939-1945 星章 (The 1939-1945 Star)/太平洋星章(The Pacific 及 1939-1945 戰爭勳章 (The 1939-1945 War Medal)

館藏類別：金屬銅質

年代：1945年代

(左) 1939-1945 星章，尺寸：10.2cm X 4.2cm

(中) 太平洋星章，尺寸：10.2cm X 4.2cm

(右) 1945 戰爭勳章，尺寸：10.2cm X 3.5cm

附註：Manuel Gonzaga Prata (1909 - 1943)，1941年12月日佔香港後被關在深水埗戰俘營，1943年9月14日被日本人殺害。終年32歲，死後葬於赤柱墳場，1970年代遷葬在跑馬地聖彌額爾天主教墳場。(藏品編號:NGMH-HK-****)

圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室藏



大衛.蒂爾克 (David Turk 1915-1965)
加拿大溫尼柏榴彈兵第1營 (1st Bn The Winnipeg Grenadiers) 二等兵

七、二等兵 大衛.蒂爾克(David Turk 1915-1965)

大衛.蒂爾克(David Turk 1915-1965) 在香港二戰期間為溫尼伯榴彈兵團(1st Bn The Winnipeg Grenadiers)的一名列兵 (Private)，參與了1941年香港保衛戰，該戰役中盟軍士兵傷亡慘重，溫尼伯榴彈兵團是加拿大軍隊中的步兵連，參與了二戰太平洋戰區的香港戰役，這場戰役歷時約十八天，盟軍部隊因人數和物資極其劣勢，最後被迫投降，許多士兵和守軍隨後成為日軍戰俘，遭受極大苦難。現時沒有戰後有關大衛.蒂爾克(David Turk)的軍旅公開記錄。



香港保衛戰/加拿大溫尼伯榴彈兵第1營 (1st Bn The Winnipeg Grenadiers)

二等兵 大衛.蒂爾克(David Turk 1915-1965)

被頒授的加拿大志願軍服務獎章(Canadian volunteer service medal)及太平洋星章/1939-1945 星章 (The 1939-1945 Star)/太平洋星章 (The Pacific Star).

館藏類別：

金屬銅質 年代：1945年

(左)加拿大志願軍服務獎章：尺寸：9.5cm X 3.5cm

(中)1939-1945 星章：尺寸：9.5cm X 4.2cm

(右)太平洋星章：尺寸：9.5cm X 4.2cm 附註：獎章刻有 H6481 PRIVATE David TURK(藏品編號:NGMH-HK-0360)

圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室藏



上圖：香港志願連（Hong Kong Volunteer Company）軍服。二戰太平洋戰爭期間東南亞作戰的一個香港步兵連隊。成員為香港保衛戰守軍戰敗後，逃離日佔香港的駐港英軍、香港防衛軍（HKVDC）及華人軍團的香港華人士兵組成。連隊於1943年被派遣到英屬印度協助當地英軍對入侵英屬緬甸的日本皇軍發起反攻，並於1944年跟隨組成殲敵部隊（Chindits）的英屬印度陸軍第77步兵旅（77th Indian Infantry Brigade）參與緬甸戰役，英國東南亞總司令部其後還調派連隊的成員到當時仍被日本佔領的英屬馬來亞從事敵後作戰及偵察任務。本志願連軍服屬於香港防衛軍人（HKVDC）所有。圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室藏。



上圖：加拿大溫尼伯榴彈兵團（Winnipeg Grenadiers）的船形帽。第1營於1941年9月被調派到香港，支援香港守軍防禦日軍的入侵，與皇家加拿大來福槍營於11月16日抵達香港，然而香港保衛戰在他抵步還不足一個月，便於1941年12月8日爆發。圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室藏。



上圖：二戰後噴火式戰鬥機曾是香港的主要空中防衛機型。1945年8月日本投降香港重光，英國皇家空軍第132中隊和第681中隊的噴火14型戰鬥機於1945年9月進駐啟德機場。1951年，駐香港的英軍噴火PR-XIX偵察機曾對海南島進行空中偵察，皇家空軍的噴火式機隊最後在1955年離開香港。圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室藏



左上圖：新界石崗草坪上的噴火式戰鬥機 右上圖：二戰維多利港上的沉艦 圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室

OPERATIONS IN HONG KONG FROM 8th TO 25th DECEMBER, 1941

1941年12月8日至25日 香港戰役

Rumb. 38190

699



SUPPLEMENT

TO

The London Gazette

Of TUESDAY, the 27th of JANUARY, 1948

Published by Authority

Registered as a newspaper

THURSDAY, 29 JANUARY, 1948

The War Office,
January, 1948.

OPERATIONS IN HONG KONG FROM 8TH TO 25TH DECEMBER, 1941

The following Despatch was submitted to the Secretary of State for War, on 21st November 1945, by MAJOR-GENERAL C. M. MALTBY, M.C., late G.O.C., British Troops in China.

SIR,

I have the honour to address you on the subject of the operations in Hong Kong in December, 1941, and to forward herewith an account of the operations which took place at Hong Kong between 8th and 25th December, 1941.

2. In normal circumstances this despatch would have been submitted through Headquarters, Far East, but in the circumstances in which I am now placed I consider that it would be better, after this long lapse of time, to submit it to you direct.

3. Before beginning my account of the operations themselves, I feel it to be my duty, both to myself and the forces under my command, to place on record certain points. Of these you will be fully cognizant, but to compilers of history they may not be so obvious.

4. The defences of this Colony were on a limited scale, with the object of denying the harbour to an enemy rather than retaining the harbour for the use of our fleet. This object, combined with the forces available, necessitated a plan to defend the Island of Hong Kong only. The arrival of two Canadian battalions on the 16th November, 1941, caused me to alter my plan to a certain degree. I placed one brigade, with a proportion of mobile artillery under command, on the mainland to prepare and defend


the so-called "Gindrinks' Line," with the hope that, given a certain amount of time and if the enemy did not launch a major offensive there, Kowloon, the harbour and the northern portion of the island would not be subjected to artillery fire directed from the land. Time was also of vital importance to complete demolitions of fuel stores, power houses, docks, wharves, etc., on the mainland; to clear certain food stocks and vital necessities from the mainland to the island; to sink shipping and lighters and to clear the harbour of thousands of junks and sampans. It will be appreciated that to take such irrevocable and expensive steps as mentioned in the foregoing sentence was impossible until it was definitely known that war with Japan was inevitable.

5. That war was inevitable seemed clear to me. I had all my forces deployed in their battle positions in ample time, but it was hard to make that definite statement on the information available, with the result that the civil authorities felt that they were not in a position to put into full force all the numerous measures required during the preliminary or the precautionary period of the Civil Defence plan. For this state of affairs I must blame three factors:—

- (a) The general doubt that Japan would declare war against the Allied powers.
- (b) The weakness of our intelligence system.
- (c) The belief that Japan was bluffing and would continue to bluff to the last. The true gravity of the state of affairs was not reflected in the embassy despatches from Tokyo.



上圖左起：羅遜 准將 (John Kelburne Lawson 1886-1941)
 華里士 准將 (Cedric Wallis 1896-1982)
 莫德庇少將 (Christopher Michael Maltby 1891-1980)
 圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室



上圖：由莫德庇少將撰寫的OPERATIONS IN HONG KONG FROM 8th TO 25th DECEMBER, 1941
 (1941年12月8日至25日 香港戰役) 圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室藏

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補編 倫敦憲報 1948年1月29日（星期四）陸軍部。

1948年1月 香港戰役（1941年12月8日至25日）

下列報告由英國駐華部隊莫德庇少將於1945年11月21日呈交戰爭大臣：

1. 先生閣下 我榮幸地就1941年12月香港戰役向您致函，並隨函附上我於1941年12月8日至25日期間在香港指揮的作戰行動的匯報。

2. 正常情況下，本函應透過遠東總部提交，但鑑於我目前的情況，我認為在如此漫長的時間之後，最好直接提交給您。

3. 在開始報告作戰行動之前，我感到有責任，為了我自己以及我指揮下的部隊，記錄以下幾點。這些要點您一定非常清楚，但對於歷史編纂者來說，它們可能並非如此顯而易見。

4. 該殖民地的防禦規模有限，其目的是阻止敵人入侵港口，而不是保住港口供我方艦隊使用。這個目標，加上現有兵力，使得我制定了一個僅保衛香港島的計劃。1941年11月16日，兩個加拿大營抵達，迫使我在某種程度上改變了計畫。我派遣一個旅，指揮一部分機動砲兵，前往大陸，準備保衛所謂的「醉酒灣防線」。我希望，如果敵人沒有在九龍發動大規模攻勢，給予一定時間，九龍、九龍港和九龍島北部將不會遭受來自陸地的砲火攻擊。時間對於徹底摧毀大陸的燃料庫、發電廠、船塢、碼頭等設施也至關重要；將部分糧食儲備和重要必需品從大陸運往香港島；擊沉船隻和駁船，並清除港口中成千上萬的帆船和舢舨。應理解，除非明確知道與日本開戰不可避免，否則不可能採取前述不可挽回且代價高昂的措施。

5. 戰爭不可避免在我看來是顯而易見的。我已將所有部隊及時部署到戰鬥位置，但根據現有信息，很難做出這一明確聲明，結果，民政當局認為他們無法全力實施民防計劃的初步或預防階段所需的所有眾多措施。對於這種情況，我必須歸咎於三個因素：(a) 普遍懷疑日本會向同盟國宣戰。(b) 我們情報系統的薄弱。(c) 相信日本在虛張聲勢，並且會一直虛張聲勢。事態的真正嚴重性並未反映在使館從東京發來的電報中。

6. That these full Civil Defense measures were not put into effect in time had definite reactions on the subsequent powers of defense and were of assistance to the enemy, e.g., small craft and sampans were available to assist the landings on the island, and supplies were able to be found in Kowloon although the roads available to the enemy had been destroyed and large items in themselves were, perhaps, but were cumulative against us.

7. In fairness to the civil authorities I must state that I did say that unless the Japanese launched a major offensive against the "Gin drinkers' Line" I saw no reason why the period between their crossing of the frontier and the evacuation of the mainland by our forces should not extend to a period of seven days or more. I gave no guarantee and still maintain that this was a fair estimate and might well have been accomplished had not the key to our position on the mainland been captured by surprise by the enemy.

8. The forces under my command had many limitations and amongst these must be enumerated:— (a) Absence of modern air power. (b) The weakness of the naval units. (c) The paucity of anti-aircraft guns, both light and heavy. (d) The lack of any radar equipment. (e) The necessary dilution, in order to economies manpower in the arms of the service, by Chinese personnel of unknown reliability in time of war. (f) The lack of regular transport driven by disciplined drivers. Reference 8(a) above, the aircraft here were no match for the enemy fighters and I gave orders that they were not to be employed unless the opportunity occurred either at first light or at dusk for a torpedo attack on any enemy capital ship or large cruiser. In any case, all were put out of action in the first raid made by the enemy, though precautions such as dispersal had been taken. The lack of reconnaissance both landwards and seawards was naturally a serious handicap. Study of the past history of Japanese operations had led me to believe that they were past masters in combined operations, and throughout the period of the siege I always anticipated a landing on the Southern shores of the island, and lack of distant seaward reconnaissance was for me a distinct handicap. Similarly I know that the lack of opposition to the incessant enemy air raids had a somewhat depressing effect towards the end on the troops, and definitely increased the accuracy of the enemy bombing and the material damage done. For similar reasons the enemy's counter battery tasks were very much simplified.

Reference 8(b) above, the forces available carried out their duties in very difficult circumstances with the utmost gallantry and in the true tradition of the Royal Navy. I have nothing but praise for their gallant conduct, and the Commodore R.N. will be submitting his own dispatch. Reference 8(c) above, these few detachments fought with great gallantry and can claim five enemy aircraft shot down, and three others probably never reached their base.

8(d) above, the survey for these equipment's had been made but their installation had not begun when the war started. Reference 8(f) above, although the R.A.S.C. performed wonders in organizing improvised transport and the few regular drivers were never off the road for days and nights on end, the general desertion of local enlisted Chinese drivers (usually after putting their vehicles out of action) was a very serious factor both from the tactical and maintenance aspects.

9. I wish now to make it perfectly clear that I fully appreciate that the demands of Empire strategy made it impossible at the time for full provision to be made for my forces, and I only make these points so that those who may be writing history or wish to criticize the conduct of my forces may be in full possession of the true facts. Further, I submit that although I and my forces may have been a hostage to fortune, we were a detachment that deflected from more important objectives, such as the Philippines, Singapore, or perhaps even Australia, an enemy force that consisted of two first line divisions, one reserve division, corps artillery, about eighty aircraft and a considerable naval blockade force. Strategically we gambled and lost, but it was a worth while gamble.

6. 這些全面的民防措施未能及時實施，對後續的防禦力量產生了一定的影響，並且對敵人提供了幫助，例如，小型船隻和舢板可用於協助登陸，而且儘管敵人可用的道路已被破壞，大型物資本身也遭到破壞，但九龍仍然能夠找到補給，但這些補給對我們而言是累積性的。

7. 公平起見，我必須聲明，我確實說過，除非日軍對「醉酒灣防線」發動大規模進攻，否則我認為他們越過邊境到我軍撤離大陸之間的時間不應該延長到七天或更長時間。我沒有做出任何保證，並且仍然堅持認為這是一個合理的估計，而且，如果不是敵人突然奪取了我們在大陸的陣地，那麼這個時間很可能已經完成了。

8. 我指揮的部隊存在諸多局限性，其中必須列舉如下：（a）缺乏現代化的空中力量。（b）海軍部隊薄弱。（c）輕型和重型防空砲均不足。（d）缺乏任何雷達設備。（e）為了節省兵力，必須調配戰時可靠性不明的中國人員，從而削弱各兵種的兵力。（f）缺乏由訓練有素的司機駕駛的常規運輸工具。參考上文8(a)，這裡的飛機根本不是敵方戰鬥機的對手，我下令除非在黎明或黃昏時分有機會對任何敵方主力艦或大型巡洋艦進行魚雷攻擊，否則不得使用飛機。無論如何，儘管採取了分散部署等預防措施，所有飛機在敵方首次空襲中均被擊退。缺乏對陸和海的偵察，自然是一個嚴重的障礙。對日軍作戰史的研究使我相信，他們是聯合作戰的大師。在整個圍城期間，我一直預期日軍會在島嶼南岸登陸，而缺乏遠距離海上偵察對我來說是一個明顯的障礙。同樣，我知道，缺乏對敵方持續空襲的抵抗，在戰後對部隊造成了一定程度的壓制，但這無疑提高了敵方轟炸的準確性和造成的物質損失。出於類似的原因，敵方的反砲火任務也大大簡化了。

參考上文8(b)，可用的部隊在極其艱難的情況下以極其英勇的方式履行了職責，並秉承了皇家海軍的真正傳統。我對他們的英勇行為只有讚美，皇家海軍準將也將提交他自己的電報。參考上文8(c)，這幾支分隊作戰英勇，聲稱擊落了五架敵機，另外三架可能從未抵達基地。

參考上文第8(d)條，這些設備的勘察工作已經完成，但戰爭爆發時尚未開始安裝。參考上文第8(f)條，儘管皇家陸軍航空隊在組織臨時運輸方面表現出色，少數常規司機也從未停下車來，但當地中國士兵司機的普遍逃兵行為（通常是在車輛無法使用後）無論從戰術角度還是維護角度來看都是一個非常嚴重的因素。

9. 我現在想非常清楚地表明，我完全理解當時帝國戰略的要求使得我軍無法獲得充足的補給，我提出這些觀點只是為了讓那些可能正在撰寫歷史或希望批評我軍行為的人能夠完全掌握真實的事實。此外，我認為，儘管我和我的部隊可能受命運擺佈，但我們是一支偏離更重要目標的部隊，例如菲律賓、新加坡，甚至可能是澳洲。敵軍由兩個一線師、一個預備師、一個軍砲兵、大約八十架飛機和一支相當規模的海軍封鎖部隊組成。從戰略上講，我們進行了一場賭博，雖然輸了，但這是一場值得的賭博。

10. Appendix A. In this Appendix will be found the full account of the events. It was prepared shortly after our capitulation under considerable difficulties. The war diary and messages to and from Battle Headquarters were naturally all destroyed before and after capitulation; Japanese interest in all written matter necessitated various methods of subterfuge to retain anything, and the main credit for whatever has been compiled must go to my G.S.O.I.—the late Colonel L. A. Newnham, G.C., M.C.—who took the most meticulous care to make this account tally with the true events. There are naturally a few blanks owing to the fog of war and the inability to gain contact with all the survivors, but with more information that will become available from formation and unit war diaries it is to be hoped that finally there will be little left for the imagination to fill in. 11. Although this Appendix gives a very full account of events, I would like to comment on several points. Japanese Tactics. The salient points of the Japanese tactics were:— (a) Nightwork. The division which made the initial advance over the frontier and those troops that first landed on the island had reached a high standard of efficiency in nightwork. All were provided with rubber soled boots that made movement very silent, systematically they used the smallest of paths and avoided all the more obvious lines of advance, and their patrols were very boldly handled. (b) Rapidity of Advance. The pace of the advance was surprisingly fast, the troops were lightly equipped and must have been very fit to accomplish the marches undertaken.

(c) Agents and Spies. It was obvious from all sources Thai agents and spies had been placed both on the mainland and the island well beforehand. Spies led the leading elements on the mainland, disguised as innocent laborers or coolies. Their patrols advanced by paths which could have been known only to locals or from detailed reconnaissance. Armed agents in Kowloon and Hong Kong systematically fired during the hours of darkness on troops, sentries, cars and dispatch riders, but little damage was done thereby beyond straining the nerves of a number of the men. After the landing on the island had been effected, penetration to cut the island in half was assisted by local guides who led the columns by most difficult routes. The possession of these agents and guides with such intimate knowledge counteracted the first great advantage the defense normally has over the attack, i.e., familiarity with the ground.

(d) Intelligence. It was obvious that the enemy system of intelligence was most complete. Marked maps found on dead officers gave a surprising amount of exact detail, which included our defenses and much of our wire. Every officer seemed to be in possession of such a map, which was a lithographed reduction of our own 1/20,000 map. They seemed to be in possession of a very full Order of Battle and knew the names of most of the senior and commanding officers.

(e) Artillery Concentration. Artillery and heavy mortar concentrations were very heavy and correctly placed. Those fired before landing on the island and for the capture of Leighton Hill were as heavy as any experienced in France during the war of 1914/18. The range of the heavy mortar must have been about 1300 yards as they fired across the harbor with accuracy and effect. The blast and noise of the bursting bomb was considerable, but the killing power was not high. On occasions artillery fire was most accurate, e.g., all the pillboxes on the north shore, where the landing was effected, were systematically destroyed. (f) Maintenance of the Objective. This principle seems to have been well understood by their junior leaders. The advance to cut the island in two was carried out regardless of cost to life.

10. 附錄A。本附錄包含事件的完整記錄。它是在我們投降後不久，在相當大的困難下寫的。戰爭日記和往返於作戰指揮部的信息自然在投降前後全部被銷毀；日本人對所有書面材料都感興趣，因此不得不採取各種掩飾手段來保留任何信息。所有得以彙編的資料，主要歸功於我的G.S.O.I.——已故的L. A. Newnham上校，G.C.，M.C.——他極為細緻地確保了這份紀錄與真實事件相符。由於戰爭迷霧籠罩以及無法與所有倖存者取得聯繫，自然會有一些空白，但隨著編隊和部隊戰爭日記中提供更多信息，希望最終能留下一些可供想像填補的內容。11. 雖然本附錄對事件進行了非常全面的描述，但我仍想評論幾點。日本戰術。日本戰術的要點是：

(a) 夜間作戰。率先越過邊境的師和最先登陸該島的部隊在夜間作戰方面達到了很高的效率。所有士兵都穿著橡膠底靴，行動時非常安靜。他們有條不紊地走最窄的小路，避開所有明顯的前進路線，巡邏時也非常大膽。

(b) 推進速度。推進速度出奇地快，部隊裝備輕便，因此，為了完成行軍，他們的體能肯定非常充沛。

(c) 關於代理人 and 間諜。從各方面消息可以明顯看出，日本的代理人 and 間諜早在前期就已經安插在大陸和島上。這些間諜偽裝成無辜的勞工或苦力，領導大陸上的先頭部隊。他們的巡邏隊沿著僅有當地人知道或通過詳細偵察才獲悉的小路前進。在九龍和香港，武裝代理人在夜間系統性地向軍隊、哨兵、車輛和傳令兵射擊，雖然沒有造成很大損害，但足以讓許多士兵緊張。當登陸島上成功後，當地向導幫助分割島嶼的部隊，帶領他們走最難走的路線。擁有這些深入了解地形的代理人 and 向導，抵消了防守方通常擁有的對地形熟悉的巨大優勢。

(d) 情報。敵方的情報系統顯然非常完善。在陣亡軍官身上發現的標記地圖提供了大量精確的詳情，包括我們的防禦工事和許多鐵絲網。幾乎每位軍官都有這樣一張地圖，這是我們1:20,000地圖的石版縮小版。他們似乎擁有非常完整的戰鬥序列並知道大多數高級指揮官的姓名。

(e) 火炮集結。火炮和重迫擊炮集結強大且布置得當。登陸島上和奪取利頓山的炮火之重堪比1914至1918年法國戰場上的炮擊。重迫擊炮射程約1300碼，能夠準確越過海港進行射擊，爆炸聲音震耳欲聾，但殺傷力不大。炮火有時非常精確，例如將北岸所有碉堡（即登陸地點）全部系統性摧毀。

(f) 維持目標原則。該原則似乎被日方中層指揮官深刻理解。切割島嶼為兩半的行動不惜人命代價繼續推進。

(g) Air Force. The efficiency of the enemy air force was probably the greatest surprise to me. Their opening attack on Kai Tak aerodrome by low level attack down to sixty feet was carried out with skill and marked boldness. Subsequent high level bombing proved to be most accurate, and they confined their attention to military objectives with marked results, such as the naval base at Aberdeen and the island water supply mains. Their evasive tactics and use of low cloud displayed a high standard of training. My general impression at the time was that either the Japanese pilots had reached a surprisingly high standard of training, or that German pilots were leading their flights.

12. Appendix B —Summary of Casualties. An approximate summary of casualties has been compiled by me as far as possible. This is, however, by no means complete, and, owing to the facts that the survivors of this force were divided up from the beginning and that no communication was permitted between camps, the full casualty list cannot be known until all figures have been compiled by the Casualty Bureau. Since capitulation, a number have died from wounds and disease, and many drowned, with the result that it is feared that final and correct figures will take a long time to compile, and the fates of many will never be known.

13. Conduct of the Troops. For the sake of clarity I have confined myself to the bare statement of military facts. I feel it to be my duty, however, to bring to notice the conduct of my troops during this period of hostilities (a) 2 Royal Scots.—It was unfortunate that the enemy captured by surprise the most important Shing-mun Redoubt and occupied the Golden Hill position. These two incidents were the direct cause of the hasty withdrawal to the mainland. The gallant action of their D Company (Capt. Pinkerton) on the extreme right flank of the Golden Hill position, the later gallant efforts of the whole battalion to recapture the Wong Nei Chong Gap, and their stubborn fighting in the Mount Nicholson and Mount Cameron areas accomplished much to retrieve their prestige. They commenced the siege with a high incidence of sickness, mainly from malaria, and suffered severe casualties during the operations.

(b) Royal Rifles of Canada and Winnipeg Grenadiers.—These two battalions proved to be inadequately trained for modern war under the conditions existing in Hong Kong. They had very recently arrived in Hong Kong after a long sea voyage, and such time as was available had been devoted to the completion of the south shore defenses and making themselves au fait with and practicing the problems of countering a south shore landing. In this role they were never employed and, instead, they found themselves counter-attacking on steep hill sides covered with scrub, over strange country, and as a result they rapidly became exhausted. Many individual acts of gallantry were performed, their stubborn defensive fighting at the Wong Nei Chong Gap and in the area of Mounts Cameron and Nicholson was marked, and the losses they incurred were heavy and are deeply regretted.

(c) 5th Bn. 7th Rajput Regt.—This battalion fought well on the mainland and their repulse of the enemy attack on the Devils Peak was entirely successful. The full force of the enemy's initial attack on the island fell on this battalion and they fought 'gallantly until they had suffered heavy casualties (100 per cent. British Officers and most senior Indian Officers being lost) and were over-run.

(d) Of the remainder of my force I wish to say little except to express my tribute to them all for the gallant part they played during a period of intensive fighting against overwhelming odds, with no rest, little sleep, and often short of water and hot meals. Whether Royal Navy, Royal Air Force, Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, Royal Signals, Infantry or members of the ancillary services, one and all played their part fully in the true traditions of the services. The casualties suffered and those inflicted on the enemy speak for themselves.

(g) 空軍。敵方空軍的效率可能是我最大的驚訝。他們對啟德機場的低空攻擊（飛行高度低至60英尺）展現出極高的技巧和大膽。隨後的高空轟炸非常精確，專注於軍事目標，取得明顯效果，如亞伯丁海軍基地與島上的供水管線。他們採用躲避性戰術和利用低雲，顯示出高度的訓練水準。當時我的總體印象是，日本飛行員要麼訓練水準出乎意料地高，要麼有德國飛行員領航。

12. 附錄B——受傷與傷亡總結。本人已盡可能彙編了一份大致的傷亡總結。然而，由於該部隊倖存者自始即被分散，且各營間無法通訊，完整的傷亡名單尚難得知。投降後，部分士兵因傷亡病逝，另有多人溺水身亡，因此最終的準確數字仍待傷亡局彙編，許多人的最終命運恐永不得知。(編者按/此傷亡總結暫略)

13. 第2蘇格蘭皇家團（2 Royal Scots）儘管開始時因敵軍突襲而失去了最重要的城防工事——城門山堡壘（Shing-mun Redoubt）及佔領了金山（Golden Hill）陣地，二蘇團依然英勇作戰。D連（由Capt. Pinkerton平克頓上尉指揮）在金山右側展現了英勇。整個營後續努力奪回黃泥涌峽（Wong Nei Chong Gap），並在掃桿坳（Mount Nicholson）及金文山（Mount Cameron）區域頑強抵抗。他們從開始圍城時就因瘧疾高發率而體力不支，且傷亡慘重。

(b)加拿大皇家步兵團與溫尼伯榴彈兵團（Royal Rifles of Canada and Winnipeg Grenadiers）這兩個營的訓練不足，未能充分適應香港當時的現代戰爭條件。他們剛從長途海上航程抵港，有限的時間主要用於完成南岸防禦和練習對付南岸登陸的作戰問題。• 實際作戰中，他們未能對抗南岸登陸，而是需在陡峭長滿灌木的未知地形上進行反攻，使得他們迅速疲勞。儘管如此，部隊中有多次個人英勇行為，他們在黃泥涌峽、金文山及掃桿坳的頑強防守有目共睹，但損失慘重。

(c)第5營，第7拉賈普特團（5th Bn. 7th Rajput Regiment）該營在大陸地區表現良好，成功擊退敵軍對魔鬼山（Devils Peak）的襲擊。他們承受了敵軍對島上初次進攻的主力衝擊，雖然奮戰英勇，但最終在重創下被敵軍壓倒，所有英國軍官及大部分高級印度軍官均傷亡。

(d)其餘部隊 其餘部隊包括皇家海軍、皇家空軍、皇家炮兵、皇家工兵、皇家通信兵、步兵及輔助部隊，均在極端困難情況下忠誠履行職責持續激戰、缺少休息、飲水與熱食均不足。他們所受的傷亡及對敵軍造成的損失本身即是最佳證明。

In closing my despatch I wish to pay a special tribute to the Hong Kong Volunteer Defense Corps. They proved themselves to be a valuable portion of the garrison. In peace they had surrendered a great deal of their leisure to training, their mobilization was completed smoothly and quickly, and in action they proved themselves stubborn and gallant soldiers. To quote examples seems almost invidious but I should like to place on record the superb gallantry of No. 3 (Eurasian) Company at Wong Nei Chong Gap and of No. 1 Battery who undertook infantry defense in the Stanley area, while the efficiency and gallantry of their Signal section and dispatch riders were outstanding.

My thanks and deep appreciation are also due to H.E. The Governor who was a tower of strength to me in our trying ordeal; and similarly I must place on record my admiration for all the members of his civil defense services who displayed magnificent fortitude and energy in their multitudinous activities.

This War Narrative of the defense of Hong Kong is built up on the detailed record of Battle (Fortress) HQ kept at the time, minute by minute. In some cases, where subsequent knowledge of facts has made it possible to insert items to make a clearer picture, this has been done in the text, but care has been taken not to include anything which would have a bearing on possible decisions which might have been taken. Frequently subsequent knowledge has been included in footnote form only. This despatch was compiled in a Prisoner of War Camp under constant fear of observation or search and with no clerical facilities. All maps, plans, schemes, orders, etc., were destroyed on capitulation and the officers and men marched to Sham-shui-po, a distance of 5 miles, and were permitted to take only what they could carry on the person. The Fortress HQ War Diary was concealed and brought away. Cross checking has taken place where possible with survivors, but the Canadian troops were moved early to another camp and no visiting was allowed to hospitals, hospital camps or Indian camps. The timings are based on Hong Kong winter time then in force.

香港義勇防衛軍（Hong Kong Volunteer Defense Corps）讚揚其在和平時期犧牲大量休閒時間進行訓練，動員迅速順利。戰時表現出頑強與英勇的戰士風範。特別提及於黃泥涌峽作戰的第3（歐亞混血）連及於赤柱（Stanley）區防禦的第1炮隊，另外通訊組及傳令員的效率與勇氣亦表現突出。

致謝 感謝總督在艱困時刻以堅強支持本人的領導。對所有民防人員在艱難多重任務中展現的堅毅與活力表示敬佩。

這份香港防禦戰事紀錄，是以當時要塞指揮部逐分鐘記錄的詳細戰鬥日誌為基礎編寫的。某些情況下，戰後掌握的新事實被補充進正文，以讓全貌更清晰，但都特意避免加入會影響當時可能決策的內容。後來發現的新資訊，多半僅以註腳形式列出。這份報告是在戰俘營內編寫，時刻擔心被監視或搜查，沒有任何文書工具。投降時，所有地圖、圖紙、方案和命令等已遭銷毀，全體官兵步行五英里至深水埗，只准隨身攜帶能帶走的物品。要塞指揮部的戰事日誌則被秘密帶走。部分內容已努力與倖存者核對，但加拿大部隊很早就被轉移，且無法前往醫院或印度營探視。所有時間皆以當時實行的香港冬令時間為準。



上圖：香港保衛戰的歷史現場黃泥涌水塘 圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室

9. Appreciations of the situation at varying times during the preceding two years estimated two to four divisions of Japanese as available for the attack on Hong Kong. On the evening of 6th December Chinese reports showed the arrival of three Japanese divisions at To Kat 8 miles from the frontier, on the previous day. Information from the Far East Combined Bureau Singapore showed that attack was likely by one division, with another division in reserve. This I believe to be incorrect, as a Japanese Staff Officer informed me after the capitulation that two divisions had been deployed on the island and a third was held in reserve.

10. Three to four weeks before the outbreak of war all intelligence sources pointed to very unusual activity in Canton and Bocca Tigris, but the best efforts could not ascertain the contents of the shipping employed—the activities being equally explainable by either:

(a) a concentration for an advance North West from Canton on to Kunming, or,

(b) development of a base of supply and staging depot for attack on Thailand. The shipping was not universally fully laden towards Canton, and empty outwards. Information also showed that the Japanese defense lines round Canton had been drawn in so as to encircle the city more closely. It is clear that the Field Security Police of the Japanese Army had a high degree of efficiency. Available information led to the following conclusions. That the: — (a) Japanese night work was poor. (b) Japanese preferred stereotyped methods and fixed plans.

(c) Japanese light automatics were not as numerous as ours nor so up to date.

(d) Japanese "Combined" Operations" were thorough and that they had excellent boats and equipment but that their successes against the Chinese were flattering as there had never 'been real opposition.

(e) Japanese Air Force was not up to first class European standards, that their bombing was poor, and that they would not go in for night bombing

(f) Japanese fifth column activities would be encountered, though no actual proof of such organisations existed. The proximity of Formosa, with its mixed population of Japanese and Chinese Formosans, and Canton, furnished the enemy with admirable intelligence bases.

11. About 1st November a Japanese deserter came across the frontier and gave himself up at a civil police post. He gave a certain amount of detail about the Japanese forces, which definitely indicated preparations for the concentration of troops North of the frontier, and the presence of large caliber artillery, indicating that of a Corps. 12. From Tokyo, ambassadorial cablegrams did not indicate immediate impending hostilities, in fact the telegrams from there were extremely moderately phrased in comparison with those of June, 1940. Consular reports also were not particularly disturbing. 13. Such intercepts of enemy aircraft movements as were received during the weeks previous to hostilities showed no abnormal activity. Intercepts from other sources showed normality.

12. From Tokyo, ambassadorial cablegrams did not indicate immediate impending hostilities, in fact the telegrams from there were extremely moderately phrased in comparison with those of June, 1940. Consular reports also were not particularly disturbing.

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9. 對於過去兩年中不同時期的態勢評估顯示，日軍約有兩至四個師團可用於進攻香港。12月6日晚，華人情報顯示三個日軍師團已於前一天抵達距邊界8英里的地方。來自新加坡遠東聯合情報局的消息則顯示，攻擊可能由一個師團發起，另一個師團作為預備隊。我認為這是不正確的，因為投降後一名日軍參謀告訴我，島上部署了兩個師團，第三個師團作為預備隊。

10. 戰爭爆發前三至四周，所有情報來源均指出廣州（粵城）及虎門地區有非常異常的活動，但即使費盡心力亦難以確定船運貨物內容這些活動既可解釋為：

(a) 從廣州向西北集中兵力攻擊昆明，或 (b) 發展物資基地及集結點，用於攻擊泰國。船隻運往廣州時並非全載重，空運回程亦多見。情報還顯示日軍圍繞廣州的防守線收縮得更緊密，明顯意在圍困該市。日軍陸軍現場保安警察效率極高。根據現有信息可得以下結論：(a) 日軍夜間作業不佳。

(b) 日軍偏好固定計劃與程式化作法。

(c) 日軍輕機槍不如我軍數量多且不夠先進。

(d) 日軍“聯合作戰”徹底，擁有優良船隻與裝備，但對華作戰的成功包含誇大成分，因為未曾遭遇真正抵抗。

(e) 日軍空軍不及一流歐洲標準，轟炸效果差，且不進行夜間轟炸。(f) 預期會遇到日軍的第五縱隊活動，但無實際證據證明有這種組織。靠近福建台灣，當地有日華混合人口，連同廣州，成為敵方優秀情報基地。

11. 約於11月1日，一名日軍逃兵越境並向華人警察自首，提供了不少細節，表明日軍兵力正集中於前線北方，且配備大口徑火炮，推測有一個軍團兵力。

12. 從東京傳來的大使館電報並未顯示即將開戰，實際上這些電報措辭比1940年6月時更為中庸。領事報告亦未顯示特別令人擔憂之處。

13. 戰前數周，擷取的敵方飛機動態未顯示異常活動。來自其他來源的截獲情報同樣顯示情況正常。

Part III-A

14. During, the early days of December as the situation progressively deteriorated so were more and more troops deployed, until on the evening of 7th December all were in their battle positions. By evening very definite reports were received of concentrations of Japanese forces in the villages bordering the frontier. The company of 2 /14 Punjab Regt. at Fanling had been in position for some days with constant watch maintained from the frontier observation posts. At 0445 hours 8th December intelligence sources reported hearing on a Tokyo broadcast code instructions to their nationals that war with Great Britain and U.S.A. was imminent at any moment. His Excellency the Governor was immediately warned and the message was passed on to all concerned. The frontier company (Major Gray, 2/14 Punjab Regt.) was telephoned and orders were issued for the forward demolitions to be blown, i.e., to the East and North of Fanling. Subsequent events showed that all these forward demolitions were blown successfully. By 0645 hours the garrison had been informed that the British Empire and Japan were at war. Command HQ had moved into the underground Battle HQ. At 0800 hours Japanese aircraft dive attacked Kai Tak aerodrome (down to 60 feet, showing first class standard) and destroyed and damaged the following grounded planes: — R.A.F.—3 destroyed, 1 seriously damaged and 1 slightly damaged. Civil—1 Clipper and 7 others (D.C. 23 Condors, etc.). Shamshuipo barracks were also attacked and bombed but very few casualties were caused, owing to full deployment. By 0900 hours Fortress Engineers and administrative services were on the move to their dispersal areas in accordance with plans. Japanese machines on to Kai Tak and over Kowloon numbered respectively 36 Fighters and 12 Bombers. During the day subversive pamphlets, addressed mainly to Indian troops, were dropped. They were poorly drawn up and carried no weight either with British or Indian troops.

15 Action of Forward Troops on the Taipo Road, commanded by Major G. E. Gray, 2/14 Punjab Regt. At 0800 hours 8th December the Japanese began bridging at Lo Wu and our observation posts reported hundreds of Japanese crossing into Laffans Plain. This was later estimated to be a battalion and it seems fairly certain that a two battalion front was adopted—the other battalion going later straight down the Taipo Road. The tactics were almost invariably to push a strong body up the nearest hill and round a flank directly any line of approach was found to be blocked. The threat of a battalion moving round his right flank was a constant menace, and necessitated Major Gray's decision to make sure of the big demolitions No. 731 and R 94 one mile North of Taipo and not to attempt any real delaying action forward of this. It was thus 1500 hours when the first enemy attacks developed in this area and were beaten off by fire. Outflanking movements developed immediately, necessitating withdrawal to South of the causeway, Taipo.

A platoon had been posted wide on the West flank as left flank guard. A Japanese detachment headed by three women (Chinese) attacked here at 1830 hours. All were shot.

At 1930 hours the mechanized portion of Forward Troops, composed of two armoured cars and four Bren carriers, co-operated most effectively in ambushing a Japanese platoon in close formation. It was virtually wiped out by machine gun and light automatic fire from one hundred yards range. The enemy never relaxed his pressure during the bright moonlight night. It was obvious that his small columns, using cross country tracks, were led by guides who knew the ground intimately, thus enabling the attack to develop quicker than had been thought possible, especially as this was combined with a high standard of night training. I was subsequently informed by a Japanese Staff officer (Major Nishiyama) that a month had been spent on concentrated night training for the attack on Hong Kong. At midnight Forward Troops withdrew to Taipo Mei where an important demolition was duly blown, followed by another withdrawal an hour later to Fo Tan Valley, this being necessitated by small parties of the enemy having reached" positions on the road behind the Forward Troops' dispositions.

第三部分-A

14. 12月初，隨著局勢的惡化，部署的部隊也越來越多，直至12月7日晚，所有部隊都已進入戰鬥位置。傍晚時分，收到非常明確的報告，稱日軍已在邊境村莊集結。駐紮在粉嶺的第14旁遮普團第2團的連隊已駐紮數日，並在邊境觀察哨進行持續監視。12月8日凌晨4點45分，情報部門報告稱，他們從東京的廣播密碼中得知，向其國民發出的指令稱，與英國和美國的戰爭隨時可能爆發。總督閣下立即收到警告，並將訊息傳達給所有相關人員。邊境連隊（旁遮普團第14旁遮普團第2團的格雷少校）接到電話，命令對前方，即粉嶺以東和以北的地區進行爆破。隨後的事件表明，所有這些前方爆破都已成功完成。至6時45分，駐軍已獲悉大英帝國與日本交戰。指揮部已遷入地下作戰指揮部。8時，日軍飛機俯衝襲擊啟德機場（高度下降至60英尺，達到一級水平），摧毀並損壞了以下停飛的飛機：——英國皇家空軍——3架被摧毀，1架嚴重受損，1架輕微受損。民用飛機 - 1架「飛剪」式轟炸機及7架其他飛機（如DC公司的23架「禿鷹」式轟炸機等）。深水埗軍營也遭到攻擊和轟炸，但由於已全面部署，傷亡人數很少。至9時，要塞工兵和行政服務人員已依照計畫前往疏散區域。飛往啟德和飛越九龍的日軍飛機分別有36架戰鬥機和12架轟炸機。白天，主要針對印度軍隊的顛覆性小冊子(傳單)空投。這些小冊子寫得粗製濫造，對英軍和印軍都毫無作用。

15 前鋒部隊在大埔路的行動，由G. E. Gray少校指揮，第2/14旁遮普團。12月8日上午8點，日軍開始在羅湖架橋，我方觀察哨報告稱，數百名日軍渡河進入拉凡斯平原。後經估計，這支部隊是一個營，而且幾乎可以肯定，他們採取了兩個營的陣線——另一個營隨後直接沿著大埔路前進。他們的戰術幾乎總是：將一支強大的部隊推上最近的山丘，然後繞過側翼，一旦發現任何進軍路線被阻斷。一個營繞行其右翼的威脅持續不斷，這迫使格雷少校決定確保大埔以北一英里處731號和R94號砲台的大規模爆破，並且不在此之前嘗試任何真正的拖延行動。因此，下午3點，敵軍在該地區發動了第一波進攻，並被火力擊退。敵軍隨即展開側翼包抄行動，迫使其撤退至堤道以南的大埔。

一個排的部隊被部署在西側，擔任左翼警戒。一支由三名中國婦女率領的日軍小隊於18:30在此發動攻擊。所有人員均被擊斃。

18:30，由兩輛裝甲車和四輛布倫運兵車組成的前鋒部隊機械化部隊協同伏擊了一支密集編隊的日軍排。該排幾乎被機槍和輕型自動火力在一百碼範圍內全殲。在明亮的月夜，敵人從未放鬆過壓力。顯然，他們的小縱隊使用越野小路，由熟悉地形的嚮導帶領，這使得進攻比預想的更快展開，尤其是在高水平的夜間訓練下。後來，一位日軍參謀（西山少校）告訴我，他們已經進行了一個月的集中夜間訓練，以備進攻香港之需。午夜時分，前鋒部隊撤至大埔尾，並在那裡成功炸毀了一座重要的砲台。一小時後，他們又撤至火炭谷，因為敵軍小部隊已經抵達前鋒部隊部署後方道路上的陣地。

16. By 0330 hours 9th December all demolitions were successfully blown except one at Taipo where Japanese forward patrols were extremely quick in following up and cutting the leads to the abutments after the withdrawal of the final covering party. The safety fuze used for the piers, however, had burned too far for interruption and these piers were successfully destroyed. At dawn Forward Troops were on Monastery Ridge just forward of the Gindrinks Line, where they maintained themselves all day, withdrawing by order at dusk. During the day many excellent artillery targets offered themselves and were engaged with success. The Forward Troops had fulfilled their role admirably, and had inflicted some 100 casualties to the Japanese at no real cost to themselves.

17. On the other main line of approach, viz.: Castle Peak Road, late in the evening 8th December enemy transport was seen banking up at the road 'bridge North of Au Tau, showing the success of the demolition there. 5.9 in. guns were seen to be tractor drawn up to the bridge and then manhandled into a village to the East. This battery fired at intervals during the next fifty-six hours on Hong Kong Island and was calculated by the Royal Artillery to be on Kam Tin aerodrome. Several shells passed over the main ridge of the island and landed near Aberdeen Reservoir; the firing was at too long a range to be taken seriously and in any case was out of range of our artillery. At 1340 hours on 8th December a large formation of Japanese planes carried out another raid, this time on Stanley, dropping a few bombs Little material damage was done.

18. (a) At 0600 hours 9th December I ordered Mainland Infantry Brigade to move the reserve company of 5/7 Rajput Regt. across to fill the gap East of Smugglers Pass, previously only patrolled until the direction of the main enemy thrust should be disclosed. (b) Enemy action during the day was chiefly confined to patrol action. 2 Royal Scots had strong patrols on the tracks leading South East from the Kam Tin area which confirmed the use of Chinese guides by Japanese advanced troops. Later information from the Chinese member of "Z Force" was to the effect that these Chinese guides were drawn from the village of Tsun Wan Wai which he said was largely pro-Wang Ching Wei. "Z Force" was a band of local volunteers which had been trained beforehand for work behind the Japanese lines and was led by Mr. Kendall. Dumps of arms, supplies, medical stores, etc., had been made beforehand at three points in the new territories. (c) It transpired at this time that the Japanese scouts and snipers were highly trained and extremely difficult to detect. Their uniform consisting of quilted material with cross stitching was particularly adapted to the insertion of twigs, grass, etc., obtained locally—thus blending perfectly with the surroundings. Others encountered later on the island had a camouflage net rolled up and carried high on the back, from which position it could be quickly drawn over head and shoulders. (d) The demolitions on Castle Peak Road were blown successfully, except the one at the Dairy Farm, where the leads were cut by a saboteur who slipped in immediately the last sentry was withdrawn. He moved to the next demolition, close by, and was blown up and killed whilst standing on top of it. (e) During the night 8th/9th arrangements were made with the police to evacuate the villagers from places where the front line posts ran through or too near to villages—a matter of great difficulty owing to the trip wires of anti-personnel mines which had been put out to supplement the thinly held front.

19. At 2200 hours the CNAC planes left for Free China. In one was dispatched Lt.-Colonel H. Q. Hughes (HKVDC) who was to act as our liaison officer with 7th Chinese Army.

16. 截至12月9日凌晨3點30分，除大埔的一座砲台外，所有砲台均已成功炸毀。在最後的掩護部隊撤離後，日軍前鋒巡邏隊迅速跟進並切斷了通往橋台的引線。然而，用於橋墩的保險引信已燒得太深，無法中斷，這些橋墩被成功炸毀。黎明時分，前鋒部隊抵達金德林克防線前方的修道院嶺，在那裡堅守了一整天，並在黃昏時奉命撤退。白天，許多優秀的砲兵目標出現並進行了成功的交戰。前鋒部隊出色地完成了任務，擊傷了約100名敵軍。日軍傷亡慘重，而他們自己卻沒有付出任何實際代價。

17. 在另一條主要進場路線，即青山公路，12月8日深夜，敵方運輸工具被發現聚集在凹頭以北的公路橋上，顯示那裡的爆破工作取得了成功。5.9吋火砲被拖拉機拖到橋上，然後被人為搬運到東邊的一個村莊。在接下來的56個小時裡，這門砲台斷斷續續地向香港島開火，皇家砲兵估計砲火瞄準的是錦田機場。幾枚砲彈飛過島的主山脊，落在香港仔水塘附近；砲火距離太遠，難以當真，而且無論如何，都超出了我方砲兵的射程。12月8日13:40，一支大型日軍飛機編隊發動了另一次空襲，這次是針對赤柱，投下了幾枚炸彈。造成的物質損失很小。

18. (a) 12月9日凌晨6點，我命令大陸步兵旅調動拉吉普團第5/7團的預備連過河，以填補走私者隘口以東的缺口。此前，該缺口僅在偵查到敵軍主力推進方向後才進行巡邏。(b) 敵軍白天的行動主要侷限於巡邏。兩支皇家蘇格蘭步兵團在從錦田地區通往東南方向的道路上進行了強有力的巡邏，這證實了日軍先頭部隊使用了中國嚮導。後來，一位「Z部隊」的中國成員提供的資訊顯示，這些中國嚮導來自駿灣圍村，他表示，該村大部分人支持汪精衛。「Z部隊」是一支由當地志願者組成的隊伍，他們事先接受過訓練，可以在日軍防線後方執行任務，由Mr. Kendall肯德爾先生領導。武器、補給、醫療物資等物資事先已在新界三個地點傾倒。(c) 當時發現，日軍偵察兵和狙擊手訓練有素，極難被發現。他們的制服由縫有十字繡的布料製成，特別適合插入當地獲得的樹枝、草等，因此與周圍環境完美融合。後來在島上遇到的其他日軍將偽裝網捲起並高高背在背上，這樣可以快速地將其拉過頭頂和肩膀。(d) 青山公路上的爆破點除牛奶場的爆破點外均被成功炸毀。牛奶場的爆破點被一名破壞者切斷，他在最後一名哨兵撤離後立即潛入。他轉移到附近的下一個爆破點，並在站在爆破點上時被炸死。(e) 當晚，與警方商定，將村民從前線哨所穿過或過於靠近村莊的地方撤離，由於為補充薄弱的防線而埋設的殺傷人員地雷的絆網，撤離工作十分困難。

19. 22:00，CNAC飛機飛往自由中國(國軍範圍)。其中一架飛機上搭載了H. Q. Hughes中校(香港防衛軍)，他將擔任我方與中國第七軍的聯絡官。

20. At about 2300 hours on the night of 9th/10th December a report was received from the Company Commander 5/7 Rajput Regt. (whose company had been moved across from being reserve company in the Right battalion Sector) that he could hear enemy moving in the Shingmun Valley on his (immediate front, and later the nearest 2 Royal Scots Company ("A" Company) reported hearing explosions from one of the pill boxes constituting "Shingmun Redoubt." Within the hour it was clear that Shingmun Redoubt had fallen, including the artillery observation post and the HQ of "A" Company 2 Royal Scots. The capture by surprise of this key position, which dominated a large portion of the left flank and the importance of which had been so frequently stressed beforehand, directly and gravely affected subsequent events and prejudiced Naval, Military and Civil defence arrangements. The possibility of mounting an immediate counter attack that night was considered with Commander Mainland Brigade but was ruled out as the nearest troops were a mile away, the ground precipitous and broken, and the exact situation round the Redoubt very obscure. At about 0315 hours an artillery concentration was put down on the area of the western portion of the Redoubt and this was heard to take toll of the enemy.

21. At midnight 9th/10th December I decided to move the reserve company of the Winnipeg Grenadiers across from Hong Kong Island. It was placed at the disposal of Brigadier Mainland Brigade and arrived at his HQ at 0400 hours. Confused fighting took place South of Shing-mun Redoubt, and a further enemy advance next morning was stopped by artillery support and by the vigorous action taken by Captain 'H. R. Newton, commanding the 5/7 Rajput Company there. About one enemy company attacked and was driven back into Shing-mun Redoubt which was then shelled by 6 in.kHowitzers. Captain Newton was confident that severe casualties had been inflicted upon the enemy. A counter attack by Captain Newton's Company was considered, but this would have caused a serious gap between the 2/14 Punjab Regt. and Shing-mun, where the enemy had already made attempts to effect penetration. The enemy success, however, caused dangerous exposure of the center ("B") and left ("C") Companies of 2 Royal Scots, and at 1530 hours I sanctioned their withdrawal from the Pineapple Road 2 and Texaco Peninsula positions (a mile in front now, and with an open flank) to the strong Golden Hill line which reached the sea at the Lai-chi-kok Peninsula. This withdrawal was carried out without incident at dusk—though the two companies required a certain amount of adjustment before dawn.

22. 10th December.—During that day I ordered the R.A.F. to evacuate Kai Tak aerodrome and to destroy machines and equipment. I had at no time contemplated 'the serious use of obsolete 100 m.p.h. aircraft which would have been shot down immediately by modern fighters, but in any case by this time only one machine was fit to operate. Demolitions there were practically completed, and were finished later by No. 1 Company HKVDC allotted for aerodrome ground and air defense (together with 4 Bren* carriers). This company under Captain A. H. Penn performed its duties very well. The aerodrome was left obstructed by using concrete sections of drains, railings from the "surrounds" and derelict M.T. Enemy air activity was spasmodic, but our first A.A. success, confirmed from three sources, was recorded; an enemy plane over Causeway Bay was hit and fell into the sea in Tide Cove.

20. 12月9/10日夜間約23:00，收到拉吉普團第5/7連長的報告。（其所在連隊由右營區的預備連調任）報告說，他能聽到敵人在他（直接面對的）城門谷移動，後來最近的皇家蘇格蘭第2連（“A”連）報告說，聽到“城門堡壘”的一個碉堡傳來爆炸聲。不到一小時，城門堡壘已陷落，包括砲兵觀察哨和皇家蘇格蘭第2連“A”連的指揮部。出其不意地奪取了這個控制著左翼大部分地區的關鍵陣地，其重要性此前已多次被強調，這直接嚴重影響了後續事件，並損害了海軍、陸軍和民防部署。大陸旅指揮官曾考慮當晚立即發動反攻的可能性，但由於最近的部隊距離一英里，地面險峻崎嶇，以及堡壘周圍的具體情況，這一可能性被排除。非常模糊。大約凌晨3點15分，砲火集中襲擊了堡壘西部地區，據傳聞，這給敵軍造成了損失。

21. 12月9日至10日午夜，我決定將溫尼伯擲彈兵的預備連從香港島調往對面。該連交給大陸旅準將指揮，並於凌晨4點抵達其指揮部。在城門堡壘以南發生了混戰，第二天早晨，敵軍的進一步推進被砲火支援以及指揮該地第7/5拉吉普團的H. R. 牛頓上尉的有力阻攔。大約一個敵軍連發動進攻，並被擊退至城門堡壘，隨後遭到6門榴彈砲的砲擊。牛頓上尉確信，敵人已遭受了慘重傷亡。牛頓上尉的連隊曾考慮進行反擊，但這會在旁遮普第14團第2團和城門之間造成巨大的空隙，而敵軍此前已試圖突破城門堡壘。然而，敵軍的勝利導致中央（“B”）和左翼（“C”）兩支皇家蘇格蘭聯隊的連隊暴露於危險之中。15時30分，我批准他們從菠蘿路2號和德士古半島陣地（此時已領先一英里，側翼敞開）撤至堅固的金山防線，該防線延伸至荔枝角半島的海邊。這次撤退在黃昏時分順利進行——儘管兩個連隊在黎明前需要進行一定程度的調整。

22日，12月10日。當天，我命令英國皇家空軍撤離啟德機場，並銷毀所有飛機和設備。我從未考慮過認真使用時速100英里的老式飛機，因為這些飛機會被現代戰鬥機立即擊落，但無論如何，此時只有一架飛機可以飛行。那裡的爆破工作基本上已經完成，後來由負責機場地面和防空之香港防空司令部第一連（連同4架布倫*運輸機）完成。該連在A. H. Penn上尉的指揮下出色地完成了任務。機場被混凝土排水溝、「圍牆」的欄桿和廢棄的M.T. 堵塞。敵方空中活動斷斷續續，但我們的首次防空成功，已從三個來源確認：一架敵機在銅鑼灣上空被擊中，墜入潮灣海(Tide Cove所指可能是沙田海)中。

23. By now the special warning system was in operation and proved most satisfactory. The arrival of enemy aircraft was forecast and known to within a couple of minutes. An intense shelling of Stonecutters Island began during the day. At first the fire ways inaccurate but later became extremely accurate and the attack was also taken up from the air. Much damage was caused by 5.9 in. fire in particular, one "round landing between the two 60 pounders which had been moved over to Stonecutters a week previously for firing in enfilade down the Taipo Road, which they had been doing very successfully during the past thirty six hours. During the day a fair amount of movement seawards was observed—Japanese torpedo boats, minesweepers and one destroyer. Later three more destroyers and a cruiser were observed. H.M.S. " Cicala " had 'been covering the left flank of the 2 Royal Scots on the Castle Peak Road during the last three days, and on this day (10th December) discovered a Japanese working party clearing demolitions at Brothers Point. Fire was opened with 6 in. guns and direct hits obtained. Several Japanese attacks from the air were beaten off but eventually the ship received a direct hit which necessitated docking for repair. At 1742 hours the last of the Eastern Telegraph Company cables between Hong Kong and the outside world was cut by enemy action. Orders were now issued to put in hand, starting with a " Priority A " group, the laying by Royal Engineers of anti-personnel minefields on beaches, etc., on the southern shores of the island.

24. 10th / 11th December.—Intermittent shelling of both mainland and island continued throughout the night, and before dawn the Bowen Road Hospital was hit four times. The first air raid 3 of the day took place at 0800 hours.

25. 11th December. On the mainland at dawn the enemy opened up mortar fire and then attacked the left flank of the 2 Royal Scots 3, driving them back in disorder and exposing the junction of the Castle Peak and Taipo Roads, thus seriously endangering the withdrawal of all the troops based on the Taipo Road (2/14 Punjab Regt., one company 5/7 Rajput Regt., troop 4.5 in. Howitzers, troop 3.7 in. Howitzers). The situation was critical but the company of the 1. Winnipeg Grenadiers and the Bren carriers from Kai Tak aerodrome defenses were moved into position covering the gap. At midday 11th December I ordered withdrawal from the mainland under cover of darkness—except for 5/7 Rajput Regt. detailed under the scheme of defense for occupation of Devils Peak Peninsula. The withdrawal called for a difficult operation by the 2/14 Punjab Regt.—a move by night across the whole front, along the line of the passes (Kowloon Pass, Shatin Pass, Grasscutters Pass) and down the Devils Peak Peninsula—a move not practiced beforehand. Brigade Headquarters, 2 Royal Scots and various administrative detachments were to cross from embarkation points on the East side of Kowloon Peninsula. The West side of the Peninsula was free 4 for evacuation of civilians, civil stores of the food in the Godowns, etc. The notice I could give was regrettably short but unavoidable owing to the rapidity with which the situation had deteriorated. In spite of the short notice the Royal Signals personnel successfully evacuated 49 miles of D8 cable and 20 tons of buried type cable.

23. 此時，特殊預警系統已投入運行，效果令人滿意。敵機抵達的預報和資訊在幾分鐘內即可知曉。白天，昂船洲遭到猛烈砲擊。起初，砲火不準確，但後來變得極為精確，攻擊也從空中進行。尤其是5.9吋火力造成了重大損失，一發砲彈落在兩門60磅砲之間。這兩門大砲一週前被移交給昂船洲公司，用於沿著大埔路進行縱射射擊。過去36個小時裡，它們一直非常成功地進行著縱射射擊。白天，觀察到大量向海面移動的船隻——日本魚雷艇、掃雷艇和一艘驅逐艦。後來，又觀察到三艘驅逐艦和一艘巡洋艦。「Cicala」號皇家海軍「Cicala」號在過去三天裡一直在青山公路上掩護兩艘皇家蘇格蘭號的左翼，並於當天（12月10日）在Brothers Point發現了一支正在清理爆破物的日本工作隊。他們用6吋火砲開火，並直接命中目標。日軍的幾次空襲都被擊退，但最終該艦被直接命中，不得不停泊維修。17:42，東方電報公司發出的最後一條電報香港與外界的聯繫因敵軍行動而中斷。英國立即下達命令，要求皇家工兵先在島嶼南岸的海灘等地佈設殺傷人員雷區，其中「A級」小組負責佈設。

24. 12月10日至11日 - 對香港本土和島嶼的砲擊持續了一整夜，黎明前寶雲路醫院遭到四次砲擊。當天第一次空襲發生在8時。

25. 12月11日黎明，敵軍發射迫擊砲，隨後襲擊了皇家蘇格蘭步兵團2營的左翼，將其擊退，並暴露了青山路和大埔公路的交匯處，嚴重危及了所有駐紮在大埔公路的部隊（旁遮普第14團2營、拉吉普第7團5營1個連、4.5吋榴彈砲連和3.7吋榴彈砲連）的撤退。情況危急，但溫尼伯擲彈兵團一連和來自啟德機場防禦工事的布倫式運輸機已調至掩護缺口的位置。12月11日中午，我下令在夜幕掩護下從大陸撤退——除了根據“佔領魔鬼山半島防禦計劃”調遣的第7拉其普特團第五團。撤退需要第14旁遮普團第二團進行一次艱難的行動——夜間沿著山口（九龍坳、沙田坳、割草坳）穿過整個前線，並沿著山口向魔鬼峰半島推進——這是事先沒有進行過演練的行動。旅部、兩支皇家蘇格蘭團和各行政支隊將從九龍半島東側的登船點過境。半島西側空置4處，用於疏散平民、倉庫內的民用食品儲備等。我所能發出的通知很遺憾，但由於局勢惡化迅速，不得不發出通知。儘管通知時間很短，皇家信號部隊的人員還是成功疏散了49英里長的D8電纜和20噸埋地電纜。

Part III-B

26. At 1000 hours nth December the enemy was reported to be landing on Lamma Island, and guns of Aberdeen and Jubilee Batteries were brought into action. This was followed at 1300 hours by a report that an enemy party in Chinese sampans was attempting a landing at Aberdeen Island. This was driven off by machine gun fire. Again during the afternoon the Japanese were reported to be concentrating about one hundred junks off Lamma, which our artillery engaged.

27. Stonecutters Island.—Enemy bombardment of Stonecutters continued throughout the day, West Fort having forty direct hits before midday. Much material damage generally was caused, chiefly to buildings. Telephone communications were continually cut. In the afternoon, to conform to the withdrawal from the mainland, I ordered the withdrawal from this island and the destruction of 'guns and all immovable stores, according to a detailed plan previously prepared. This was successfully carried out.

28. During the day 11th December fifth column activities developed in Kowloon. Some of the fifth columnists were armed, 5 and rioting and looting occurred in the streets. A large number of launch crews and lorry and car drivers deserted, throwing a heavy handicap on the shoulders of the administrative services—civil, naval and military—particularly on view of the large and hurried evacuation for that evening and night. Throughout the day nth December Hong Kong was subjected to bombing and spasmodic artillery fire. The R.N. Dockyard, R.A.S.C. Camber and the R.A.O.C. Depot all suffered some damage, though casualties were few. The civilian population in Hong Kong remained calm, though naturally the news of early evacuation of the mainland came as a considerable shock.

29. Withdrawal of troops from the mainland (11th/12th December).—(a) Careful plans had been drawn up 'by Brigadier Mainland Infantry Brigade, and all troops were 'employed on successive positions. The operation was well carried out. However, HQ details of 2/14 Punjab Regt. and some others came down on to Kai Tak aerodrome by mistake in the darkness and became involved in street fighting in the outskirts of Kowloon City. A launch was, sent over at about 0100 hours but could not gain contact with them. The bulk of the Company, however, were taken off at Star Ferry pier at dawn, breaking off a running fight with the enemy as they actually cast off from the pier side. (b) Battalion HQ of the 2/114 Punjab Regt. and two Companies had been unable to maintain the timed programme during the night owing to enemy action, and at dawn they were withdrawing down the West side of Devils Peak Peninsula. They stayed that day dispersed in the foothills at the southern end, whilst two companies of 5/7 Rajput Regt. held the Ma Lau Tong line as planned, with one company on the rear position Hai Wan. (c) The personnel of both Indian battalions were in good heart but somewhat exhausted after four days of continuous day and night vigilance and long night carries, over rough tracks and coolie paths, of many machine guns, light automatics and mortars. Owing to the simultaneous withdrawals of all three battalions, the 5/7 Rajput Regiment's transport had not been augmented by mules from the other battalions as planned, and this emphasised the shortage of mule transport which had always been apparent on peace exercises. It will be realised that units were on an improvised scale of trucks, lorries, and mules, as pooling of the inadequate "Colonial" establishments had been found to be necessary. The transport situation had become much worse with the arrival of the two Canadian battalions, for their transport had -been shipped in a different vessel, diverted via. Australia, and had not arrived before war with Japan broke out.

第三部分-B

26. 12月26日上午10點，敵軍據報登陸南丫島，香港仔砲台和銀禧砲台的火炮投入戰鬥。隨後下午1點，又有報告稱，一隊敵軍乘坐中國舢板試圖登陸香港仔島。敵軍被機槍火力擊退。下午，又有報告稱，日軍在南丫島附近集結了大約一百艘帆船，我方砲兵予以砲擊。

27. 昂船洲島 - 敵軍對昂船洲島的砲擊持續了一整天，西砲台在中午前已被直接擊中40次。砲擊造成了巨大的物質損失，主要是建築物。電話通訊不斷中斷。下午，為了配合撤離大陸的行動，我下令撤離該島，並按照事先制定的詳細計劃銷毀所有槍支和不可移動的物資。這項計劃成功實施。

28. 12月11日白天，第五縱隊在九龍展開活動。一些第五縱隊成員攜帶武器，街頭發生騷亂和搶劫。大量汽艇船員、卡車和汽車司機棄船逃竄，給行政部門（包括民政、海軍和軍隊）帶來沉重的負擔，尤其是在當晚大規模緊急撤離的情況下。12月11日全天，香港遭受轟炸和間歇性砲火攻擊。皇家海軍船塢、皇家空軍司令部坎伯基地和皇家空軍司令部倉庫都遭受一定程度的破壞，但傷亡人數不多。香港平民保持平靜，但提前撤離大陸的消息自然令人震驚。

29. 從大陸撤軍（12月11/12日）。(a) 大陸步兵旅準將制定了周密的計劃，所有部隊都部署在連續的陣地上。行動進行得很順利。然而，2/14旁遮普團的指揮部和其他一些部隊在黑暗中誤入啟德機場，並在九龍城郊區捲入了巷戰。一艘汽艇於約0時派出，但未能與他們取得聯繫。然而，該連的主力在黎明時分從天星碼頭出發，結束了與敵軍的持續戰鬥，因為敵軍實際上是從碼頭邊解圍的。(b) 2/114旁遮普團的營指揮部。由於敵軍的行動，兩個連隊在夜間無法按計畫完成任務，黎明時分，他們撤退至魔鬼峰半島西側。當天，他們分散在南端的山麓地帶，而第5/7拉傑普特團的兩個連隊則按計劃堅守馬勞通防線，一個連隊駐守海灣後方陣地。(c) 經過四天不間斷的晝夜警戒和夜間在崎嶇不平的道路和苦力小路上搬運大量機槍、輕型自動步槍和迫擊砲後，兩個印度營的人員情緒高漲，但略顯疲憊。由於三個營同時撤離，第5/7拉傑普特團的運輸工具未能按計劃得到其他營的騾子增援，這加劇了和平演習中騾子運輸的短缺問題。值得注意的是，由於發現有必要整合不完善的「殖民地」設施，部隊的規模是由卡車、貨車和騾子組成的臨時部隊。隨著兩個加拿大營的到來，運輸狀況變得更加糟糕，因為他們的運輸工具是通過另一艘船轉運，途經澳大利亞，並且在與日本的戰爭爆發前尚未抵達。

(d) At midnight 11/12th December the Hong Kong Telephone Company cut all communications between the island and the mainland.

(e) One troop of 3-7-in. Howitzers remained at the southern end of Devils Peak in support of the Ma Lau Tong position. Mainland Infantry Brigade HQ also remained on the Peninsula pending further developments.⁶ Most of the Bren carriers and all the armored cars were safely evacuated from the mainland.

(f) At 0600 hours 12th December military cables to Kowloon were cut at the R.N. Yard cable hut.

(g) At dawn 2 Royal Scots temporarily took over the North East sector of the island defenses, this being largely a precautionary measure only, as the occupation of the Devils Peak Peninsula by the 5/7 Rajput Regt. covered this sector effectively. This North East sector had previously been manned in skeleton form by some HQ personnel of 1 Middlesex Regt. plus a platoon of No. 3 Company HKVDC. In the North West sector was "Z" Company 1 Middlesex Regt., consisting of spare men of machine gun companies plus battalion cooks, store men, bandsmen, etc., manning forty machine guns from Fortress reserve stocks. This Company constituted a valuable fighting force enabling inter alia the 1 Middlesex Regt. to man the pill boxes on the entire perimeter of the island from 11th to 13th December.

30. Air raids and shelling of the island continued throughout the day 12th December. The North shore Dockyard was badly damaged and also the R.A.O.C. Depot, which was hit on five occasions. Aberdeen and Green Island cables were both cut. By now many coast defense guns, especially 6-in., were being used for landward firing, calculations to hit one hundred points having been worked out in peace time. Harassing fire by night, and counter battery fire and the engagement of observed targets by day, was carried out. The allowance of 25 rounds per gun for such landward firing was greatly exceeded. High explosive Mk XIII shell of 1918 manufacture was faulty, several bursting immediately in front of the muzzle.

31. A.A.—There were insufficient guns to give adequate gun density at any point. More 3-7-in. guns were expected shortly and also more Bofors (the garrison had but two), for "release telegrams" had been received from HQ Far East. The A.A. defenses were well known to be inadequate, but I realized that the call for the European and Mediterranean theatres of war had prevented reinforcements. Targets were numerous (12th December) but the A.A. positions extremely few owing to the mountainous nature of the country of Hong Kong Island. The enemy, with such good observation from Kowloon, was very quick on to any A.A. section opening up, and I consider that Lt. Colonel F. D. Field fought his command very well. The scarcity both of transport and roads severely handicapped the mobility of the guns and also the ammunition supply and administration of the sections. The shortage of British officers was very much felt. During the night one of the A.A. searchlights on Green Island acted as a sentry beam on receipt of a report that the enemy were landing near West Point. At this juncture Wing Commander H. G. Sullivan, the Officer Commanding R.A.F., offered the services of one officer and 16 N.C.Os. for wireless and telephone duties, which I gladly accepted. They were incorporated with Royal Signals. The morale of the civilian population had been considerably shaken, and fifth columnists became more active. Rice distribution and the monetary situation caused anxiety and necessitated urgent measures.

(d) 12月11/12日午夜，香港電話公司切斷了島嶼與大陸之間的所有通訊。(e) 一支3-7吋榴彈砲連留在魔鬼山南端支援馬游塘陣地。大陸步兵旅總部也留在半島等待進一步發展。(f) 12月12日06:00，通往九龍的軍用電纜在皇家海軍船廠的電纜棚被切斷。(g) 黎明時分，2支皇家蘇格蘭人暫時接管了島嶼防禦的東北部，這在很大程度上只是一項預防措施，因為第5/7拉傑普特團佔領了魔鬼山半島，有效地掩護了這一區域。這個東北部先前由米德爾塞克斯第1團的一些總部人員以骨幹形式駐守。加上HKVDC第3連的一個排。西北地區是米德爾塞克斯團1「Z」連，由機槍連的備用人員加上營廚、倉庫管理員、樂隊成員等組成，操作來自要塞後備庫存的40挺機槍。該連構成了一支寶貴的戰鬥力量，使米德爾塞克斯團1從12月11日至13日能夠守衛島嶼週邊的碉堡。

30. 12月12日全天，對該島的空襲和砲擊持續。北岸船塢嚴重受損，皇家海軍作戰司令部倉庫也遭到五次攻擊。香港仔和青島的電纜都被切斷。此時，許多岸防砲，尤其是6吋砲，正被用於向陸地射擊，在平時時期，他們已經計算出可以命中100個目標。夜間騷擾射擊，白天砲火反擊和對觀察目標的攻擊均已實施。這種向陸地射擊每門火砲25發子彈的配額大大超出了規定。1918年製造的高爆彈Mk XIII有缺陷，幾發在砲口正前方爆炸。

31. 防空砲 - 火砲數量不足，無法在任何地點達到足夠的火力密度。預計很快就會有更多3-7英寸火砲和更多博福斯（駐軍只有兩門），因為遠東總部已經收到了「釋放電報」。防空砲的防禦能力眾所周知不足，但我意識到，由於調往歐洲和地中海戰場，增援部隊無法及時趕到。目標眾多（12月12日），但由於香港島地處山區，防空陣地極為稀少。敵人在九龍擁有良好的觀察力，能夠迅速發現任何防空砲。該區域正在開放，我認為F. D. Field中校的指揮非常出色。交通和道路的匱乏嚴重阻礙了火砲的機動性，也影響了各區域的彈藥供應和管理。英國軍官的短缺尤為明顯。夜間，綠島上的一盞防空探照燈在收到敵軍在西點附近登陸的報告後，充當了哨兵光源。此時，皇家空軍司令H. G. Sullivan中校提出派一名軍官和16名海軍軍官負責無線電和電話工作，我欣然接受了。他們被編入皇家信號部隊。平民的士氣受到了極大的動搖，第五縱隊變得更加活躍。食米的分配和貨幣狀況引發了人們的焦慮，迫使人們採取緊急措施。

32. During the afternoon 12th December the enemy was reported to be occupying George Island (off Lamma) and there was considerable activity seawards.

33. In the late afternoon a strong enemy attack (about one battalion) developed against the left company of 5/7 Rajput Regt. on the Ma Lau Tong line but was successfully beaten off, assisted by quick support provided by the Royal Artillery. Heavy casualties on the enemy were observed. The 5/7 Rajput Regt. was subjected to dive 'bombing and heavy mortar fire throughout the day. In view of the weight of the Japanese attack, the rapid development of their heavy mortar fire, the constricted passage across the Lyemun Strait, the shortage of launch crews, and as we now had no footing on the mainland except at Devils Peak Peninsula, I gave orders to Commander Mainland Infantry Brigade that the Ma Lau Tong line should be evacuated during the night.

The first task was to be the evacuation of HQ and two companies of 2/14 Punjab Regt. which had been previously arranged. This was to be followed by the withdrawal of the 3-7-in. Howitzer troop R.A. The second and the shorter of the Devils Peak Lines (Hai Wan) was to be held by HQ 5/7 Rajput Regt. and two companies, the remainder of that battalion being evacuated last. The first withdrawal was timed for 1930 hours.

34. Shell fire died down at dusk (12th December) but the water transport difficulties were serious. Chinese crews deserted in the darkness from the W.D. fleet, though covered by rifles, engineers were deficient, and some launches were found to be in a sinking condition. Administrative officers had been sent out from my HQ to accelerate matters and took personal charge and operated what boats they could, but serious delays occurred. It was not until 0130 hours that the 2/114 Punjab Regt., some 300 men, were all across. At 0400 hours the bulk of the first troop R.A. (less mules) and one company of 5/7 Rajput Regt. were across, tout the Mule Corps was still to come. It was clear that the situation was critical if daylight crossings were to be avoided and I called on the Royal Navy to assist. Their response was prompt. Three motor torpedo boats were dispatched from Aberdeen and one more was recalled from patrol in Junk Bay where it had been covering the right flank of the 5/7 Rajput Regt. from possible enemy attack in sampans from Hang Hau area (an operation which had been attempted by night during peace training and found feasible). The destroyer HM S " Thracian " was also ordered round from" Aberdeen but could not be expected to arrive before 0600 hours, 13th December.

I ordered Brigadier Wallis to give full priority to personnel, and that there was to be no question of evacuating the 120 mules and further risking the operation. In any case the mule lighter crew had deserted, and the handling of this craft in the dark by personnel unaccustomed to it was a dubious proposition, and % moreover she was badly holed by enemy fire and had to be abandoned in a sinking condition. Meanwhile the W.D.V. " Victoria " had been slowly and steadily evacuating personnel and equipment under Major A. J. Dewar and Captain C. .G. Turner. When the torpedo boats arrived at the 'small pier on the Devils Peak Peninsula it was found that the state of the tide did not permit them to " lie close to " — a risk that had been foreseen and accepted. This meant more delay and ferrying by sampans. Ferry trips were, however, made by the torpedo boats directly H.M.S. " Thracian " arrived, the tide having risen slightly.

32. 12月12日下午，據報敵軍已佔領喬治島（南丫島外／編者按:George Island待考），且海上活動活躍。

33. 傍晚時分，日軍（約一個營）對馬游塘防線第5/7拉吉普團左翼連隊發動猛烈進攻，但在皇家砲兵的快速支援下，該團被成功擊退。敵軍傷亡慘重。第5/7拉傑普特團全天遭受俯衝轟炸和猛烈迫擊砲火力攻擊。鑑於日軍攻勢猛烈，迫擊砲火發展迅速，渡過鯉門海峽通道受阻，發射人員短缺，且我方除魔鬼峰半島外已無立足之地，故我命令大陸步兵旅指揮官連夜撤離馬樓塘防線。

第一項任務是依照事先安排撤離指揮部和2/14旁遮普的兩個連。隨後，皇家陸軍3-7吋榴彈砲連也撤離。魔鬼山防線（海灣）的第二條也是較短的防線由5/7拉吉普團指揮部和兩個連堅守，該營的其餘人員最後撤離。第一次撤離計劃於19:30進行。

34. 砲火在黃昏（12月12日）停止，但水運困難仍嚴重。儘管有步槍掩護，但中國船員在黑暗中從西印度群島艦隊開小差，工兵不足，一些汽艇被發現處於沉沒狀態。我的指揮部已派出行政官員加速推進，他們親自負責並操作他們所能操作的船隻，但還是發生了嚴重的延誤。直到凌晨1點30分，約300人的旁遮普第114團2營才全部渡河。凌晨4點，皇家陸軍第一批部隊（不包括騾子）的大部分和拉傑普特第7團5營的一個連都渡河了，不過騾子還在後面。顯然，如果要避免在白天渡河，情況就十分危急，於是我們請求皇家海軍支援。他們的反應非常迅速。三艘魚雷艇從香港仔出發，另一艘從江灣巡邏隊調回，該艇一直在掩護拉吉普第7團5營的右翼，以防敵人從坑口地區用舢板發動襲擊（該行動曾在和平訓練期間在夜間嘗試過，結果證明是可行的）。驅逐艦「色雷斯人號」也奉命從阿伯丁返回，但預計無法在12月13日06:00之前抵達。

我命令華里士准將人員撤離放在第一位，絕不考慮撤離120頭騾子，以免進一步冒險。無論如何，騾子駁船的船員已經開小差，讓不熟悉情況的人員在黑暗中駕駛這艘船是件很不明智的事，而且它已被敵方砲火嚴重擊穿，不得不在即將下沉的情況下棄船。同時，英國海軍「維多利亞號」在A. J. 杜瓦少校和C. G. 特納上校的指揮下，緩慢而穩定地撤離人員和設備。當魚雷艇抵達魔鬼山半島的「小碼頭」時，發現潮水情況不允許它們「靠近」——這是他們已經預見並接受的風險。這意味著更多的延誤和舢板渡船。不過，魚雷艇直接在皇家海軍「維多利亞號」上進行了渡輪。「色雷斯人號」抵達，潮水略為上升。

35. At about 0400 hours 13th December I discussed with Bngadier Wallis the advisability of also including in the withdrawal the two companies of 5/7 Rajput Regt. holding the rear position. The enemy were in constant though light contact throughout, and after their severe handling would be temporarily disinclined to follow up. The water transport situation had already become more than precarious, it was extremely doubtful if any W.D. vessel, except perhaps the " Victoria " would be available next night, and I thus foresaw the greatest difficulties and even the impossibility of maintaining the 5/7 Rajput Regt. with ammunition and supplies in their isolated position. I decided that the risk was too great, and I also urgently required them to relieve and man the North East sector then 'held by 2 Royal Scots. This latter battalion was not in good shape, as they had lost many of their best officers killed or wounded, and I judged it to be necessary to withdraw them into reserve so that they could obtain a short respite in which to rest and re-equip. In addition they were unfamiliar with the ground, their previous sector having been the South West. One company of 5/7 Rajput Regt. was therefore ordered to cover the withdrawal of the remainder and then themselves embark in the last flights. Daylight had arrived by then, but they accomplished the evacuation without casualties, covered by artillery fire from various island positions.

36. It was not until 0920 hours that the last contingent of 5/7 Rajput Regt. from the mainland readied Aberdeen. The whole battalion was collected in the Tytam Gap area by noon and given twenty-four hours to rest and equip before taking over the North East sector from 2 Royal Scots The 2/14 Punjab Regt. took over the North West sector. During the night (12/13th December), at the urgent request of the civil authorities, arrangements were made with the Harbour 'Master to pass 9 tons of dynamite from Green Island to the Star Ferry for collection and distribution. On its return, loaded, it left Green Island two hours ahead of schedule, with the result that it reached the Vehicular Ferry (not Star Ferry) unexpectedly, and the N.C.O. commanding the pill box there gave the order to fire, as no lights or distinguishing marks were visible. The launch blew up and all on board thus unfortunately lost their lives.

37. At 0900 hours 13th December a launch bearing a flag of truce was seen to put off from Kowloon. It arrived at Victoria Pier with a Staff Officer of the General commanding the Japanese Forces (Lt.-General Sakai) bearing a letter addressed to H.E. The Governor. The letter demanded the surrender of the Colony and threatened severe artillery fire and aerial bombardment in the event of refusal. The demand was tantamount to unconditional surrender and was rejected categorically.

38. During the morning the Japanese were observed to be collecting launches in Kowloon Bay and concentrating them mainly at Bailey's Shipyard near the cement-works. The situation as I saw it was that the enemy, if he attacked from the mainland, might direct his attack on to:

35. 12月13日凌晨4點左右，我與華里士準將討論了是否應該將駐守後方陣地的拉吉普團第5/7團的兩個連也納入撤退。敵軍始終保持持續的輕度接觸，在遭受重創後，敵軍暫時不願跟進。水上運輸情況已變得岌岌可危，除了「維多利亞號」之外，西印度海軍的任何船隻能否在明晚投入使用都極為可疑。因此，我預見到，在孤立無援的情況下，維持拉吉普團第5/7團的彈藥和補給將面臨巨大的困難，甚至是不可能的。我認為風險太大，並緊急要求他們增援並調配當時由兩支皇家蘇格蘭人守衛的東北地區。後者的營狀態不佳，許多優秀軍官陣亡或負傷，我認為有必要將他們撤回預備隊，以便他們獲得短暫的喘息機會，休整併重新裝備。此外，他們之前駐紮的防區是西南地區，因此對地形不熟悉。因此，第5/7拉吉普團的一個連奉命掩護剩餘部隊撤離，然後自己搭乘最後的飛行。當時天已經亮了，但他們在來自島嶼各個陣地的砲火掩護下完成了撤離，沒有人員傷亡。

36. 直到9點20分，第5/7拉吉普團的最後一支來自大陸的部隊才抵達阿伯丁準備就緒。全營於中午前在泰塔姆峽谷地區集結，並給予24小時休息和重新裝備的時間，之後從皇家蘇格蘭第2團（旁遮普第2/14團）手中接管東北防區。接管西北區。12月12/13日夜間，應民政部門的緊急請求，與港務長安排將9噸炸藥從青洲運往天星小輪收集和分發。返航時，這艘裝滿炸藥的船隻比預定時間提前了兩個小時離開青洲，結果意外抵達了汽車渡輪（而非天星小輪）。由於沒有看到任何燈光或識別標誌，負責指揮第一礮堡的士官下令開火。汽艇爆炸，船上所有人員不幸罹難。

37. 12月13日上午9點，一艘懸掛停戰旗的汽艇從九龍啟航。它抵達維多利亞碼頭，船上載著日軍指揮官坂井中將的一名參謀，並攜帶一封給總督閣下的信。信中要求殖民地投降，並威脅稱，如果拒絕投降，將遭到猛烈炮火和空襲。這項要求相當於無條件投降，因此遭到斷然拒絕。

38. 上午，據觀察，日軍正在九龍灣收集汽艇，主要集中在水泥廠附近的貝利船廠。據我觀察，情況是，如果敵人從大陸進攻，可能會將攻擊目標指向：

- (a) Lyemun-Quarry Point area ~From Kowloon Peninsula
- (b) Northpoint Bowrington area
- (c) Victoria
- (d) Kennedy Town (b) or (c) seemed most probable in view of the short distance across, the easy support by artillery and mortars and the possible combination with Wang Ching Wei factions and others in, the congested area of the town. The number of derelict craft in the area of (a) lessened the likelihood of attack there. Any attack from the mainland might well be in combination with an attack on the South shore. My available reserves were:

(i) 2 Royal Scots, after relief and move from North East sector to the Wanchai Gap Filter Beds area, but temporarily unfit until they could be thoroughly rested and reorganized.

(ii) Two companies 5/7 Rajput Regt. North East sector.

(iii) One company Winnipeg Grenadiers in South West sector.

(iv) Two companies 2/14 Punjab Regt. in North West sector.

(v) " Z " Coy. 1 Middlesex Regt. including one mobile machine gun platoon.

39. A.A.—In the early afternoon 13th December our A.A. guns brought down a large seaplane which crashed into the sea about 3000 yards West of Lamma (confirmed later by the Japanese).

40 During the day the enemy artillery fire increased in intensity (up to 9-in. caliber), one 9-2-in. gun at Mount Davis was knocked out by a direct hit, and at dusk Belchers Fort was heavily shelled and set on fire. Other serious fires were started at West Point and Kennedy Town. Fifth columnists⁷ had been active during the day and a large number of army transport drivers deserted, some of them taking their lorries with them. Police dealt with these in due course. The civilian population showed signs of strain, and food queues in some districts became disorderly. The question of rice distribution presented a grave problem in the overcrowded quarters.

41. At 0200 hours 14th December great anxiety was caused by the speed of the fires at Belchers and Kennedy Town. The civil fire brigades had been fighting the fires for many hours and asked for military assistance. At various times three parties were accordingly sent but on each occasion were returned without any work having been performed on demolitions (a detailed series of " fire lanes " had been worked out and calculations completed before the war broke out). On the fourth occasion, however, some houses were blown down. Fires were under control by midday. Elements of the civil population made these disasters an occasion for disorderly conduct; fifth columnists became more active and great care was necessary in checking telephone calls. The civil police found difficulty in maintaining guards over vulnerable points, and negotiated with the Chungking Government secret societies for assistance.

42. Certain movements of enemy warships were observed during the day (14th December), steaming on far distant courses.

(a) 鯉魚門-石礦場地區 ~ 從九龍半島出發

(b) 北角-寶靈頓地區

(c) 維多利亞

(d) 堅尼地城

(b)或(c)方案似乎最有可能，因為距離較近，火炮和迫擊砲的支援容易，而且可能與汪精衛派系及其他勢力在城內擁擠的地區聯合作戰。(a)地區廢棄船隻的數量降低了該地區遭到攻擊的可能性。來自大陸的任何襲擊都可能與對南岸的襲擊同時發生。我可用的預備隊如下：

(i) 兩輛皇家蘇格蘭步兵營，在接替後從東北區調至灣仔峽低地區，但暫時無法作戰，直到它們得到充分休整和重組。

(ii) 拉古普團第5/7團的兩個連，東北區。

(iii) 西南戰區溫尼伯擲彈兵團一個連。

(iv) 北雷斯特戰區旁遮普團第14團2連的兩個連。

(v) 米杜息士團1「Z」連，包括一個機動機槍排。

39. 高射砲 - 12月13日午後，我方高射砲擊落了一架大型水上飛機，飛機墜毀在南丫島以西約3000碼的海面上（日軍後來證實了這一點）

40. 白天，敵方砲火強度增強（達到6吋口徑），摩星嶺的一門9.2吋火炮被直接擊中，黃昏時分，貝爾徹斯堡遭到猛烈砲擊並起火。西點軍校和堅尼地城也發生了其他嚴重的火災。第五縱隊7在白天一直活躍，大量陸軍運輸司機開小差，其中一些帶著卡車逃走了。警方及時處理了這些情況。平民表現出緊張的跡象，一些地區的領糧隊伍變得混亂。在擁擠不堪的街區，食米的分配問題成了一個嚴重的問題。

41. 12月14日凌晨2點，卑路乍街和堅尼地城的火勢蔓延迅速，引起了人們的極大擔憂。民防消防隊已經撲滅了數小時的大火，並請求軍方援助。軍方曾多次派出三支消防隊，但每次都未進行任何拆除工作就返回（在戰爭爆發前，一系列詳細的「消防通道」已經制定完成，計算也已完成）。然而，在第四次派出時，一些房屋被吹倒了。中午時分，火勢得到了控制。一些平民利用這些災難製造了擾亂治安的事件；第五縱隊變得更加活躍，檢查電話通話也變得格外小心。警方發現難以對薄弱環節進行守衛，於是與重慶政府的秘密社團談判尋求援助。

42. 12月14日白天，觀察到敵艦在遠處航行時的某些動靜。

43.

(a) There was a marked increase in the intensity and accuracy of hostile shelling on the 14th December. Two 4.7-m. guns at Belchers had been hit and put out of action, and one 9.2 in. at Mount Davis had its communications cut for two hours. Also at Mount Davis, one 3-in. A.A. gun was hit and permanently disabled, causing about 30 per cent, casualties to the A.A. personnel. Many Chinese gunners deserted as a result.

(b) Pak Sha Wan Battery (Chinese volunteers) came in for particular attention, being both shelled and mortared. Its Battery Command Post and all internal communications were destroyed and the Battery Commander was wounded and evacuated. The guns were reduced to independent auto sight control. At this juncture owing to an imperfectly conveyed message and an error of judgement of the junior officer left in acting command, the personnel were given the option of going to Stanley. All but two Chinese left; seventeen British and Portuguese stayed. A few regular British gunners were later sent up as reinforcements.

(c) A very heavy concentration on Magazine Gap cut eight main cables involving 195 circuits, severing communications between Fortress Headquarters and all terminals to the South of that Gap. Within 20 hours the Royal Corps of Signals, working magnificently, restored all lines

44. Civil Population —The civil police found their hands more than full in maintaining order in the city but had the situation generally under control except in the A.R.P. tunnels, where in certain cases armed gangs of robbers were operating. Pamphlets were dropped by the Japanese

45. H.M.S. "Thracian" carried out an excellent operation during the night (15/16th December) making her way past Green Island, across the Japanese front on the Kowloon Peninsula, and then sinking two ferry boats at anchor full of enemy troops one thousand yards East of the Electric Power Station, Kowloon.

46. By now the new organization of the island defenses had been carried out viz.: division into two brigade areas—East Infantry Brigade (Brigadier Wallis) and West Infantry Brigade (Brigadier J. K. Lawson). The North-South dividing line approximated closely to the former dividing line between the easterly and westerly island sectors. At the northern extremity, however, it was placed further East to increase the front held by the 2/14 Punjab Regt. now considered a safer sector owing to the "anti-boat fence" or boom which was in position from Sheung Wan to Green Island. The continuation towards Kellett Island had been prevented by the desertion of Chinese crews and there had been no opportunity of carrying the complete scheme through, i.e., a third portion constructed across to Kowloon Point. 1 Middlesex Regt. was given a small but important sector based on Leighton Hill Ridge Causeway Bay area. No preparations, however had been possible on the Ridge before hostilities, except a little wiring and three shell-slits, as the property was Government owned and housed many Government officials who could not be dispossessed or inconvenienced before the "precautionary period" of the Defiance Scheme (which actually was never declared owing to the rapid development of full war conditions). 1 Middlesex Regt. came directly under command of Fortress as "Corps, Troops" for defense purposes. This eased the situation for Brigadier Wallis, who had the larger half of the island to command, and for Brigadier Lawson who was unfamiliar with the ground. During the night 14/15th December the 5/7 Rajput Regt. relieved the 2 Royal Scots in the North East sector. The latter moved later to the area Wanchad Gap-Filter Beds to refit and re-organise, but one company took over a narrow front just West of the naval hospital.

43.

(a) 12月14日，敵軍砲擊的強度和精準度顯著增強。寶翠園的兩門4.7米火砲被擊中並失去作用，摩星嶺的一門9.2英寸火砲通訊中斷了兩個小時。同樣在摩星嶺，一門3吋高射砲被擊中永久失效，造成約30%的高射砲人員傷亡。許多中國砲手因此開小差。

(b) 白沙灣砲台（中國志願軍）受到了特別關注，遭到砲擊和迫擊砲襲擊。其砲台指揮所和所有內部通訊均被摧毀，砲台指揮官受傷並被疏散。火砲被迫依靠獨立的自動瞄準器控制。此時，由於訊息傳達不準確以及留下代理指揮的下級軍官判斷失誤，人員被允許前往赤柱。除兩名中國士兵外，其餘人員均已離開；17名英國和葡萄牙士兵留守。後來，一些英國正規砲兵被派往增援部隊。

(c) 重兵集中火力攻擊馬己仙峽道，切斷了8條主要電纜，共195條線路，切斷了要塞總部與該峽以南所有終端之間的通訊。皇家通信兵團在20小時內出色地恢復了所有線路。44. 平民－民警忙於維持城市秩序，但除了皇家警察隧道（A.R.P. tunnels）外，局勢總體上得到了控制，在某些情況下，那裡有武裝劫匪團夥活動。日軍空投了小冊子。

45. 「色雷斯人號」皇家海軍在夜間（12月15/16日）執行了一次出色的任務，它駛過綠島，越過九龍半島的日軍前線，隨後在九龍發電廠以東一千碼處擊沉了兩艘停泊在岸邊、滿載敵軍的渡輪。

46. 至此，島嶼防禦的新編組已實施，即劃分為兩個旅區－東步兵旅（華里士準將）和西步兵旅（J.K.羅遜準將）。南北分界線與先前東西島區之間的分界線非常接近。然而，在最北端，分界線被進一步向東延伸，以加強由第十四旁遮普團第二團把守的防線。由於上環至綠島的「防艇圍欄」或圍油欄，該防區現在被認為是一個更安全的防區。由於中國船員的逃亡，繼續向奇力島推進的計劃受阻，因此沒有機會完成整個計劃，即建造橫跨九龍角的第三部分。米杜息士第一團被分配了一個規模雖小但重要的防區，駐紮在銅鑼灣禮頓山嶺地區。然而，在戰爭爆發前，山脊上除了一些電線和三個砲眼外，沒有進行任何準備工作，因為該地產歸政府所有，許多政府官員被安置在那裡。這些官員在「防禦計劃」的「預防期」（由於全面戰爭形勢的迅速發展，該計劃實際上從未宣布）之前無法被驅逐或受到不便。米德爾塞克斯第一團作為「軍、部隊」直接受堡壘指揮，用於防禦目的。這減輕了華里士準將的處境，因為他要指揮島上的大部分地區，而羅遜準將則對地形不熟悉。12月14/15日夜間，拉傑普特第五/第七團接替了東北地區的皇家蘇格蘭第二團。後者後來轉移到灣仔峽進行整修和重組，但一個連隊接管了海軍醫院西側的一個狹窄前線。

47. During the early hours 15th December a broadcast from Kowloon could be heard of European songs and music; the talks, however, were not clear. They were probably from loud speakers on vans in the streets, as the radio transmitting station in Kowloon had been destroyed before evacuation. Several traitors, with lamps of primitive design operated from a dry battery, with a small but adequate mirror, were reported signaling from the island to the mainland. When these operators were intercepted they were shot.

48.

- (a) There was a systematic shelling of pill boxes along the North shore during the morning 15th December: three were knocked out and one badly damaged. One had forty holes drilled right through by a high velocity gun of small calibre located on Kowloon Peninsula, firing from a concealed position inside a water front " Godown." The provision of alternative emplacements for the pill boxes of the North shore defences had already been taken up and some ten to twelve were completed. They should of course have been completed in peace time but it would have meant requisitioning valuable " Godown " and office properties, and requisitioning had not been sanctioned by Government until the proposed " Precautionary Period."
- (b) By nightfall all military and civil telephone routes in the North East sector, including those to pill boxes Nos. 40 to 53 were severely interrupted. Night repair work was at once put in hand.
- (c) Aberdeen Island and the A.A. positions at Lyemun (Saiwan Hill) were heavily shelled, one gun being -put out of action temporarily.
- (d) At noon 15th December the -enemy was observed preparing sandbagged positions on the water front by the Kowloon Godowns, probably for mortars. Later, mortar fire fell in the vicinity of the R.N. Dockyard, Command H.Q., and Lower Peak Tramway Terminus.
- (e) By now a " Command Observation Post " with direct lines to Fortress H.Q. was operating well from the Peak, manned by HKVDC, and also two special observation posts (pill box 69 and Kennedy Rd.) manned by 2/14 Punjab Regt.
- (f) Enemy was observed collecting small craft in Kowloon Bay—possibly for a raid; special arrangements were made to counter this viz.: a .concentration was fired by 6-in. Howitzers and two craft were set alight. Orders were also issued from Fortress HQ to the A.A. searchlights at Sai-wan and Braemar to cease their normal role at any time if they heard continuous machine gun fire on the North shore and to turn their lights down to illuminate the harbor.

49.

At 2100 hours, 15th December, an attempted landing was reported by the Pak Sha Wan Battery (HKVDC). It was ascertained later from several sources that a very bold attempt was made by the enemy who, with small rubber boats and petrol tin rafts, for equipment, swam across in fair strength— estimates varied from one to three Companies. All were shot in the water, the depleted battery (see para. 43 (b) contributing about defense.

50.

- (a) For four hours on 15th December Pinewood A.A. Battery was shelled by calibres up to 9-in. One gun was smashed irreparably and the other so badly damaged that it was out of action for the remainder of the battle. All instruments were rendered useless. Casualties to personnel were not numerous and men not hit were employed on salvage, and in an infantry role with 2/14 Punjab Regiment. We claimed two hits on enemy aircraft during the day.
- (b) (b) The general impression of Japanese artillery fire was that their gunners were extremely accurate on targets which were obviously well known from our peace time dispositions and under direct observation, but inaccurate in picking up new targets needing predicted fire, in spite of abundant air reconnaissance. About 30 per cent, of the ammunition burst defectively and of the heavier natures at times 50 per cent, failed to explode.

47. 12月15日凌晨，九龍的廣播中可以聽到歐洲歌曲和音樂；然而，談話內容並不清晰。這些談話很可能是從街上貨車上的揚聲器傳出來的，因為九龍的無線電發射站在撤離前就被摧毀了。據報道，幾名叛徒拿著設計簡陋、用乾電池供電的電筒，以及一面雖小但夠用的鏡子，從島上向大陸發出信號。這些電筒被攔截後，被槍殺了。

48.

- (a) 12月15日上午，北岸沿線的確堡遭到系統性砲擊；三個碉堡被擊毀，一個碉堡嚴重受損。其中一個碉堡被位於九龍半島的一門小口徑高速砲從海濱「倉庫」內的隱蔽位置發射的砲彈擊穿了40個彈孔。北岸防禦碉堡的替代砲位建設工作已經啟動，已完成10至12個。這些砲位當然應該在和平時期完成，但這意味著需要徵用寶貴的「倉庫」和辦公大樓，而政府直到擬議的「預防期」才批准徵用。
- (b) 夜幕降臨，東北地區所有軍用和民用電話線路，包括通往40至53號碉堡的線路，都嚴重中斷。夜間搶修工作立即展開。
- (c) 香港仔島和鯉魚門（西灣山）的陣地遭到猛烈砲擊，一門火砲暫時無法使用。
- (d) 12月15日中午，敵軍在九龍貨倉旁的海濱用沙袋堆砌陣地，可能是為了準備迫擊砲。隨後，迫擊砲火落在皇家海軍船塢、指揮部總部和山頂纜車下站附近。
- (e) 此時，一個由香港防衛司令部駐守的、可從山頂直達要塞總部的「指揮部觀察哨」已正常運轉，此外還有兩個由旁遮普第十四團第二營駐守的特別觀察哨（69號碉堡和堅尼地路）。
- (f) 敵軍在九龍灣聚集小型船隻，可能是為了進行突襲；為應對這種情況，敵軍採取了特殊措施：集中使用6英寸榴彈砲進行砲擊，兩艘船隻被點燃。堡壘總部還下令西灣和寶馬的防空探照燈，一旦聽到北岸持續的機槍聲，立即停止正常工作，並將燈光調暗，以照亮港口。

49.

12月15日21:00，白沙灣砲台（HKVDC）報告有敵軍試圖登陸。後來，經過多方核實，敵軍進行了一次非常大膽的嘗試，他們使用小型橡皮艇和汽油筏作為裝備，以相當規模（估計人數從1到3個連不等）遊過。所有砲彈均在水中被擊中，耗盡火力的砲台（見第43段（b））對防禦有所貢獻。

50.

- (a) 12月15日，松林防空砲台遭到9吋口徑以下火砲的四小時砲擊。一門砲被徹底擊毀，另一門受損嚴重，在戰鬥的剩餘時間裡都無法使用。所有設備都無法使用。傷亡不多，未中彈的人員被派往救援，並被編入旁遮普第14團第2營的步兵部隊。我方聲稱當天擊中了兩架敵方。
- (b) 對日軍砲火的總體印像是，他們的砲手對那些顯然根據我方和平時期部署並直接觀察的目標極其準確，但在發現需要預測射擊的新目標時卻不夠準確，儘管空中偵察十分充分。約30%的彈藥發生缺陷爆炸，而較重的彈藥有時，自然界的爆炸強度只有50%，但卻未能成功。



上圖：香港保衛戰的歷史現場大潭水塘 圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室

51. During this day (15th December) the last of the " Priority A " anti-personnel minefields was completed by Fortress R.E. The morale of the civilian population, remained shaky, chiefly due to rice distribution difficulties. The Chungking Government representatives had been most helpful in assisting in the maintenance of order.

52. News was received from the Chinese General Staff of the advance of Chinese forces towards Hong Kong. This fitted in with the plans which I had previously received via Chungking of the proposed attack of General Yu Han Mou's 7th Army. However, the information now was modified by the statement that effective assistance could not be available until early January. Information of intended help from Chinese forces from the North was circulated to formations and units.

53. At daybreak 16th December observation revealed no enemy movements along the mainland waterfront between Kai Tak and the Kowloon Star Ferry, but launch activity in Kowloon Bay continued.

54. Bombing and shelling by the enemy were now showing a higher standard of accuracy and increasing in intensity, being confined mainly to military objectives. The first air raid occurred at 0900 hours and lasted thirty five minutes. In the afternoon, 16th December, seventeen enemy planes bombed Mount Davis, which was also heavily and accurately shelled: an unexploded 9-in. shell entered the Fortress Plotting Room and damaged the instruments. A bomb dropped in Shaukiwan caused 150 civilian casualties. Shek O, Lyemun and Aberdeen were also bombed; some casualties to Royal Navy personnel and damage being caused at the last named. By the end of the day more than half of the pill boxes along North shore from Lyemun to Bowrington had been knocked out. Moves to alternative positions were carried out during the night (sixteen were now prepared but were .not yet on the telephone system). The maintenance of communications to the North shore pill boxes, and on other subsidiary routes there, was proving extremely difficult on account of repeated breaks from hostile fire.

55. One enemy plane was seen at 0930 hours 16th December to crash into the sea (three sources confirmed) near Tatong, hit by the 3.7-in section at Wong Nei Chong. At 1030 hours a fighter-bomber was hit by the Brick Hill 3-7-in. gun and crashed in a gully (two sources corroborated).

56. Civilian morale improved somewhat. The arrest this day of a prominent Chinese merchant for defeatist talk was expected to have a salutary effect—which in fact it did. Fifth columnists were still active. Their methods consisted of shining lights to bring shell fire to bear on concentrations of transport, etc., sniping, spreading false rumours, inducing desertion from " essential services " and inciting to riot. They also again attacked the isolated A. A. searchlight position at Shaukiwan.

57. During the hours of darkness and early hours of 17th December mortar fire from Kowloon Peninsula continued on to the North shore pillboxes. A force of 14 Army light bombers made two separate attacks at about 0930 hours 17th December—the first on Shaukiwan and Wanchai, and the second on the Peak Wireless Station, Garden Road, and Central District in Victoria. These were followed by a short but relatively severe artillery and mortar bombardment on Central District. Shortly afterwards two Japanese launches flying a white flag crossed the harbour. The delegation 'brought written proposals for surrender, similar to those of 13th December. It "was thought that the Japanese supposed our morale to be shaken. The proposals were signed by Lt. General Sakai and the Naval C.-in-C Vice-Admiral Niimi. The envoys appeared genuinely surprised and disconcerted when the proposals were again summarily rejected. They left with the hint that future bombardments might not be so discriminate. This second delegation coming within four days of the first suggested that either (a) they disliked the prospect of attacking across the water or (b) that the Chinese threat in their rear was taking effect, or (c) that it was an attempt to undermine our morale by thoughts of peace and quiet. The Japanese delegation announced on arrival that there would be no hostilities until 1600 hours by which time they expected a reply. Advantage was taken of this very welcome lull to repair communications, etc.

第三部分-C

51. 12月15日，堡壘R.E.完成了最後一個「A級」殺傷人員雷區的佈設。平民士氣依然低迷，主要原因是糧食分配困難。重慶政府代表在維持秩序方面提供了極大的幫助。

52. 中國總參謀部傳來消息，中國軍隊正向香港推進。這與我之前透過重慶收到的余漢謀將軍第七軍團計畫進攻的計畫相符。然而，這則訊息被修改了，表示有效援助要到1月(1942年)初才能到位。有關中國軍隊將從北方提供援助的資訊已分發給各部隊。

53. 12月16日拂曉，觀察顯示啟德和九龍天星碼頭之間的大陸海濱沒有敵軍活動，但九龍灣的發射活動仍在繼續。

54. 敵方的轟炸和砲擊現在顯示出更高的精確度，強度也不斷增加，主要集中在軍事目標上。第一次空襲發生在上午9點，持續了35分鐘。12月16日下午，17架敵機轟炸了摩星嶺，摩星嶺也遭到了猛烈而精確的砲擊：一枚未爆炸的9英寸砲彈射入要塞測繪室，損壞了儀器。一枚投在筲箕灣的炸彈造成150名平民傷亡。石澳、鯉魚門和香港仔也遭到轟炸；皇家海軍傷亡，鯉魚門也遭受了破壞。當天結束時，北岸從鯉魚門到寶靈頓的碉堡有一半以上被摧毀。夜間，敵方轉移到了其他陣地（16個碉堡已準備就緒，但尚未連接電話系統）。由於敵方砲火頻頻中斷，維持與北岸碉堡及其他支線路線的通訊變得極為困難。

55. 12月16日9時30分，一架敵機被發現墜入附近海域（三位消息來源證實），是被黃泥涌3.7吋砲擊中。10時30分一架戰鬥轟炸機被南朗山3.7吋砲擊中，墜入溝壑（兩位消息來源證實）。

56. 平民士氣略有改善。當天，一位著名的中國商人因發表失敗主義言論被捕，人們原本預計這會產生積極的影響——事實也確實如此。第五縱隊仍然活躍。他們的手段包括：用燈光照射運輸車輛等集中地，進行砲擊；狙擊；散佈謠言；誘使人們逃離「重要服務」；以及煽動暴動。他們也再次襲擊了筲箕灣孤立的防空探照燈陣地。

57. 12月17日夜裡至凌晨，九龍半島的迫擊砲火持續轟擊北岸碉堡。12月17日上午9點30分左右，14架陸軍輕型轟炸機發動了兩次襲擊——第一次襲擊筲箕灣和灣仔，第二次襲擊山頂無線電台、花園道和維多利亞城中區。隨後中區遭到短暫但相對猛烈的砲火和迫擊砲轟炸。不久後，兩艘懸掛白旗的日本汽艇駛過港口。代表團帶來了與12月13日類似的投降書。「人們認為日本人認為我們的士氣動搖了。提案由酒井中將和海軍總司令新見中將簽署。當提案再次被斷然拒絕時，使節們顯得真的感到驚訝和不安。他們離開時暗示，未來的砲擊可能不會如此有針對性。第二個代表團在第一個代表團抵達後的四天內到來，暗示是（a）他們不喜歡隔海進攻的前景，或許（b）他們後方的中國威脅正在生效，或許（c）這是試圖用和平與安寧的想法來破壞我們的士氣。日本代表團抵達後宣布，在16:00之前不會發生敵對行動，他們預計屆時會收到答覆。他們利用這段令人欣喜的間歇來修復通訊等。

Considerable activity seawards was reported during the afternoon of the 17th December, including a 2,000 ton freighter operating in the shelter, westward of Lamma. On the mainland there was activity round Kai Tak aerodrome, tooth launch and motor transport and at Bailey's yard the following were seen—three ferry vessels, three barges, one large water boat, one steam tug, one motor boat. During the 17th December our artillery suffered no damage or casualties for the first time for many days. Our counter battery fire silenced hostile artillery on Devil's Peak, Gun Club Mill, and also three mortars on the Kowloon waterfront.

58. Aircraft identified to date were of the following types; Navy Reconnaissance Flying Boat, type 94—Heavy Navy Bomber, type 96—Army light Bomber, type 98—Army Fighter, type 97, unidentified fighter, now known to be the Navy O. Heaviest bomb dropped, identified, 250 lbs.—but from deduction (fuze caps, size of crater, etc.) it was considered that some of 500 lbs. were also dropped.

59. Morale of civilian population continued to improve and the rice distribution was getting better. 60. At 2100 hours 17th December hostile artillery fire started a severe fire at the large paint works at Braemar, causing a heavy smoke pall. Owing to its proximity the ammunition of the 18-pounder Beach Defense section nearby had to be moved to an alternative position, and at about midnight the guns themselves were forced to follow to the same position behind the Police station in that vicinity. The shelling of the North East sector was particularly heavy and lines were being constantly cut and repaired. At 2000 hours many pill boxes were still out of touch and field cable had to be substituted for the buried system that night. At about 0100 hours Aberdeen came under shell fire from seawards and the Industrial School (HQ of the Aberdeen portion of the R.N. Dockyard) was hit.

61. (a) At first light 18th December a Japanese destroyer was sighted sixteen miles South of Aberdeen. (b) A considerable movement of small craft between the Kowloon wharves and piers was observed. (c) In the early hours a 60-pounder gun which, had been brought up into the North Point under cover of darkness (Lt. J. S. Vintner commanding) attempted to sink three freighters in Kowloon Bay suspected of being used as observation posts or being prepared as "jumping off places" for an attack. Only shrapnel was available but by obtaining hits on the water line one 4000 ton ship was holed and settled down.

62. At 1000 hours an air raid of considerable intensity developed on the Central District Victoria. The Anglo-Persian Company's petrol and oil storage tank's at North Point were set on fire and subsequently shelled at intervals throughout the day. The attack seemed to be directed particularly against the Government Offices, where the Secretariat was hit, and many casualties were caused in the neighborhood. During the early afternoon Causeway Bay area was very heavily shelled, the water front from that place to Lyemun now becoming a tangle of fallen tram wires and standards and almost impassable for vehicles and dispatch riders. At noon 18th December the Braemar beach defense gun position (para. 60) was shelled, received several direct hits, and the two 18 pounders destroyed beyond repair. Further air raids occurred from 1500 hours onwards and the Saiwan artillery observation post was dive bombed and also shelled. Between 1700 and 1800 hours a party of about two hundred enemy was seen working; down from Haiwan to Devil's Peak pier and were engaged by our artillery. Just before and after dusk an extremely heavy bombardment by artillery and mortars on Lyemun Peninsula was earned out. At night fall it was reported that the North Point fixed beam (across to Kowloon Point) could not function owing to the intensity of the heat and the dense smoke arising from the burning Anglo-Persian Company's oil installations. This fire continued for days and was a severe handicap to observed fire.

12月17日下午，海上活動頻繁，包括一艘2000噸的貨輪在南丫島以西的避難所內作業。大陸地區，啟德機場、牙輪下水道和汽車運輸設施周圍活動頻繁。在貝利碼頭(Bailey's yard)，可看到以下船隻：三艘渡輪、三艘駁船、一艘大型水艇、一艘蒸氣拖船和一艘摩托艇。12月17日，我方砲兵部隊「多日來」首次未遭受任何損傷或人員傷亡。我方砲火反擊壓制了魔鬼山、槍械俱樂部磨坊以及九龍海濱三門迫擊砲的敵方砲火。

58. 迄今已確認的飛機類型如下：海軍偵察飛行艇，94型 - 海軍重型轟炸機，96型 - 陸軍輕型轟炸機，98型 - 陸軍戰鬥機，97型，未知的戰鬥機，現已確認為海軍O型。投下的最重炸彈，已確認為250磅——但根據推斷（引信帽、彈坑大小等），推測還投下了約500磅的炸彈。

59. 平民士氣持續好轉，食米分配情況也得到改善。

60. 12月17日21時，敵方砲火在布雷馬的大型油漆廠引發嚴重火災，濃煙滾滾。由於距離較近，附近18磅砲海灘防禦工事的彈藥不得不轉移到其他位置，大約午夜時分，火炮也被迫轉移到附近警察局後方的同一位置。東北部砲擊尤為猛烈，線路不斷被切斷和修復。截至晚上8點，許多碉堡仍然無法連接，當晚不得不用野外電纜代替埋設的電纜系統。約凌晨1點，香港仔遭到來自海上的砲擊，工業學校（皇家海軍船塢香港仔部分的總部）被擊中。

61. (a) 12月18日拂曉時分，在香港仔以南16英里處發現了一艘日本驅逐艦。(b) 觀察到九龍碼頭和橋墩之間有大量小型船隻移動。(c) 凌晨時分，一門60磅砲在夜幕掩護下被開進北角（由J. S. Vintner中尉指揮），試圖擊沉九龍灣的三艘貨船，這些貨船被懷疑被用作觀察哨或準備作為襲擊的「跳板」。雖然只有彈片可用，但一艘4000噸的船隻通過擊中水線被擊穿並沉沒。

62. 上午10點，維多利亞城中央區遭受了相當猛烈的空襲。英波公司位於北角的汽油和石油儲槽點燃，隨後整天不斷遭到砲擊。這次襲擊似乎主要針對政府合署，秘書處也遭到攻擊，附近地區傷亡慘重。午後不久，銅鑼灣地區遭到猛烈砲擊，從銅鑼灣到鯉魚門的海濱如今已是一片廢墟，電線和旗幟紛紛倒塌，車輛和信差幾乎無法通行。12月18日中午，寶馬山防砲陣地（第60號砲台）遭到砲擊，數次直接命中，兩門18磅砲被摧毀，無法修復。下午3點起，空襲進一步發生，西灣砲兵觀察哨遭到俯衝轟炸和砲擊。下午5點至6點，約200名敵軍被發現從海灣向魔鬼山碼頭進發，遭到我方砲火的砲擊。黃昏前後，鯉魚門半島遭受了砲火和迫擊砲的猛烈轟炸。熄滅。據報告，入夜時分，北角（通往九龍角）的固定梁因英波公司石油設施燃燒產生的高溫和高煙而無法工作。這場大火持續了數日，嚴重影響了火勢的觀察。

63. Landing on- Hong Kong Island

- (a) At 1900 hours 18th December three armored cars of the HKVDC were sent to Tytam Gap to be a mobile reserve in the hands of the Commander East Infantry Brigade at his HQ there, and two other cars remained in hand at Leighton Hill close to i Middlesex HQ.
- (b) At 1930 hours a report was received that the Saiwan A.A. position and Old Redoubt had been under heavy shell fire (9-in. Howitzer) for half an hour, that the whole fort was badly damaged and that the structure would not stand up to further shelling.
- (c) At 2000 hours pillboxes 41 and 42 (Shaukiwan) and also the narrow 2 Royal Scots front at Bowrington were bombarded.
- (d) At 2130 hours the Officer Commanding 5/7 Rajput Regt. reported difficulty in getting in touch with the Lyemun fixed beam and asked for illumination in area Quarry Bay- Aldrich Bay. The Braemar A.A. searchlight was ordered to come down on to a shore defense role but (not known till later) the telephone lines to its position were knocked out by shell fire and the motor cyclist dispatch rider sent in lieu was badly wounded and never got through. The communications to the fixed beam at Lyemun had been giving difficulty throughout the evening, owing to breaks from shell fire, and Captain C. E. Otway, R.E., had finally been sent to make personal charge there. At about 2130 hours 18th December the Officer Commanding 5/7 Rajput Regt. moved a reserve company from the area South of his HQ9 to a forward area closer to him. The remaining company (B) in battalion reserve was in the Tai Hang Road area, but communications to it had again been cut. Very lights were seen going up from North Point and Lyemun, and shelling and machine gun fire was heard in considerable volume along the North shore water front and in the area of the Electric Power Station and the Anglo-Persian Company installation.¹⁰
- (e) It was learnt later that at 2200 hours Captain Otway observed sampans lighting smoke flares in the harbor, and motor boats and small craft plying between Devils Peak and Lyemun pier. His light was twice attacked by an enemy patrol with hand grenades and after beating off a third attack he left the light exposed, locked the doors, and at about 2330 hours withdrew his six men through the Japanese lines to join the nearest infantry in the defense of the Saiwan 6-in. Howitzer position in Lyemun Gap. When he left, the Japanese were shooting straight down the beam with an " Infantry gun," 50 per cent, of the shots; hitting the concrete surround of the light.
- (f) The landing of the enemy between Lyemun and North Point appears to have been simultaneous, for at 2200 hours night 18/19th December pillbox N. 4 at Taikoo was reported in the hands of the enemy and a little later 5/7 Rajput Regt. was overheard reporting the occupation of the Sugar Factory by the enemy. At 2205 hours 1 Middlesex Regt was ordered to .send a mobile machine gun platoon to North Point to form a defensive flank from pillbox 49 (Power Station) to join up with the 5/7 Rajput Company in that area (" D " Company). An armored car was also sent. Defensive artillery fire was promptly put down on Taikoo Dockyard and the Sugar Factory, and the Commanding Officer of 5/7 Rajput Regt. on the spot reported that the results were most effective.

63. 登陸香港島

- (a) 12月18日19:00：香港防衛軍（HKVDC）的三輛裝甲車被派往大潭峽（Tytam Gap），作為機動預備隊，由駐紮在那裡的東步兵旅指揮官指揮，另外兩輛裝甲車則留在米杜息士團（Middlesex）指揮部附近的禮頓山（Leighton Hill）。
- (b) 19:30：收到報告稱，西灣防空陣地和舊堡壘遭到猛烈炮火（9英寸榴彈砲）攻擊達半小時，整個堡壘嚴重受損，無法再承受砲擊。
- (c) 20:00：41號和42號西灣砲堡（Shaukiwan）以及位於寶靈城（Bowrington）的皇家蘇格蘭防線遭到砲擊。
- (d) 21:30：第5/7拉吉普團（Rajput Regt）指揮官...報告難以與萊蒙的固定光束取得聯繫，並請求在鯽魚門-鯽魚涌地區提供照明。布雷瑪防空探照燈奉命執行岸防任務，但（後來才得知）其所在位置的電話線路被砲火擊毀，而代替其工作的摩托車電傳員身負重傷，始終未能接通。由於砲火中斷，萊蒙固定光束的通訊在整個晚上都出現問題，最終，皇家工程兵團的C. E. Otway上尉被派往那裡親自指揮。12月18日21:30左右，拉吉普團5/7團長將一個預備連從其HQ9以南地區調至更靠近他的前方地區。營預備隊剩餘的B連位於大坑路地區，但與其的通訊再次被切斷。有人看到北角和鯽魚門的韋裡燈火升起，北岸沿岸以及發電站和英波公司設施附近都能聽到相當響亮的砲擊和機槍聲。10
- (e) 後來得知，22:00，奧特韋上尉發現港口內有舢板點燃煙霧彈，摩托艇和小型船隻在魔鬼山和鯽魚門碼頭之間來回穿梭。他的燈火曾兩次遭到敵方巡邏隊用手榴彈的襲擊，在擊退第三次襲擊後，他讓燈火暴露在外，鎖上門，並於23:30左右帶領六名士兵穿過日軍防線，加入最近的步兵部隊，保衛鯽魚門海峽的塞灣六英寸榴彈砲陣地。當他離開時，日軍正用「步兵砲」沿著橫梁直射，50%的砲彈擊中了燈火周圍的混凝土。
- (f) 敵軍在鯽魚門（Lyemun）和北角（North Point）之間登陸似乎是同時發生的，因為12月18/19日晚22:00，太古（Taikoo）的4號砲堡被報告落入敵軍手中，稍後，第5/7拉吉普團（5/7 Rajput Regt.）報告敵軍手中，稍後，第5/7拉吉普團（5/7 Rajput Regt.）報告敵軍手中糖廠佔領了糖廠。22:05，米杜息士團（Middlesex）第1團奉命派遣一個機動機槍排前往北角，從49號砲堡（發電站）組成側翼防禦，與該地區的第5/7拉吉普團（5/7 Rajput Company）（簡稱“D”連）會合。一輛裝甲車也出動了。防禦砲火迅速擊落太古造船廠和糖廠，現場第5/7拉吉普團指揮官報告稱，戰果十分顯著。

(g) At 2242 hours pillbox 55 crew in Causeway Bay reported that the alternative position in which they were located was being shelled and also sniped at from their right flank.

(h) At 2330 hours Brigadier Wallis reported that the Officer Commanding 5/7 Rajput Regt. was still at Taikoo HQ and that on the other flank the intention was to recapture Saiwan Redoubt with the bayonet. The 6-in. Howitzer Section on Mount Parker was still in action.

(i) At midnight 18-19th December, B. Company (battalion reserve) of the 5/7 Rajput Regt. was now moving to the area of pillbox 53. a. machine gun platoon of 1 Middlesex Regt. was in area of pillbox 50 and one platoon of B Company 5/7 Rajput Regt was still holding out in North Point area. The Power Station itself was held by a force known as the " Hughesiliers ", under the Hon. Major J. J. Paterson, which was formed before the outbreak of war from men of 55 and over who felt the call to duty though they themselves were outside the terms of the Compulsory Service Act. It contained many prominent men of considerable standing in the colony and their role was the prevention of sabotage to the electric plant. It was reinforced about the 16th December by 45 Hong Kong Electric Company employees (HKVDC), China Light and Power Company employees, from Kowloon (numbering 30) plus two officers and seven other " Free French." The two officers were Captains Ega and Jacosta. This force was instrumental in holding the Power Station this night and fought in the streets next day until the late afternoon: when the house-to-house fighting and mopping up by the Japanese caused their surrender by encirclement, except for a few who escaped. The delay the force imposed was very valuable to me.

(j) Just after midnight it was reported that the armored car sent to reconnoiter towards the Power Station had been knocked out by a mobile anti-tank gun.¹¹ It is clear from reports since made that at that time the Japanese were in possession of the ridge overlooking and dominating the Power station and the approach along King's Road from the West. It was from this direction that the reinforcing platoon of 1 Middlesex Regt. came, as it was judged that the road nearer the water front was impassable owing to the flames from the Anglo-Persian Company's installations. The platoon ran straight into the same anti-tank and machine gun fire, the Platoon Sergeant-Major and others were killed and the remainder got into action in the vicinity of the Power Station where they fought excellently. When the bulk of the Hughesiliers withdrew, three 1 Middlesex N.C.O.s rallied and collected a mixed party of Regulars and Volunteers, nine strong, and fought till 1400 hours in the main office building of the Power Station.

(k) At about 2200 hours 18th December the Royal Artillery at Lyemun Gap reported that propaganda from a loud speaker from Saiwan Redoubt was being broadcast—" We Japanese have captured Saiwan Hill," " It is useless to resist," etc The area was promptly put under small arms fire At about 0100 hours it was reported that a counter attack by one platoon of Canadians had been carried out on Saiwan Redoubt, organized and led by an Artillery officer. The counter-attack did not succeed, as was discovered subsequently. This officer then took a Tommy gun and carried out active local defense on his own, round the 6-in. Howitzer position at Lyemun Gap, in a most gallant manner.

(g) 22時42分，銅鑼灣55號碉堡的營員報告稱，他們所在的一方陣地遭到砲擊，右翼也遭到狙擊。

(h) 23時30分，華里士準將報告稱，第5/7拉吉普團指揮官仍在太古總部，另一側的部隊意圖用刺刀奪回西灣堡壘。柏架山上的6吋榴彈砲組仍在戰鬥。

(i) 12月18日至19日午夜，第5/7拉吉普團B連（營級預備隊）正向53號碉堡區域移動。米杜息士團1的機槍排位於50號碉堡區域，第5/7拉傑普特團B連的一個排仍在北角區域堅守。發電站本身由一支被稱為「曉士兵團」的部隊守衛，由榮譽少校J.J.百德新指揮。這支部隊在戰爭爆發前組建，由55歲及以上男性組成，他們儘管自身不受《義務兵役法》的約束，卻依然感到使命的召喚。這支部隊由許多在殖民地享有盛譽的傑出人士組成，他們的職責是防止對發電站的破壞。12月16日左右，來自九龍的45名香港電力公司（HKVDC）成員、中華電力公司成員（共30人）以及兩名軍官和另外七名「自由法國人」增援。這兩名軍官分別是埃加上尉和雅科斯塔上尉。這支部隊在當晚守衛發電站的過程中發揮了重要作用，並在第二天的街頭戰鬥一直持續到傍晚：日軍的逐屋清剿和掃蕩迫使他們被包圍投降，只有少數人逃脫。這支部隊拖延時間對我來說非常寶貴。

(j) 午夜剛過，據報道，派往發電站偵察的裝甲車被一門機動反戰車砲擊毀。11 此後的報告清楚地表明，當時日軍佔據了俯瞰並控制發電站的脊脊以及從西邊沿國王路的通道。米杜息士團第一團的增援排就是從這個方向趕來的，因為他們判斷，由於英波連設施的火焰，靠近海濱的道路無法通行。該排直接衝進了同樣的反坦克和機槍火力中，排長和其他人陣亡，其餘人員在發電站附近投入戰鬥，並表現出色。當休斯利爾步兵團主力撤退後，三名米杜息士團的士官集結，召集了一支由九名正規軍和志願者組成的混合部隊，在發電站主辦公樓內戰鬥至下午兩點。

(k) 12月18日約22:00，鯉魚門海峽皇家砲兵報告稱，西灣堡壘的揚聲器正在廣播“我們日本人已經佔領了西灣山”、“抵抗是徒勞的”等宣傳。該地區迅速遭到輕武器的掃射。約1:00，報告稱，一個加拿大排對塞灣堡壘進行了反擊，由一名砲兵軍官組織和領導。後來發現，反擊沒有成功。這名軍官隨後攜帶一把湯米衝鋒槍，獨自在6吋砲台周圍進行主動防禦。以極其英勇的方式，攻佔了鯉魚門的榴彈砲陣地。

(l) At 0145 hours the Hughesliers (see subpara, (i) above) reported the Power Station surrounded, but were ordered to hold on at all costs as other posts were holding out near them and it was hoped that B Company 5/7 Rajput Regt. (Captain R. G. Course) would at any moment make its presence felt.

(m) At 0200 hours gith December Officer Commanding 1 Middlesex Regt. reported that B Company 5/7 Rajput Regt. was back in his vicinity South of Leighton Hill—the reason given being that the Company had gone forward into the Braemar reservoir area but had been unable to locate D Company 5/7 Rajput Regt. holding that sector, i Middlesex Regt. was still holding pill boxes 53 and 54 (Causeway Bay) and had sent officer reconnaissance patrols forward to North Point where the Hughesliers had again reported that they were hard pressed.

(n) At 0300 hours R.A. (East) reported two Canadian platoons had tried to capture the Saiwan position about midnight under an accurate barrage on the hill top but that this counter attack was a failure.

The fighting here in the dark was very confused. Later Major Fielden, R.A., reported the road junction at Shaukiwan held by armoured cars and that he was trying to work round West of Saiwan observation post (on the top of the redoubt); he had thirty men covering the 6-in. Howitzer position in Lyemun Gap and he said that pill box 40 was still firing

(o) Between 0400 and 0600 hours 19th December reinforcing platoons of the Royal Rifles of Canada were sent forward on to the Mount Parker high ground.

(p) To give increased defence in Victoria against possible landing on that water front which, supplemented by fifth columnists, would constitute a grave danger from the West and perhaps overrun Government House area, a company of 2/14 Punjab Regt. had been deployed on a line running from pill box 63 southwards past and including the Central Police Station. The situation now developing on the East of Victoria was judged to be serious enough, however, to warrant taking risks in the Victoria area, and so this company (about 0400 hours) was called in from its positions to be in hand at HQ of 2/14 Punjab Regt. at Garden Road. "A" Company Winnipeg Grenadiers was already in hand at Wong Nei Chong Gap for emergency use.

(q) Captain R. S. Cole, 5/7 Rajput Regt., during the early hours was waiting for troops of his battalion on the track from Braemar to Mount Butler when a party of Japanese, headed by three Chinese with rifles approached. They were dressed in uniform and obviously acted as guides. He challenged, shot the Chinese, and dispersed the party. This incident corroborates others, accounting for the speed with which the Japanese troops covered country, supposedly unfamiliar, in the dark.

(r) At 0400 hours 19th December I arranged with the Chief Engineer for the despatch of an R.E. party for an infantry fighting role, viz.: to reinforce the Wong Nei Chong Gap area and to come under orders of Commander West Infantry Brigade on arrival there. Seventy- British and Chinese was the eventual composition of this party.

(l) 凌晨1點45分，休斯利爾營（見上文(i)小節）報告發電站已被包圍，但被命令不惜一切代價堅守，因為其他哨所仍在附近堅守，並希望拉傑普特團第5/7團B連（R. G. Course上尉）隨時能出現。

(m) 12月8日凌晨2點，米杜息士團1連指揮官報告稱，拉吉普團第5/7團B連已返回禮頓山以南附近——原因是該連已進入銅鑼灣，但未能找到駐守該區域的拉吉普團第5/7團D連，即米杜息士團1。仍守著銅鑼灣53號和54號碉堡，並派遣軍官偵察巡邏隊前往北角，「曉士兵團」再次報告他們面臨重壓。

(n) 凌晨3點，皇家陸軍（東部）報告，兩個加拿大排在午夜時分試圖在山頂的精確砲火下攻占西灣陣地，但這次反攻失敗了。

夜幕降臨，戰鬥異常混亂。皇家陸軍少校菲爾登（Fielden）後來報告說，筲箕灣（Shaukiwan）的路口已被裝甲車把守，他正試圖繞過位於堡壘頂部的西灣（Saiwan）觀察哨以西；他派了30人掩護鯉魚門峽（Lyemun Gap）的6英寸榴彈砲陣地，並表示射擊40號。(o) 12月19日凌晨4點至6點，加拿大皇家步槍隊的增援排被派往柏架山（Mount Parker）高地。(p) 為了加強維多利亞城地區對可能從水岸登陸的防禦，如果第五縱隊增援，西側的登陸將構成嚴重威脅，並可能佔領總督府地區，旁遮普第十四團（2/14 Punjab Regt.）的一個連被部署在從63號碉堡向南延伸的一條線上，包括中央警署。然而，維多利亞城東部的情況被認為十分嚴峻，值得在維多利亞地城區冒險一試。因此，該連（約凌晨4點）被調離其陣地，前往花園路旁遮普第14團2營指揮部接受調遣。溫尼伯擲彈兵「A」連已在黃內衝峽待命，以備不時之需。(q) 拉吉普第7團5營的R. S. 科爾上尉凌晨時分正在布雷馬至畢拿山的路上等候其營部部隊，這時一隊日軍迎面走來，由三名手持步槍的中國人領頭，他們身著制服，顯然是嚮導。科爾上尉挑釁並射殺了這群中國人，驅散了他們。此事與其他事件相符，解釋了日軍在黑暗中迅速攻占所謂陌生地區的原因。(r) 12月19日凌晨4點，我與總工程師商定派遣一支陸軍工程隊執行步兵作戰任務，即增援黃泥涌峽地區，並在抵達後接受西部步兵旅指揮官的指揮。這支部隊最終由70名英國和中國士兵組成。

(s) 凌晨4點剛過，米杜息士第1團團長報告稱，敵軍繞過大坑村附近的山丘，向東推進。拉吉普第5/7團D連仍在水庫附近，銅鑼灣地區已穩固防守，太古路沿線沒有敵軍行動的跡象。此時，我命令旁遮普第2/14團派出一個連，協助填補溫尼伯擲彈兵團和米杜息士第1團之間的空隙。(t) 凌晨4點30分，皇家陸軍少校E. de V. Hunt報告稱，鯉魚門峽的局勢已受到控制。(u) 凌晨5點，在低地地區遇了一小隊敵軍。這顯示敵軍的進攻十分猛烈。(v) 凌晨6點，要塞皇家陸軍的人員。（見上文第（r）小段）離開，（後來才知道）抵達黃泥涌峽附近，卻發現西部步兵旅指揮部正遭受敵方機槍和迫擊砲的猛烈火力攻擊。三個迫擊砲陣地位於地勢起伏的窪地中，但皇家工兵沒有合適的武器到達這些死地。由於無法進入旅指揮部掩體，皇家工兵只好在附近佔據了一個陣地。(w) 12月19日06:50。我先前曾與皇家海軍準將商議，希望皇家海軍積極參與陸戰。他現在告訴我，皇家海軍接管香港仔-香港仔地區步兵哨所的安排已經完成。這讓溫尼伯擲彈兵12連從香港仔分區撤離，並於05:00出發。然而，皇家海軍並未接管這些步兵哨所，因為海軍部隊的主力被用於從南面增援黃泥涌峽。(x) 白天，載滿貨物的帆船、駁船、汽艇和渡輪被發現駛往北角附近，但由於「低空」觀察哨已被佔領，建築物等遮擋了上層觀察哨的視線，因此無法觀察到確切的登陸區域。

(y) Between 0800 and 0900 hours small parties of enemy were observed on Jardines Lookout, coming down on to Wong Nei Chong Gap. In this area confused fighting was taking place, troops of various units participating, as well as the Canadian Brigade H.Q. staff. Brigadier J. K. Lawson (about 1000 hours) reported that the H.Q. shelters were over-run, firing into them was actually taking place at point blank range and that he was going outside to fight it out, after destroying telephone exchanges, etc. He did so, and I regret to say was killed, together with his Brigade Major. Major Temple and personnel of H.Q. West Group, R.A. were also killed. During the next thirty-six hours the groups of shelters here changed hands several times, but in spite of every effort the enemy secured a definite lodgment. 13 Part of the enemy attack came on to Stanley Gap and involved the 3.7-in. A.A. Section there. The Royal Artillery of the nearest 3-7-in. Howitzer positions were called on to assist, and leaving their gun position were drawn into the fighting with their small arms. Unfortunately, as it was thought that a temporary counter attack only was involved, steps were not taken to remove small essential parts, e.g., locks, or firing levers, and these guns together with ammunition later fell into enemy hands and were used against us. 14

64. The Officer Commanding R.A.F. had some time previously requested that his officers and men should be used for ground defence, and at this time the Royal Air Force were taking up positions with the Royal Navy in the Aberdeen area, where they assisted materially in the subsequent fighting.

65. (a) It now became necessary to form a new West Group R.A. This was done at Wanchai Gap, and communications -readjusted by 1500 hours, Major Duncan being appointed Commander. This small group of artillery gave admirable support during the next few days, being continuously in action though repeatedly shelled and dive bombed. Such counter battery work as remained possible was undertaken by R.A. HQ at Fortress HQ. (c) At 0845 hours, 19th December, the Mount Parker 6-in. Howitzer Section 600 yards North of Tytam Gap was firing with one of its howitzers straight down the road towards Lyemun Gap.

66. At 0730 hours six motor torpedo boats were sent to the vicinity of Green Island to be ready to attack enemy vessels ferrying troops from the mainland to the island. On the arrival at the rendezvous they were ordered direct by the Commodore to attack in pairs. The first attack by M.T.Bs. 07 and 09 was successful and sank one enemy landing craft set another on fire and forced a third to turn back (each held about forty troops). Whilst returning 07 was hit and damaged, and was towed in by 09. The second pair of motor torpedo boats had already been ordered to attack, but by the time of their arrival ferrying across the harbor had ceased. Whilst returning M.T.B. 12 was badly hit and ran ashore out of control in Kowloon Dock area. The third pair were ordered not to attack, but by mischance (or deliberately) M.T.B. 26 did so and was sunk with all hands in the middle of the harbor. During these Operations these craft came under fire from both sides of the harbor, and in the final stages enemy fighter aircraft joined in by attacking them with light bombs and with machine gun fire. Our casualties amounted to 50 per cent. It was not considered that adequate results would accrue from further attacks by day or by night, the harbor being full of wrecked shipping and underwater obstacles.

67. At 1000 hours, 19th December, Lieut. Colonel J. L. Willcocks (who as previously arranged, was commanding the Defense Force around Stanley Prison of which he was Superintendent) reported that the Stanley platoon of prison officers was in its prepared position on Stanley Peninsula, covering the batteries.

(y) 8時至9時，在怡和山上觀察到小隊敵軍正向黃泥涌峽進發。該地區發生了混戰，各部隊以及加拿大旅總部參謀均參與其中。J. K. Lawson 羅遜準將（約10時）報告稱，總部...防空洞被攻占，實際上是近距離射擊，他正要出去戰鬥，先是破壞了電話交換機等設施。他照做了，我很遺憾地說，他和他的旅長一起陣亡了。坦普爾少校和皇家陸軍總部西集團軍的人員也陣亡了。在接下來的36小時裡，這裡的防空洞群幾經易手，但儘管敵人竭盡全力，還是穩住了陣地。13 部分敵軍進攻至赤柱峽，並捲入了那裡的3.7吋防空砲兵分隊。最近的3-7吋榴彈砲陣地的皇家砲兵被召來支援，他們離開砲位，帶著輕武器投入戰鬥。不幸的是，由於人們認為這只是一次臨時反擊，並沒有採取措施拆除一些重要的小部件，例如鎖或擊發桿，這些槍支連同彈藥後來落入敵人手中，被用來對付我們。14

64. 英國皇家空軍司令官先前曾請求將其官兵用於地面防禦，當時皇家空軍正與皇家海軍在香港仔區域交戰，並在隨後的戰鬥中提供了物質援助。

65. (a) 現在有必要組成一個新的皇家空軍西部集團軍。該集團軍在灣仔峽完成，並在15:00重新調整了通信，鄧肯少校被任命為指揮官。在接下來的幾天裡，這支小型砲兵群提供了出色的支援，儘管遭到反覆砲擊和俯衝轟炸，但仍持續作戰。皇家空軍總部在要塞總部盡可能地進行了反砲擊工作。(c) 12月19日8:45，位於大潭峽以北600碼的柏架山6吋榴彈砲組以其中一門榴彈砲直衝鯉魚門峽方向。

66. 07:30，六艘魚雷艇被派往綠島附近，準備攻擊從大陸向綠島運送部隊的敵艦。抵達會合地點後，準將直接命令他們成對出擊。M.T.B. 07和09的第一次攻擊成功，擊沉了一艘敵登陸艇，使另一艘起火，並迫使第三艘登陸艇返航（每艘艇載有約40名士兵）。返航時，07號被擊中受損，由09號拖回。第二對魚雷艇先前已接獲攻擊命令，但當他們抵達時，渡海運輸已停止。返航時，M.T.B. 12號被嚴重擊中，在九龍碼頭附近失控擱淺。第三對魚雷艇奉命停止攻擊，但由於意外（或故意），M.T.B. 26號潛艇照做了，沉沒在港口中央，所有人員全部遇難。在行動中，這些潛水艇遭到港口兩側的砲火攻擊，最後階段，敵方戰鬥機也加入攻擊，用輕型炸彈和機槍掃射。我方傷亡佔50%。由於港口內滿是失事船隻和 underwater 障礙物，因此白天或夜間的進一步攻擊難以達到理想的效果。

67. 12月19日10時，J. L. 威爾科克斯中校（按照先前安排，他指揮著赤柱監獄周圍的國防軍，並擔任監獄長）報告說，赤柱監獄的獄警排已在此半島的預備位置，掩護砲台。

68. At this juncture I conferred with Brigadier Wallis about the stabilization of the position. The situation was that at 0800 hours the Royal Rifles of Canada were finding it difficult to maintain their positions on Mount Parker and they were attempting to hold the 6-in. Howitzer positions in that area, together with the R.A. personnel who had taken up local defense dispositions. Some of the R.A. personnel consisted of those from the .6-in Howitzer Section at Lyemun Gap which had been over-run. No British officer was available for this latter section. Owing to the lack of mobilization transport and the 40 ft. haul up to the road by which, the guns had been abandoned and small parts removed. These defensive positions round the Mount Parker 6-in. Howitzer position were obvious not adequate to act as a serious " stop " to the enemy. They had been hastily improvise Mount Parker not being held by us, they we overlooked by high ground on two sides, and were only six hundred yards in front of the Combined Headquarters of East Infant. Brigade, the infantry battalion in the South East Sector, and R.A East Group. Infantry available for reinforcing in this area had been employed towards Mount Parker and were not out of touch. There was thus the grave danger if the enemy staged a serious attack here, of the loss of all these Headquarters and the cutting off of all the troops in the area Collins Battery—d'Aguilar Peninsula—Obelisk ,included in which were the wireless personnel of the Civil Government at d'Aguilar Wireless Station. Accordingly I authorized Brigadier Wallis to withdraw his HQ to the Stonel Company HQ and to time his withdrawal so that the last troops left the Taitam Gap area at 1300 hours.

At 1145 hours 19th December his HQ there closed down. There was the possibility of carrying out offensive operations from the area of Red Hill and the Tytam Reservoirs and connecting up with Wong Nei Chong Gap when cleared. This would involve capture of the important features Mount Butler and Jardines Lookout. The enemy, so far as could be ascertained, was distributed in small groups on that line of high ground and it seemed to me doubtful if their total strength on the island was more than two battalions. It was realized that the alternative might be necessary, viz.: to operate via Repulse Bay area in order to link up with West Infantry Brigade. Shortly after noon a message was received from the Officer Commanding 2 Royal Scots that one company in a counter-attack had reached a point 200 yards northwards of Wong Nei Chong Gap shelters, where they were holding out with only thirteen effectives left. At this time the 3-7-m. Howitzer section at the Gauge Basin was engaging the enemy over open sights, which it continued to do until small arms fire prevented the service of the guns. One gun was brought away.

69. At 1100 hours I ordered Lt.-Colonel G. R. Kidd to counter attack with two companies (" A "15 and " D "16 Companies) in an easterly direction from Leighton Hill to link up with " D " Company 5/7 Rajput Regt. and enable it to withdraw for more active employment. At the same time such an attack would cut in at the enemy's rear, thus limiting his exploitation and obstructing further landings and movements in and from the North Point area.

70. At 1130 hours 19th December I was visited by H.E. The Governor and C.-in-C. who stressed the importance of fighting it out to the end however bad the military outlook might be. Every day gained was a direct help to the Empire war effort. 71. At 1300 hours a force of R.A.S.C. and details collected in the Pokfulum area, seventy strong, was moved to Bennets Hill to take up an emergency defensive position in case further exploitation by the enemy was attempted: then to move forward to the close support of the Winnipeg Grenadiers at Wong Nei Chong Gap.

At 1330 hours I issued orders for a general advance eastwards at 1500 hours to reach as a first objective Middle Spur—Wong Nei Chong Reservoir—Clementis Ride and then to join up with the objective reached by the 2/14 Punjab Regiment's counter attack already referred to in para. 69. The 2/14 Punjab Regt. was to co-operate by exploiting Northwards to relieve the " Hughesiliers "17 and others in the Power Station. The central axis of attack was to be Middle Gap—Wong Nei Chong Reservoir-Gauge Basin. 2 Royal Scots were to include Jardines Lookout. Only eight field guns were available to support this advance.

68. 此時，我與華里士準將討論了穩定陣地的事宜。當時的情況是，早上8點，加拿大皇家步槍隊發現難以守住柏架山上的陣地，他們正試圖與採取局部防禦部署的皇家步槍隊人員一起守住該地區的6英寸榴彈砲陣地。皇家步槍隊的部分人員來自鯉魚門峽的6吋榴彈砲分隊，該分隊已被攻佔。沒有英國軍官可以負責這部分分隊。由於缺乏動員運輸工具，以及將火砲拖到40英尺高的公路上，這些火砲被遺棄，一些小部件被拆除。柏架山6吋榴彈砲陣地周圍的這些防禦陣地顯然不足以對敵人形成有效的「阻擊」。這些陣地是倉促搭建的，柏架山未被我軍守住，兩面高地俯瞰它們，距離東因凡特聯司令部僅600碼。旅、東南區的步兵營及皇家陸軍東部集團。該地區可供增援的步兵已部署到柏架山，並未脫離接觸。因此，如果敵人在此發動猛烈攻擊，將面臨巨大的危險；所有指揮部將被攻佔，德已立炮台—鶴咀半島—方尖碑地區的所有部隊將被切斷，其中包括駐紮在德阿吉拉爾無線電台的民政政府無線電人員。因此，我授權華里士準將將其指揮部撤至斯通爾連指揮部，並安排撤退時間，以便最後一批部隊於13:00離開大潭峽地區。

12月19日11時45分，他的指揮部關閉。有可能從紅山和大潭水庫地區發動進攻，並在清理完畢後與黃泥涌峽匯合。這將涉及佔領重要的拿山和渣甸山。據目前所知，敵軍分散在那條高地上，兵力分散，在我看來，他們在島上的總兵力是否超過兩個營恐怕難以確定。我們意識到，或許有必要採取另一種選擇，即經由淺水灣地區作戰，以便與西步兵旅會合。中午過後不久，收到皇家蘇格蘭步兵團指揮官的消息，一個反攻連已到達黃泥涌峽防空洞以北200碼處，他們在那裡堅守，只剩下13名有效兵力。此時，3-7-m步兵團...位於測量盆地的榴彈砲組利用開闊的視野與敵人交戰，直到輕武器火力無法使用火砲時才停止。一門火砲被繳獲。

69. 上午11點，我命令G. R. Kidd中校率領兩個連（A連15和D連16）從禮頓山嚮東發動反擊，與拉吉普團第5/7團的D連會合，使其撤退以進行更積極的行動。同時，這樣的攻擊將切入敵人後方，從而限制其進攻，並阻礙其進一步登陸和進出北角地區的行動。

70. 12月19日上午11點30分，總督閣下和總司令來訪，他們強調無論軍事前景多麼糟糕，戰鬥到底的重要性。爭取的每一天都對帝國的戰爭努力提供了直接的幫助。

71. 13:00，一支由皇家陸軍航空隊（R.A.S.C.）和在薄扶林地區集結的部隊（共70人）被調往班納山（Bennets Hill），採取緊急防禦陣地，以防敵軍進一步試圖利用；隨後，他們向溫尼伯擲彈兵在黃泥涌峽近距離出發。13:30，我下令向東全面推進，15:00時到達第一個目標（Middle Spur AOP）中央山咀砲兵觀測堡、黃泥湧水庫—克萊門斯山（Clementis Ride），然後與第69段所述旁遮普第14團2營反攻所達到的目標會合。旁遮普第14團2營將配合向北推進，以接替發電站內的「曉士兵團」（Hughesiliers）17號營及其他部隊。進攻的中心軸為中峽—黃泥湧水庫—水位測量區。兩門皇家蘇格蘭砲將包括怡和山。只有八門野戰砲可用於支援此攻擊。

At about 1630 hours 19th December 1 Middlesex Regt. reported that Leighton Hill was being heavily shelled, that " B 'I' Company 5/7 Rajput Regt. was forward on their right and that Major Kampta Prasad's " B " Company 2/14 Punjab Regt. was further to the right. 18 R.A. reported enemy in the Police Station at Wong Nei Chong Gap, on the ridge just to the North, and moving South of Wong Nei Chong Reservoir. From other reports it became clear that the general advance had not been successful and that the enemy was in greater strength than had been believed.

72. (a) At 1820 hours it became necessary to withdraw the crew from pillbox 53 at Causeway Bay (North East end) as it was isolated much in advance of the general line. The pillbox itself had been destroyed, the officer had been killed, and 50 per cent, of the crew had become casualties. (b) Enemy transport vessels were still crossing the harbor and artillery action was taken.

73.

- (a) At 1900 hours the R.A.S.C. personnel at the transport pool at Repulse Bay were ordered to hold on to and defend their transport area and not to withdraw.
- (b) At 2000 hours the party of R.A.S.C. moved forward from Bennets Hill. Its numbers had now been increased to about 150. The party, being unable to reach Wong Nei Chong Gap, joined the R.A.O C. party at the Ridge
- (c) At 2000 hours 19th December it was reported that some of No. 3 Company HKVDC who had been surrounded- in Jardines Lookout pillboxes, had managed to escape, after fighting all day, to the Blue Pool area. They were ordered to join 1 Middlesex Regt. at Leighton Hill which they did at 0800 hours next morning.
- (d) At 2100 hours heavy mortar bombardment of the China Fleet Club area took place.

74. Just before midnight 19-20th December the Commissioner of Police reported that reliable secret information pointed to the likelihood of enemy landings in the Central District and Kennedy Town, and that Police patrols had been sent out. All military units concerned were warned 75. The troops had now been in action eleven days with no respite. Owing to the shortage of hot food and sleep, and the impossibility of providing reliefs because of the lack of troops, signs of strain were beginning to appear. My A A resources were now very reduced luckily only three raids of any intensity were carried out by the enemy during the day of the 19th, but the last raid on Stanley was very severe. Two Bofors guns were still in action but were powerless to prevent the enemy bombing selected targets. His bombing throughout was confined to day bombing and my A.A. searchlight detachments were never employed in their true role.

12月19日下午4點30分左右，米杜息士團第一團報告稱，禮頓山遭到猛烈砲擊，「B」。拉吉普團第7團5連在其右翼前方，而坎普塔·普拉薩德少校率領的旁遮普團第14團2連「B」連則在其右翼更遠。皇家陸軍第18師報告稱，敵人出現在黃泥湧峽警察局，該警察局位於黃泥湧水庫以南，山脊正北。其他報告則表明，整體推進並未成功，敵軍兵力比預想的要大。

72. (a) 18時20分，由於銅鑼灣東北端53號碉堡被孤立，遠遠超出了總防線，因此有必要將人員撤出該碉堡。碉堡本身已被摧毀，軍官陣亡，50%的傷亡。(b) 敵方運輸船仍在穿越港口，並採取了砲擊行動。

73.

- (a) 19時駐紮在淺水灣運輸池的皇家陸軍航空隊 (RAS) 人員奉命堅守並保衛其運輸區，不得撤退。
- (b) 20:00，皇家陸軍航空隊小隊從班納山 (Bennets Hill) 出發。其人數現已增至約150人。由於無法到達黃泥湧峽，該小隊在山脊與皇家陸軍航空隊 (RAO) 小隊匯合。
- (c) 12月19日20:00，據報告，被包圍在渣甸山碉堡的香港防衛司令部 (HKVDC) 第3連的部分人員，經過一整天的戰鬥，成功逃往大潭地區。他們奉命與位於禮頓山 (Leighton Hill) 的米杜息士第一團 (1 Middlesex Regt.) 匯合，並於隔天上午8:00抵達。
- (d) 21:00，中國艦隊俱樂部地區遭到猛烈迫擊砲轟擊。

74. 12月19日至20日午夜前警務處處長報告稱，可靠的秘密情報表明敵軍可能在中環和堅尼地城登陸，警方已派出巡邏隊。所有相關軍事單位均已收到警告。75. 部隊已連續作戰11天，沒有喘息的機會。由於缺乏熱食和睡眠，以及由於兵力不足而無法提供換防，緊張的跡象開始顯現。我的防空資源現在非常緊張——幸運的是，19日白天敵軍只進行了三次強度不等的空襲，但最後一次對赤柱的空襲非常猛烈。兩門博福斯機槍仍在使用，但無力阻止敵軍轟炸選定的目標。敵軍的轟炸始終局限於白天，我的防空探照燈分隊從未真正發揮作用。

Part III-D

76. At 0135 hours the armoured cars of HKVDC at Wong Nei Chong Gap reported that they were in difficulties and had arranged for help from 2 Royal Scots, who had two companies in the close vicinity. In the meantime the Hong Kong Regt., HKSRA, reported that the enemy had been cleared from Wong Nei Chong Police Station. At 0400 hours 20th December 2 Royal Scots estimated the enemy to be one battalion strong in the vicinity of Jardmes Lookout. North of Wong Nei Chong Gap the situation was as before, viz., a company of 2/14 Punjab Regt. then " B " Company 5/7 Rajput Regt. then 1 Middlesex Regt. on Leighton Hill. At 0715 hours the Officer Commanding the Winnipeg Grenadiers reported that he was withdrawing troops from the Mount Nicholson area, as two companies¹⁹ were distributed in many small units and needed reorganising for further employment, especially as they were much mixed up with 2 Royal Scots. He proposed to reorganise on the line held on the day before, viz , Middle Gap, thence South West to Cable Hill. At 0745 hours it was learnt that the enemy had occupied the large garage at the Repulse Bay Hotel. At 0800 hours 20th December the Royal Artillery reported two companies 2 Royal Scots digging in on North East slopes of Mount Nicholson. The Commissioner of Police now reported that a part of enemy had discarded their uniform and had collected in houses in Happy Valley for, he thought, fifth column work. He proposed to round them up. At about 1000 hours the Officer Commanding 1 Middlesex Regt. reported that the crews of pill boxes 12, 13, and 15, which had been withdrawn to stiffen up the landward defences, were opposing an enemy advance on to Bennets Hill and that the enemy on Brick Hill were moving on Aberdeen. He reported that all pill boxes from Deepwater Bay to Repulse Bay were intact. The Officer Commanding the Winnipeg Grenadiers was authorised to withdraw his platoon from Aberdeen Island to assist in the main defensive positions.

77. At about 1000 hours 20th December orders were issued to 2/14 Punjab Regt. to send a company (" A " Company) to operate through Aberdeen and along Island Road to clear the enemy (estimated at thirty strong) from the Repulse Bay Hotel garage and to relieve the personnel there.

78. Repulse Bay Hotel —At about 0930 hours Lt. Grounds, 1 Middlesex Regt., rang up on a civil telephone and reported that the Japanese had surrounded the Hotel. He was ordered to put the women and children on the lowest floor space and to make them lie down, to organise the defence himself and to take full charge with Lt. Tresidder, R.A.S.C , to assist With him were two or three Royal Navy personnel 20 , and his own Middlesex machine gunners Lt Grounds did excellently until he was unfortunately killed whilst organising an attack on the isolated Hotel garage with the object of driving out a strong enemy party and rescuing HKVDC officers and others imprisoned there The area round the Hotel was not finally cleared till the afternoon, " A " Company Royal Rifles of Canada having arrived from the direction of Stone Hill and co-operating in the action. The enemy lost one officer and 25 men killed.

第三部分-D

76. 凌晨1點35分，駐紮在黃泥涌峽的香港防衛軍（HKVDC）裝甲車報告稱遇到困難，並已安排皇家蘇格蘭團（Royal Scots）2連的支援，該團有兩個連在附近。同時，香港星加坡團（HKSRA）報告稱，敵軍已從黃泥涌警察局撤離。12月20日凌晨4點，皇家蘇格蘭團2連估計，在渣甸山瞭望台（Jardmes Lookout）附近，敵軍兵力約為一個營。黃泥涌峽以北的情況與先前相同，分別是：旁遮普第十四團2連、拉吉普第十七團5連「B」連以及米德爾塞克斯第十四團在萊頓山。7時15分，溫尼伯擲彈兵司令官報告稱，他正在從尼科爾森山地區撤軍，因為兩個連隊（19）分散成許多小單位，需要重組以備後續行動，尤其是他們與皇家蘇格蘭團（2支）混在一起。他建議沿著前一天堅守的防線進行重組，即經中峽（Middle Gap），然後向西南行進至凱布爾山（Cable Hill）。7時45分，獲悉敵軍已佔領淺水灣飯店的大型車庫。12月20日8時，皇家砲兵報告稱，皇家蘇格蘭團（2支）的兩個連隊正在尼科爾森山東北坡挖掘戰壕。警察局長隨後報告稱，一部分敵軍脫下制服，聚集在跑馬谷（Happy Valley）的房屋中，他認為這是第五縱隊的工作。他建議將他們集中起來。大約10時，米德爾塞克斯第一團（1 Middlesex Regt）司令官.....報告稱，12、13和15號碉堡的人員撤退以加強陸上防禦，正在抵抗敵軍向貝內茨山的推進，而磚山上的敵軍正向阿伯丁推進。他報告說，從深水灣到淺水灣的所有碉堡都完好無損。溫尼伯擲彈兵團指揮官獲準將其排從阿伯丁島撤出，以協助主要防禦陣地。

77. 12月20日上午10點左右，命令第14旁遮普團2營派遣一個連（「A」連）穿過阿伯丁並沿島路行進，清除淺水灣酒店車庫內的敵軍（估計約30人），並接替那裡的人員。

78. 淺水灣飯店 - 約9時30分，米杜息士第一團的Grounds中尉打來民用電話，報告說日軍包圍了飯店。他奉命將婦女和兒童安置在最底層並讓他們躺下，自己組織防禦，並與皇家陸軍中校Tresidder中尉一起全面負責協助。與他一起的有兩三名皇家海軍人員20，以及他自己的米杜息士機槍手。Grounds中尉表現出色，但在組織對孤立的酒店車庫的攻擊時不幸身亡，攻擊的目的是驅逐一支強大的敵軍並營救被囚禁在那裡的香港防衛軍官和其他人員。飯店周圍地區直到下午才終於清理完畢，加拿大皇家步槍隊「A」連從石山方向趕來並配合行動。敵軍損失一名軍官，25人陣亡。

At about 1100 hours 20th December a message was received that "A" Company 2/14 Punjab Regt. had reached Aberdeen and was moving towards Shouson Hill, but during the day they could make no progress, as the enemy were in strength around that position, and the company itself numbered under thirty.

79. At 1200 hours Fortress R.E. were reorganised into three sections—two covering Wanchai Gap, the third in reserve. They were ordered to support the Winnipeg Grenadiers in every way possible. A Japanese monoplane flying over Stanley was hit, was obviously in trouble, lost height and was last seen low behind Lamma Island, and not re-appearing, may be presumed to be a casualty, giving a total of five enemy aircraft shot down during the battle.

80. At 1300 hours the Chinese crew deserted the A.A searchlight on Aberdeen Island. The five remaining British other ranks temporarily, joined the nearest infantry unit

81.— (i) During the morning several eye witnesses stated that Chinese planes had bombed Kowloon. (ii) Admiral Chan reported that General Yu Han Mou had wirelessed that 60,000 troops were at Sham Chun on the frontier and were about to attack.²¹

82 During the midday period 20th December the enemy continued pouring troops and material across the harbour in every type of craft The North Point area and other likely points were accordingly engaged by our artillery. In the morning Colonel H. B. Rose, MC., Commanding HKVDC, was nominated as Commander West Brigade. Its role remained as heretofore—to clear the enemy from Wong Nei Chong Gap and to establish itself on the A.A. position on Stanley Gap high ground 1400-1500 hours. The enemy were active behind the Repulse Bay Hotel, at Shouson and Bennets Hill, and along the road between Tytam Reservoir and the Gauge Basin. An enemy battery and two platoons deployed near Stanley Mound. During the day Brigadier Wallis from his HQ at Stone Hill was continuously forward along the Repulse Bay Road endeavouring with Lieut -Colonel W. J. Home to force a way either West via Middle Spur or North via the gap to join up with the West Infantry Brigade It was not known till later that the attempts were unsuccessful owing to the strength of the enemy. At about 1700 hours the enemy was reported to have surrounded the civilian food stores (Little Hong Kong) and to be attacking again at Wong Nei Oiong Gap, driving out a company of 2 Royal Scots and some Winnipeg Grenadiers. Some of the enemy moved up towards the high ground, Mount Nicholson.²²

83. At about 1930 hours, 20th December, a counter attack, about which I had previously instructed Lieut. -Colonel J. L R. Sutcliffe and planned for 1900 hours, was launched by a company of Winnipeg Grenadiers from Wanchai Gap, via Blacks Link to achieve the objects set out in para. 82 above, and to collect considerable numbers of wounded known to be at Wong Nei Chong Gap. Artillery support had been arranged but nothing was achieved, nor was the preliminary clearing of Mount Nicholson effected.

delay caused by a virtual breakdown of unit communications. He was unable to help in the last mentioned item, for the Brigade reserve of signals equipment had already been used to replace this unit's signal equipment, lost on the previous night's positions.

2月20日上午11點左右，收到消息稱，旁遮普團第14團2/A連已抵達香港仔，並正向壽臣山方向前進。但由於敵軍在該位置周圍兵力強大，而該連自身人數不足30人，白天他們未能取得進展。

79. 中午12點，堡壘皇家空軍被重組為三個分隊 - 兩個分隊負責灣仔峽，第三個分隊作為預備隊。他們奉命竭盡所能支援溫尼伯擲彈兵。一架正在赤柱上空飛行的日軍單翼飛機被擊中，顯然出現了故障，高度下降，最後一次低空飛行是在南丫島後方，此後再未出現，推測是飛機墜毀。戰鬥中共有五架敵機被擊落。

80. 下午1點，中國機組人員逃離了香港仔島上的防空探照燈。其餘五名英國士兵暫時加入了最近的步兵部隊。

81.
(i) 上午數名目擊者表示中國飛機轟炸了九龍。

(ii) 陳將軍報告說，余漢謀將軍已透過無線電報告，六萬軍隊駐紮在邊境的深圳，即將發動攻擊。²¹

82. 12月20日中午，敵軍繼續用各種船隻將兵力和物資傾瀉過海，北角地區和其他可能的據點因此遭到我方砲火的攻擊。上午，香港防空司令部司令H. B. 羅斯上校(Colonel H. B. Rose)被任命為西旅指揮官。其任務與以往相同——清除黃泥涌峽的敵人，並在赤柱峽高地建立防空陣地。14:00-15:00敵軍活躍於淺水灣酒店後方、壽臣山和斑納山，以及大潭水庫和水庫之間的公路沿線。敵軍一個砲兵連和兩個排部署在赤柱附近。白天，華里士準將從位於石山的指揮部沿淺水灣路持續前進，與W. J. 霍姆中校一道，試圖強行開闢一條經由中部山脊向西或經由缺口向北的通道，與西部步兵旅匯合。直到後來才得知，由於敵軍實力強大，這些嘗試都未能成功。據報，大約17:00，敵軍包圍了平民食品店，並再次向黃泥涌峽發起進攻，驅逐了由兩支皇家蘇格蘭步兵團和一些溫尼伯擲彈兵組成的一個連隊。部分敵軍向高地轟高信山(Mount Nicholson)推進。²²

83. 12月20日19:30左右，溫尼伯擲彈兵的一個連從灣仔峽經、布力徑(Blacks Link)發動了反攻，我此前已指示J. L R. Sutcliffe中校，計劃於19:00發動反攻，旨在實現上文第82段所述目標，並收留大量生在黃泥涌峽。砲火支援已安排完畢，但未能奏效，轟高信山的初步清理也未能完成。

84. (a) Major C. Manners (retired R.A.) telephoned at about 1900 hours from Repulse Bay Hotel reporting that Canadian troops had arrived. (b) At 1930 hours East Infantry Brigade was ordered to hold Repulse Bay Hotel at all costs, and Major Young, Royal Rifles of Canada, the Company Commander there, was ordered direct from Fortress HQ to pay particular attention to strong patrolling that night. The company was 140 strong

85 At 2000 hours, 20th December, the Senior Naval Officer Aberdeen reported that " A " Company 2/14 Punjab Regt. was still tied to the ground North of Brick Hill and that Major C R. Boxer had been wounded—making the third General Staff Officer wounded in that locality that day. It was apparent that there was little chance of getting through to Repulse Bay from the Aberdeen side. (It was afterwards established that " A " Company 2/14 Punjab Regt., only 25 strong, had tried every method of clearing the enemy from the strong pocket in which they were established with at least one machine gun and a light mortar.)

86 Serious fires were now reported in the Central District of Victoria and the Civil Fire Brigade asked for the assistance of troops which under the circumstances I was unable to provide.

87 (a) At 2230 hours I discussed the situation with Brigadier Wallis. A special reconnaissance patrol under Lieut. Bompas, R.A., had located two companies of enemy infantry working their way towards Repulse Bay Hotel, along the catchment from the East, during the afternoon. The road from Stanley to Repulse Bay was overlooked from the high ground Violet Hill and Middle Spur, with two hundred enemy in position, making the road unsafe. The Canadians could not get to Wong Nei Chong Gap by the routes tried this day. Brigadier Wallis considered the enemy to be in too great strength in the Hotel area to be turned out without proper artillery support, now a matter of great difficulty He believed the enemy were not so strong in the Gauge Basin area and that another plan should be tried, but it was pouring with rain, visibility very bad, the men tired out and they had had little food I ordered him

- (i) to hold what he had got,
- (ii) to press on to Wong Nei Chong Gap via Gauge Basin and
- (iii) to use Bren carriers boldly in reconnaissance.

(b) By midnight 20th-21st December two 3-7-in. Howitzers had been positioned near Stanley Prison with an observation post on the hill behind, i.e., to the South. These, together with one 18 pounder from a Beach Defense role (which had to be man-handled and could only fire over open sights from road locations), were the only remaining field pieces in East Infantry Brigade Commander's hands.

- (c) Later Commander East Infantry Brigade said that the earliest his attack could be staged was 0900 hours. Contributing factors were.
- (i) lack of transport and administrative facilities and

88. The company of 2 Royal Scots—see footnote to para. 82 was driven back in the early morning, exposing the flank of " B " Company 2/14 Punjab Regt.

84. (a) C. Manners少校（已退役的皇家陸軍）於19:00左右從淺水灣酒店致電報告，加拿大部隊已抵達。(b) 19:30，東部步兵旅奉命不惜一切代價堅守淺水灣酒店。連長、加拿大皇家步槍隊Young少校接到要塞總部的直接命令，要求當晚特別注意加強巡邏。該連共有140人。

85.12月20日20:00，香港仔海軍高級軍官報告稱，旁遮普省第14團2/A連仍被困在磚山以北的地面上，C. R. Boxer少校受傷——這是當天該地區第三名受傷的總參謀軍官。顯然，從香港仔一側前往淺水灣的可能性很小。（事後證實，旁遮普團第14團2/A連只有25人，他們嘗試了各種方法，試圖用至少一挺機槍和一門輕型迫擊砲清除他們所處的堅固包圍圈內的敵人。）

86.維多利亞城中部地區報告發生嚴重火災，民間消防隊請求部隊支援，但當時我無力提供支援。

87.(a) 22時30分，我與華里士準將討論了情況。由皇家陸軍中尉邦帕斯率領的特別偵察巡邏隊在下午發現兩個敵軍步兵連正沿著集水區從東側向淺水灣酒店進發。從紫羅蘭山和中部山脊的高地可以俯瞰從赤柱到淺水灣的道路，那裡有兩百名敵軍駐紮，道路不安全。加拿大人無法通過當天嘗試的路線到達黃泥涌峽。華里士準將認為，敵軍在酒店地區的兵力過於強大，如果沒有適當的砲火支援，撤退將非常困難。他認為，敵人在集水區地域沒有那麼強大，應該嘗試另一種計劃，但天正下著傾盆大雨，能見度很差，士兵們都累壞了，而且他們幾乎沒有食物。我命令他

- (i) 守住現有陣地；
- (ii) 經由水準儀盆地向黃泥涌峽推進；
- (iii) 大膽使用布倫式運兵車偵察。

(b) 12月20日至21日午夜，兩門3.7吋榴彈砲已部署在赤柱監獄附近，並在其後方山丘（即南側）設立了觀察哨。這兩門砲，加上一門用於海灘防禦的18磅砲（該砲必須人工搬運，並且只能在公路位置對著開闊的視野射擊），是東部步兵旅旅長手中僅存的野戰砲。

(c) 後來，東部步兵旅旅長表示，他最早可以在9點發動攻擊。造成這結果的因素包括：

- (i) 缺乏交通及行政設施；
- (ii) 部隊通訊幾乎中斷造成的延誤。他無法在最後提到的問題上提供幫助，因為旅的預備信號設備已經被用來替換該部隊前一晚陣地上丟失的信號設備。

88. 兩輛皇家蘇格蘭步兵連（見第82段註腳）在清晨被擊退，揭露了旁遮普團第14團2營「B」連的側翼。

89. Commander West Infantry Brigade arranged for a fresh attack at 0700 hours by the Winnipeg Grenadiers to recapture Wong Nei Chong Gap " C " Company of that regiment was in position at 0300 hours at Middle Gap, though they reported that they had encountered a party of enemy whilst moving up, and had suffered a few casualties. The attack did not succeed.

90. At about 0700 hours 21st December Major Manners (see para. 84 (a)) rang up again from Repulse Bay Hotel He said the defenses appeared to be quite inadequate, and with the women and children in the Hotel helpless, he viewed the situation with extreme pessimism At 0725 hours Major Young at Repulse Bay Hotel was ordered to organize two strong patrols, to reconnoiter Westwards from the Hotel and to clear up the situation at the junction of Island Road with the road to Hong Kong, where some troops who were coming down from " The Ridge " Advance Ordnance Depot had been ambushed over-night. At 0800 hours a review of the situation was received from Lt. Tresidder at Repulse Bay Hotel:

Enemy estimated 450 strong on Stanley Mound and over-looking Repulse Bay with H Q at Wong Nei Chong Gap: they had three machine guns and a heavy mortar they had British and Chinese prisoners with them some of the enemy were Koreans

91. At about 0600 hours 1 Middlesex Regt reported enemy attacking near pillbox 14 and on Brick Hill H.M.S " Cicala " (gunboat) was ordered to assist land operations in the Deepwater Bay area. Valuable close co-operation resulted. This ship entered the bay and shelled enemy mortars and artillery, scoring hits. Unfortunately strong air action developed against her, and having been badly holed she withdrew and sank later in the Lamma channel.

92. Meanwhile (see para. 85) " A " Company of 2/14 Punjab Regt had still made no head way and I ordered a senior officer to be sent at once from the battalion in Victoria. Lt.- Colonel Kidd elected to go himself and collected a few naval ratings in Aberdeen en route, but he was most regrettably killed when putting his own men in to the attack on Shouson Hill in order to clear that area. The attack failed with twenty-one casualties (out of a strength of twenty-five). At 0900 hours 21st December Major H. Marsh reported from his machine gun company H.Q. at **Little Hong Kong** that the enemy could be seen moving from Wong Nei Chong Gap along the crest of the hill westwards. That matters in that area had not progressed favourably was evident when at 1025 hours I learnt that our troops were being pushed back North of Blacks Link 23 and Mount Cameron. The Winnipeg Grenadiers now in positions on Mount Cameron were ordered to hold on at all costs.

93. A second air raid on the Peak District developed at 0950 hours and a bomb of 500 lbs. was dropped, amongst others, just below Jardines Corner, entirely blocking the road and cutting off communications with Volunteer HQ except by telephone, by which means the Observation Post Commander reported that forty steam launches in line, with steam up, were assembled two hundred yards off shore by Kai Tak aerodrome. Unfortunately, at this time Royal Artillery communications to observation posts were destroyed except the one to High West, and from this observation post the target was invisible.

89. 西步兵旅指揮官安排溫尼伯擲彈兵於7點再次發動進攻，以奪回黃內涌峽。該團的「C」連於3點在中峽就位，但他們報告稱，在前進途中遭遇了一隊敵軍，並遭受了一些傷亡。這次進攻沒有成功。

90. 12月21日上午7點左右，曼納斯少校（見第84(a)段）再次從淺水灣酒店打來電話。他表示，飯店內的防禦工事似乎相當薄弱，加上酒店內的婦女和兒童無助，他對情勢極為悲觀。上午7點25分，淺水灣酒店的楊少校奉命組織兩支強大的巡邏隊，從酒店向西偵察，並清理香島路與通往香港的道路交界處的情況。一些從「山脊」前進軍械庫下來的部隊昨晚在那裡遭到伏擊。上午8點，淺水灣酒店的特雷西德中尉報告了情況：

敵軍估計有450人駐紮在赤柱山丘，俯瞰淺水灣，司令部設在黃泥衝峽；他們裝備了三挺機槍和一挺重型迫擊砲，隨行的還有英國和中國戰俘，其中一些是韓國人。

91. 大約早上6點，米杜息士團1報告，敵軍在磚山14號碉堡附近發動攻擊。皇家海軍「西卡拉」號（砲艇）(H.M.S Cicala)奉命協助深水灣地區的陸上作戰。雙方進行了寶貴的密切合作。該艦進入海灣，砲擊敵軍迫擊砲和火砲，並擊中目標。不幸的是，敵軍遭遇了猛烈的空襲，艦身被嚴重擊穿，隨後撤退並沉沒在南丫海峽。

92. 同時（見第85段），旁遮普團第14團2營的「A」連仍然沒有取得進展，我命令立即從維多利亞城營派一名高級軍官前往。基德中校選擇親自前往，途中在香港仔獲得了一些海軍士兵的認可，但令人遺憾的是，他在率領自己的士兵進攻壽臣山以清理該地區時陣亡。這次進攻以失敗告終，傷亡人數為21人（總兵力25人）。12月21日上午9點，H.馬什少校從位於「**小香港**」的機槍連總部報告稱，可以看到敵人從黃泥涌峽沿著山頂向西移動。10點25分，我得知我們的部隊正被擊退至布力徑23號和金馬倫山以北，這顯然表明該地區的局勢不容樂觀。目前駐紮在金馬倫山的溫尼伯擲彈兵奉命不惜一切代價堅守陣地。

93. 上午9點50分，峰區再次遭到空襲，投下了一顆500磅（約220公斤）的炸彈。砲彈投擲在怡和角下方等地，完全阻塞了道路，切斷了與志願軍總部（除電話外）的通訊。根據觀察哨指揮官報告，40艘蒸汽汽艇已在離岸200碼處集結，蒸汽已升起。不幸的是，此時皇家砲兵與觀察哨的通訊已被摧毀，只有通往高西的那條仍保留，從這個觀察哨看不到目標。

編者按: **Little Hong Kong** 「小香港」，「**Little Hong Kong**」在二次世界大戰期間指的是香港島南區黃竹坑附近的壽臣山中央彈藥庫（**Central Ordnance Munitions Depot**）。這個彈藥庫於1930年代末由英軍建成，是一處軍事要塞，因為英軍為迷惑日本間諜，故意將該地以「小香港」（**Little Hong Kong**）暱稱來混淆其真實位置，將其與附近的「香港仔」名稱混淆。該中央彈藥庫是香港防衛戰期間，最後一個對日軍投降的據點，守軍直到1941年12月27日才投降，總督楊慕琦12月25日投降公告還晚兩天，「**Little Hong Kong**」這個名稱源自英軍刻意為戰略保密和迷惑日軍而用的假名。

94. At 1000 hours 21st December 2/34. Punjab Regt. in the Garden Road-Kennedy Road area were ordered to re-orientate themselves to face South East to cover a possible break through from the Wanchai Gap direction. - A section of machine guns was sent at once to connect up by fire with the Wanchai Gap dispositions, at which place were located the HQ of both West Infantry Brigade and the Winnipeg Grenadiers. At the same time all garrisons of 2/14 Punjab pillboxes on the North shore were to be withdrawn to Battalion HQ—I had now to take considerable risks on other portions of the island defenses in view of the direct menace from the Mount Cameron area.

95. By 1100 hours the enemy had brought a heavy mortar into action just off King's Road near the Power Station, with which they bombarded the R.N. Yard. They also bombed Repulse Bay area and carried out a ground attack on the Little Hong Kong area from the direction of Aberdeen, thus threatening encirclement, at any rate temporarily, of that important area in which was located the new R.A.O.C. Magazine and the main bulk of the remaining ammunition stock. The enemy had landed some troops near Causeway Bay, and the house-tops in that area were reported "crowded with them." At noon they were pressing down King's Road and had mounted a gun at No. 163. At this time all the guns, at the R.N. Yard were out of action, following a heavy bombardment.

96.

(a) At midday 21st December our "line" ran from Little Hong Kong area to the Southern slopes of Mount Cameron. In the former area were located two parties under Major H. Marsh, i Middlesex Regt., and Major A. J. Dewar, R.A.S.C., respectively. Major Marsh had one officer (plus a R.A.M.C. officer), eighteen other ranks i Middlesex Regt., five men of the Winnipeg Grenadiers and fourteen Chinese of the Medium Detachment of the HKVDC, and was located in the "Combined Company HQ" of the defense sub sector—one company of the Winnipeg Grenadiers having been withdrawn for the Wong Nei Chong Gap counter attacks. Major A. J. Dewar, with twenty naval ratings, placed himself under the command of Major Marsh and was posted on the high ground (Shouson Hill private houses) covering the East flank. This "Island" of defense resisted all attacks from 20th December to the afternoon of 25th December and fought very gallantly, as did also a similar isolated detachment, viz, the administrative details on "The Ridge" under Lt.-Colonel R. A. P., Macpherson.

(b) During the course of the morning I had issued instructions to withdraw the Middlesex machine guns from the pillboxes between Sandy Bay and Aberdeen, and to put them on a mobile basis as far as possible: a platoon at a time could be "ferried," even though the transport situation was acute. The South West sector of the island defense was therefore completely denuded,—another undesirable but necessary risk. A section of machine guns was now sent to supplement the defenses in the Aberdeen-Bennets Hill area, under Commander H. C. Millet, R.N. (ret.). A platoon was also sent to the Officer Commanding 1 Middlesex Regt., for the Leighton Hill defenses.

94. 12月21日10:00，花園道-堅尼地道地區的旁遮普2/34團奉命重新調整方向，面向東南，以掩護可能從灣仔峽方向突破的部隊。——立即派出一組機槍與灣仔峽部署的部隊進行火力支援，西部步兵旅和溫尼伯擲彈兵的總部都設在那裡。與此同時，北岸2/14旁遮普礮堡的所有駐軍都將被撤回營部——考慮到來自金馬倫山地區的直接威脅，我現在必須在島嶼防禦的其他部分冒相當大的風險。

95. 至上午11點，敵軍在英皇道附近發電廠附近部署了一門重型迫擊砲，砲轟了皇家海軍船塢。他們還轟炸了淺水灣地區，並從香港仔方向對「小香港」地區發動了地面攻擊，威脅要包圍這個重要地區，至少是暫時的，因為那裡有皇家海軍航空兵團的新彈藥庫和大部分剩餘彈藥。敵軍在銅鑼灣附近登陸了一些部隊，據報道該地區的屋頂「擠滿了人」。中午時分，他們沿著英皇道推進，並在163號架設了一門火砲。此時，皇家海軍船塢的所有火砲在遭到猛烈砲擊後都停止了戰鬥。

96.

(a) 12月21日中午，我們的「防線」從「小香港」地區延伸至金馬倫山南麓。在前一個區域，駐紮著兩支隊伍，分別隸屬於米杜息士軍團的H. Marsh少校和皇家海軍陸戰隊少校A. J. Dewar少校。Marsh少校手下有一名軍官（另加一名皇家海軍陸戰隊軍官）、米杜息士軍團的其他十八名軍官、五名溫尼伯擲彈兵和十四名香港防衛軍(HKVDC)中型支隊的中國士兵，他們駐紮在國防分部的「聯合連隊指揮部」——溫尼伯擲彈兵的一個連隊已被撤回，準備參加黃泥涌峽的反攻。A. J. Dewar少校擁有二十名海軍士兵，受Marsh少校指揮，駐守在高地（壽臣山私人住宅），負責掩護東翼。從12月20日至25日下午，這座「島嶼」防禦工事抵禦了所有進攻，英勇作戰。同樣英勇的還有一支類似的孤立小隊，即R. A. P. 麥克弗森中校指揮的「山脊」行政分隊。

(b) 上午，我已下令將米杜息士機槍從赤柱灣和香港仔之間的礮堡中撤出，並儘可能地進行機動部署：即使運輸情況緊急，也可以一次「運送」一個排。因此，島嶼防禦工事的西南區完全被摧毀——這是另一個不受歡迎但必要的風險。現在，一部分機槍被派往增援香港仔-班納山地區的防禦工事，由皇家海軍指揮官H. C. 米勒（已退役）指揮。還派遣一個排前往米杜息士第一團指揮官處，負責禮頓山防禦工事。

97.

- (a) Mortaring of North shore defences continued at 1300 hours 21st December, and pill boxes were subjected to accurate high velocity shell fire from both Kowloon and positions on their flank on the island. Pill box 59, for instance received thirty direct hits, but the Middlesex sergeant in command personally upheld the defence, though withdrawing the crew temporarily.
- (b) Enemy craft were still ferrying backwards and forwards between Kowloon and the Sugar Factory-North Point area. (c) In the morning a motor torpedo boat had evacuated from Stanley the Commanding Officer of 5/7 Rajput Regt. and the remnants of his battle HQ, and he now took over command of the troops of 5/7 Rajput Regt. who were fighting alongside 1 Middlesex Regt.

98. HKVDC

- (a) A report was received that No. 1 Company had had heavy casualties in the Stanley Mound area and had lost all their officers. The remains of the company had rallied at Stanley.
- (b) (b) The A.A. Lewis gun post of No. 6 Company (Portuguese) at "Watson's," Causeway Bay, reported that they had been captured by Japanese, disarmed, and told to make off towards our lines. They did so and rejoined for duty.

99. 1330 hours. A Japanese destroyer, escorting two merchant vessels, was sighted South of Cheung Chau Island, heading for Hong Kong.

97.

- (a) 12月21日13:00，北岸防禦工事的迫擊砲火持續進行，碉堡遭到來自九龍營及其島側陣地的精確高速砲火攻擊。例如，59號碉堡被30發砲彈直接擊中，但米杜息士營的指揮官親自指揮，儘管暫時撤回了營員，但仍堅持防禦。
- (b) 敵艦仍在九龍營和糖廠-北角地區之間來回穿梭。
- (c) 上午，一艘魚雷快艇從斯坦利撤離了第5/7拉吉普團的指揮官及其戰鬥指揮部殘餘人員，他現在接管了與米杜息士營並肩作戰的第5/7拉吉普團的部隊指揮權。

98. 香港防衛軍

- (a) 收到報告稱，第一連在赤柱崗地區傷亡慘重，所有軍官全部陣亡。該連的殘部已在赤柱集結。
- (b) 位於銅鑼灣「屈臣氏」的第六連（葡萄牙人）的A.A. 劉易斯砲位報告稱，他們已被日軍俘虜，解除武裝，並被命令向我軍防線撤退。他們遵命撤退並重新加入戰鬥。

99. 13:30。一艘日本驅逐艦在長洲島以南護航兩艘商船，正駛向香港。



上圖：日軍沿著香港島的山徑前進。照片中士兵手持的長桿是(Bangalore)班加羅爾魚雷(爆破筒)，這種管子裡裝滿了炸藥用於在攻擊碉堡時清除電線和地雷等障礙物。圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室

Part III-E

100. 1430 hours.

(a) Two companies of enemy occupied the whole length of Mount Nicholson, and brought up a small gun.

(b) A report was received from "A" Company Royal Rifles of Canada that the whole company had moved. One platoon had reached the " Ridge " and another platoon was on Middle Spur though the enemy were still firing from it. The situation at Repulse Bay being so unsatisfactory, I ordered a senior officer to be sent to take local command there. Major C. R. Templar, R.A. was selected. On arrival he collected two trucks, filled them with Canadian troops and went up towards Wong Nei Chong Gap.

101. At 1600 hours 21st December a telegram was received from the Military Attache, Chungking, that the main Chinese attack could not start before 1st January but " it was hoped that " twenty bombers would operate at once against Japanese aerodromes.

102 The question of the women and children at Repulse Bay Hotel now arose. It was difficult to give a satisfactory answer but I decided that the safest course would be to leave them there for the night The situation was extremely " fluid," both in this area and the Little Hong Kong area.

103. After dark enemy landing craft operating near the R.N. Yard were fired on from pill boxes and passed West down the harbor, but no actual landing was attempted. Strong Police patrols were sent out in the Central and Western Districts for special reconnaissance to confirm this.

104. (a) During the day 21st December The Royal Rifles of Canada had been trying to force their way north-eastwards as planned—one company and carriers, with No 1 Company Volunteer Machine Gunners in support, up the Tytam Road; a second Company directed across country on to Bridge Hill. These companies made a great effort, in spite of handicaps, but by the late afternoon could get no further forward than Red Hill-Bridge Hill, owing to considerable resistance by the enemy. Volunteer machine-gunners (Nos 1 and 2 Companies) rendered valuable forward support on this occasion. (b) At 2030 hours 21st December Major C. R. Templar reported an unsuccessful attack on Wong Nei Chong Gap and that there were still about one hundred R.A.S.C. and R.A.O.C. on " The Ridge," with fifty Canadians in Altamira House. Further, that sixty to seventy Canadians were in Repulse Bay Hotel, round which sniping was continuing.

105. At about midnight a cable was received from the War Office emphasizing the need to destroy all oil installations This was carried out by artillery fire on the next day (22nd) The Texaco tanks at Tsun Wan Wai, the Shell tanks at Tai Kok Tsui (next to Cosmopolitan Dock), and the R.N tanks a mile to the South thereof, were all set well alight, but the Socony tanks²⁴ at Laichikok could not be shelled as they were close to the hospital establishment in the women's prison.

106.

(a) In the evening (21st December) the decision was taken to evacuate " The Ridge," and at about 2230 hours 8 officers and 120 other ranks left, trying at the same time to clear the catchwater in a southerly direction This, however, failed under enemy machine gun fire. They sheltered for the night in " Overbays ", a private house on the edge of Deepwater Bay.

(b) During the evening some Japanese managed to penetrate into the Repulse Bay Hotel but were evicted by prompt action initiated by Major Templar.

107. Night 21/22nd December. Enemy launches kept the North shore defenses on the alert, but there were no attempted landings. Sniping occurred from houses round the Race Course and also in Victoria. The civil population observed the curfew well.

108 In the morning the enemy opened heavy fire from Middle Spur and resumed operations on the high ground North of the Repulse Bay Hotel, and at 1000 hours he was reported in possession of two large houses overlooking Deepwater Bay. At 1030 hours 22nd December I placed Stanley Garrison under the direct orders of Brigadier Wallis By now the intention of linking up East Infantry Brigade with West Infantry Brigade by moving westwards had perforce to be abandoned. It may be noted that at this time the 3 7-in Howitzers at Stanley had only 45 rounds left in all. This was supplemented later when the provisioning of Stanley garrison was carried out by motor torpedo boats from Aberdeen. In the meantime the enemy had cut off the water supply in Stanley by the capture of the Taitam Reservoir area machinery. For the forces in the Repulse area there was now only two days' supply of food and water. The evacuation of the civilians was still quite impracticable either 'by road or by water though I went into the question most carefully

第三部分-E

100. 14:30。

(a) 敵軍兩個連隊佔領了聳高信山的全境，並運來了一門小型火炮。

(b) 收到加拿大皇家步槍隊A連的報告，整個連隊已撤離。一個排已到達“山脊”，另一個排位於中部山脊，但敵軍仍在從那裡射擊。淺水灣的局勢並不樂觀，我命令派遣一名高階軍官前往當地指揮。皇家陸軍少校C. R. Templar被選中。抵達後，他調集了兩輛卡車，裝滿加拿大部隊，向黃泥衝峽進發。101. 12月21日下午4點，我收到駐重慶武官發來的電報，稱中國軍隊的主要進攻無法在1月1日前發動，但「希望」有20架轟炸機同時對日本機場進行攻擊。

102. 現在，淺水灣酒店的婦女和兒童的問題出現了。我很難給出令人滿意的答案，但我決定最安全的做法是讓他們留在那裡過夜。該地區和「小香港」地區的局勢都極度「不穩定」。

103. 天黑後，在皇家海軍船塢附近活動的敵方登陸艇遭到碉堡的射擊，並向西沿港口航行，但並未真正嘗試登陸。警方派出強大的巡邏隊前往中西區進行特別偵察，以確認這一點。

104.

(a) 12月21日白天，加拿大皇家步槍隊按計劃向東北方向推進 - 一個連和運輸車，在第一連志願機槍手的支援下，沿著泰坦路前進；另一個連則被指示穿越鄉村，前往橋山。儘管面臨重重障礙，這些連隊仍奮力前行，但到了傍晚，由於敵軍頑強抵抗，他們無法再前進到紅山-橋山一帶。志願機槍手（第一連和第二連）在這次行動中提供了寶貴的前方支援。

(b) 12月21日20:30，C. R. Templar少校報告稱，對黃泥涌峽的進攻失敗，「山脊」上仍有大約100名皇家步槍隊和皇家陸軍作戰司令部司令，以及50名加拿大士兵駐紮在 Altamira House。此外，六、七十名加拿大人待在淺水灣飯店，飯店周圍仍在持續狙擊。

105. 午夜時分，陸軍部發出電報，強調必須摧毀所有石油設施。第二天（22日），砲火正式實施。位於駿灣圍的德士古油庫、位於大角咀（大都會碼頭旁）的殼牌油罐以及其以南一英里處的皇家海軍油罐均被點燃，但位於荔枝角的索科尼油罐24由於靠近女子監獄的醫院設施，無法被砲擊。

106. (a) 12月21日晚，決定撤離「山脊」。約22時30分，8名軍官和120名其他士兵離開，試圖同時向南清理引水道。然而，在敵方機槍火力的打擊下，行動失敗。他們在深水灣邊緣的一處私人住宅「Overbays」避難過夜。(b) 晚間，一些日軍設法潛入淺水灣酒店，但被坦普勒少校迅速驅散。

107. 12月21/22日夜間。敵方汽艇使北岸防禦工事保持戒備，但未發生登陸嘗試。賽馬場周圍以及維多利亞州的房屋中發生了狙擊。平民遵守宵禁。

108 清晨，敵軍從中部支脈發動猛烈砲火，並在淺水灣酒店北面的高地上恢復行動。10點，敵軍據報佔領了兩棟俯瞰深水灣的大房子。12月22日10點30分，我將赤柱駐軍置於華里士準將的直接指揮之下。此時，向西移動以連接東步兵旅和西步兵旅的計畫不得不放棄。值得注意的是，此時赤柱駐軍的3門7吋榴彈砲總共只剩下45發砲彈。後來，赤柱駐軍的補給由來自香港仔的魚雷艇提供，補充了彈藥。同時，敵軍繳獲了大潭水庫地區的機械設備，切斷了赤柱的供水。對於淺水灣地區的部隊來說，現在只剩下兩天的食物和水了。儘管我非常仔細地研究過這個問題，但平民撤離無論是通過公路還是水路，仍然是相當不可行的。



上圖：香港保衛戰的歷史現場香港仔工業學校 圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室

- (a) 1030 hours 22nd December —Commander West Infantry Brigade reported that the Canadian troops in the Mount Cameron area were being heavily dive-bombed and mortared. They had no tools with which to dig in (although the rocky ground made this in any case almost impossible), no 3-in: mortars or bombs, there was no shelter, and there was nothing to do except stick it out with small arms fire from behind the rocks. These conditions applied in general to the subsequent fighting on the important high ground there. Morale now had been seriously affected by the feeling that it was futile to continue resistance with insufficient equipment, with insufficient mobile artillery support, and without both air support and air observation.
- (b) (b) At this time, too, 2 Royal Scots were being heavily mortared from the ground near Jardines Lookout. The enemy seemed to have no difficulty in keeping up his ammunition supply across country from North Shore: and evidence was afterwards forthcoming that local Chinese were forcibly impressed as carriers. Much of the Japanese mortar ammunition, too, was of a much lighter nature than the British: one variety was 95 per cent. H.E., thus causing great moral effect, particularly valuable on un-seasoned troops in the opening phases of battle. The Japanese handling of mortars was extremely good. They were very quick into action; were quickly ranged, and accurate concentrations were put down at short notice at ranges of 1,500 yards.
- (c) (c) By the early afternoon 22nd December the enemy was consolidating his positions on the northern lower slopes of Mount Nicholson within one hundred yards of the 2 Royal Scots forward defended localities. (d) The Japanese air force at this time was extremely accurate.

110. 1400 hours. The enemy gradually advanced in the Repulse Bay area. An 8 pounder here, over open sights, knocked out some enemy mortars on Violet Hill. In addition the enemy was infiltrating southwards from the high ground "The Twins" and Netting Hill. The Royal Rifles of Canada's positions on Sugar Loaf and Stanley Mound were precarious. Commander East Infantry Brigade telephoned that he was hoping to arrange the evacuation of the civilians from the Hotel this night.²⁵

111.

(a) During the morning I suggested to the Officer Commanding 1 Middlesex Regt. that he could not long hope to exercise control from so forward a position as Leighton Hill. At 1600 hours very heavy mortar fire developed on this area. HQ 1 Middlesex Regt. accordingly withdrew and established itself in Hennessey Road, Wanchai—the densely populated area West of Mount Parish.

(b) The enemy launch traffic to North Shore, which had been going on all day, increased during the afternoon.

112. In the afternoon 22nd December, Commander West Infantry Brigade considered from the information available that the enemy was concentrating between Little Hong Kong and Mount Cameron with a view to attacking North-West on Wanchai Gap. Counter measures were accordingly ordered by him.

113. Meanwhile I had agreed to an adjustment of the line in the area of the Filter Beds. A gap existed between the right flank of the company of 2/14 Punjab Regt. and the left of 2 Royal Scots, thus giving the enemy a line of attack towards the Race Course, in which area he was already active with fifth columnists. Such an attack would envelop the whole Leighton Hill area, turn the left flank of the 2 Royal Scots and cut straight in to Wanchai, and I had insufficient troops in hand to meet such a contingency. This adjustment was carried out without incident and the company of 2/14 Punjab Regt. (only thirty-five strong) thus freed moved to the area South-East end of the Race Course, thus linking up with the 2 Royal Scots West of Mount Nicholson Camp. The Company Commander on arrival had, however, only eight men with two Light Automatics at his disposal, owing to casualties and dispersal of his men from enemy shelling in the darkness. The enemy attacked the company of 5/7 Rajput Regt. which remained in the area South-East end of the Race Course. Although this company was of a composite nature only—two platoons formed from the remains of "B" and "D" Companies—it held its ground successfully.

109.

(a) 12月22日10:30 - 西部步兵旅指揮官報告稱，駐紮在卡梅倫山地區的加拿大部隊遭到猛烈的俯衝轟炸和迫擊砲轟擊。他們沒有挖掘工具（儘管岩石地面幾乎不可能挖掘），沒有三英寸迫擊砲或炸彈，沒有掩體，除了躲在岩石後用輕武器射擊之外別無選擇。這些情況普遍存在於隨後在重要高地上進行的戰鬥中。士氣受到嚴重影響，因為人們認為，在裝備不足、機動砲火支援不足、空中支援和空中觀察不足的情況下繼續抵抗是徒勞無功的。

(b) 同時，兩輛皇家蘇格蘭坦克也在怡和山附近遭到來自地面的猛烈迫擊砲轟擊。敵人似乎毫不費力地從北岸向全國各地運送彈藥；後來有證據表明，當地華人被迫徵召為搬運工。日軍迫擊砲彈藥的重量也比英軍輕得多；其中一種彈藥的含彈量高達95%，因此對士氣產生了極大的影響，尤其對戰鬥初期缺乏經驗的部隊來說彌足珍貴。日軍對迫擊砲的操作極為熟練。它們迅速投入戰鬥，快速射程，並在1500碼的範圍內迅速集中火力。

(c) 到12月22日下午早些時候，敵軍已在尼科爾森山北麓低坡鞏固陣地，距離皇家蘇格蘭軍兩處前緣防禦點不到100碼。

(d) 此時的日軍空軍精準度極高。

110. 14:00。敵軍逐漸向淺水灣地區推進。一門8磅炮在開闊的視野範圍內，擊毀了紫羅蘭山上的一些敵方迫擊砲。此外，敵軍正從孖崗山高地向南前進。加拿大皇家步槍隊在Sugar Loaf和赤柱山的陣地岌岌可危。東部步兵旅指揮官打電話說，他希望今晚安排飯店平民撤離。

25

111.

(a) 上午，我向米杜息士第一團指揮官建議，他不可能指望在雷頓山這樣前沿的陣地長期控制局勢。下午4點，該地區遭受了猛烈的迫擊砲火襲擊。米杜息士第一團指揮部因此撤退，並駐紮在灣仔軒尼詩道巴里士山以西人口稠密的地區。

(b) 敵軍開往北岸的汽艇交通一整天都在繁忙，下午更是增加。

112. 12月22日下午，西部步兵旅指揮官根據現有情報認為，敵軍正集結在「小香港」和金馬倫山之間，意圖從灣仔峽向西北方向進攻。因此，他下令採取應對措施。

113. 同時，我同意調整低地地區的防線。旁遮普第十四團第二連的右翼與皇家蘇格蘭營第二連的左翼之間存在一個缺口，這使得敵軍可以向跑馬場方向進攻，而敵軍的第五縱隊已在該地區積極活動。這樣的攻擊將包圍整個禮頓山地區，繞過皇家蘇格蘭營第二連的左翼，直接切入灣仔，而我方現有兵力不足以應付這種突發情況。此次調整順利進行，旁遮普第十四團第二營（僅三十五人）的連隊得以解脫，並轉移到跑馬場東南端地區，與轟高遜山營地以西的第二皇家蘇格蘭團匯合。然而，由於傷亡慘重，以及夜間敵軍砲擊導致士兵分散，連長抵達時只剩下八人和兩把輕型自動步槍。敵軍襲擊了仍駐紮在跑馬場東南端地區的拉傑普特第十七團第五營。儘管該連由混合部隊組成——由“B”連和“D”連的殘部組成兩個排——但它成功地守住了陣地。



上圖：香港保衛戰的歷史現場舊鯉魚門炮台(現已成博物館) 圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室

114. During the day 22nd December Stanley Mound and Stanley Prison had been shelled and mortared, and at midnight I received news of the enemy capture of the Stanley Mound feature.

115. The isolated troops at "Overbays" (see para. 106) had been in close contact with the enemy throughout the day and at about 1930 hours the place was evacuated in an endeavor to join up at Repulse Bay Hotel. The majority succeeded in getting past the Japanese. A Warrant Officer of the R.A.O.C., however, telephoned to Fortress HQ at 2000 hours to say that he and four wounded were alone in the house. He was instructed to surrender. There was in point of fact (though this was unknown at the time) a party of thirty others upstairs. This party attempted to surrender at 0800 hours the following day (23rd December) but were hand-grenaded in their rooms and a number were bayoneted. Corporal Jeffery and six men escaped, leaving twenty-eight dead, including four Japanese, in the room. The Warrant Officer and the wounded on the ground floor were not seen alive after 2300 hours on the 22nd, and they were not amongst the eventual Prisoners of War. It can only be assumed that they were burned to death when the Japanese later fired the house.

116. A serious report concerning the water supply came from the Director of Public Works at 0100 hours. No water was coming from Taitam Reservoir, the Aberdeen supply was out of action for at least two days, and only a trickle was coming from Pokfulam. "The town (of Victoria) was now helpless." The fighting troops were also feeling the shortage of water.

117. At about 0130 hours Commander West Infantry Brigade reported the loss of Mount Cameron, that troops were coming back in disorder, and that an effort was being made to rally them at Magazine Gap and Mount Gough. Wanchai Gap was still held. At 0345 hours 23rd December the Royal Engineers reported their rear party still in position on Mount Kellett and that the Winnipeg Grenadiers were being re-organised in the Gough Hill Police Station area.

At 0430 hours the Royal Engineers and 4 and 7 Companies H.K.V.D.C. were still in position, the Volunteers holding their original line in the area Magazine Gap which they had taken up three days previously. A new R.A. (West) H.Q. was being established at Victoria Gap. At this critical time the Royal Navy offered valuable help—one officer and 40 men of the Royal Marines—who were ordered to Magazine Gap to report to the senior officer there (Lt.-Colonel F. D. Field, R.A.) for the purpose of clearing up the situation at Wanchai Gap, now out of touch. At about 0600 hours it was reported that three platoons of the Royal Navy from Aberdeen had already moved forward to Bennets Hill to reinforce the machine gunners of 1 Middlesex Regt. already in position there. By 0800 hours 23rd December Lt.-Colonel F. D. Field reported that he had got into touch with 2 Royal Scots at Wanchai Gap and he was instructed to send a fighting patrol to Mount Cameron to ascertain the situation there. It was learnt from him that "A" Company 2 Royal Scots was still in position near St. Albert's Convent, which had been occupied by us as a military hospital.

From now onwards until 1100 hours many conflicting reports were received concerning Mount Cameron, but it was apparent that the crest of this commanding and important feature remained in enemy hands. Information indicated that the enemy's local HQ and organising centre was at Wong Nei Chong Gap, but owing to the configuration of the ground it was not possible to shell this over the top of Mount Nicholson, for the remaining sections of mobile artillery were in positions in the area Victoria Peak-Mount Gough-Mount Kellett. However I am confident that heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy on the stretch of Blacks Link between Wong Nei Chong Gap and Middle Gap, for a 9.2-in. gun from Stanley had been engaging enemy in this area for the last two days with immediate observation from Shoushon Hill nearby. In addition Major H. Marsh had expended some 20,000 rounds from his medium machine guns on very good targets at ideal ranges. It was now learnt that two small ammunition convoys had got through to Little Hong Kong during the previous night and had returned successfully with much needed supplies. At this time Stanley was being supplied with ammunition by motor torpedo boat.

114. 12月22日白天，赤柱山丘和赤柱監獄遭到砲擊和迫擊砲轟擊，午夜時分，我收到敵軍已佔領赤柱山丘的消息。

115. 被孤立於「Overbays」（參見第106段）的部隊全天與敵軍保持著密切接觸，約19:30撤離該地，試圖前往淺水灣酒店會合。大部分部隊成功突破日軍防線。然而，皇家陸軍作戰司令部的一名準尉在20:00致電要塞總部，表示他和四名傷者獨自留在屋內。他被指示投降。事實上（儘管當時並不清楚），樓上還有另外三十人。這群人於隔天（12月23日）上午8點試圖投降，但在房間裡遭到手榴彈攻擊，有些人被刺刀刺死。傑弗裡下士和六名士兵逃脫，房間裡留下28人死亡，其中包括4名日本人。22日晚上11點後，一樓的準尉和傷者不見生還，他們最後也沒有被列入戰俘名單。只能推測他們是在日軍後來縱火焚燒房屋時被燒死的。

116. 凌晨1點，公共工程部主任發來了一份關於供水問題的嚴重報告。大潭水庫停水，香港仔供水至少停了兩天，薄扶林供水也只有涓涓細流。維多利亞城現在束手無策。戰鬥部隊也感受到了缺水的威脅。

117. 約凌晨1點30分，西部步兵旅指揮官報告金馬倫山失守，部隊撤退時陷入混亂，正在努力在馬已仙峽和歌賦山集結。灣仔峽仍被堅守。12月23日凌晨3點45分，皇家工兵報告稱，他們的後方部隊仍在奇力山駐紮，溫尼伯擲彈兵正在歌賦山警察局地區重新集結。

凌晨4點30分，皇家工兵連和香港防衛軍第4連和第7連仍在陣地，防衛軍則堅守著三天前佔領的馬已仙峽地區的原有防線。維多利亞峽正在建立一個新的皇家海軍（西）司令部。在這一關鍵時刻，皇家海軍提供了寶貴的援助——1名軍官和40名皇家海軍陸戰隊士兵——他們奉命前往馬已仙峽向那裡的高級軍官（皇家海軍中校F. D. Field）匯報，以理清灣仔峽的局勢，因為灣仔峽現已失聯。大約6點，據報告，來自香港仔的皇家海軍三個排已經前往班納山，增援已經在那裡駐紮的米杜息士第一團的機槍手。12月23日上午8點，F. D. 菲爾德中校報告稱，他已與位於灣仔德峽的兩支皇家蘇格蘭步兵營取得聯繫，並奉命派遣一支戰鬥巡邏隊前往金馬倫山，了解當地情況。他獲悉，皇家蘇格蘭步兵營第二連「A」連仍駐紮在聖士提反書院附近，該書院院曾被軍用作軍醫院。

從此時起直至上午11點，關於金馬倫山的情報相互矛盾，但顯然這座制高點的重要山峰仍在敵方手中。情報顯示，敵方在當地的指揮部和組織中心位於黃泥涌峽，但由於地形原因，無法越過最高遜山頂進行砲擊，因為剩餘的機動砲兵部隊駐紮在太平山-歌賦山-奇力山一帶。然而，我相信，在黃泥涌峽和中峽之間的布萊克斯連線一帶，敵軍傷亡慘重，因為過去兩天，斯坦利的9.2英寸火砲一直在這一地區與敵軍交戰，而附近的壽臣山則隨時準備進行監視。此外，H. 馬什少校用他的中型機槍在理想射程內對目標進行了約2萬發子彈的射擊。據悉，前一天晚上，兩支小型彈藥運輸隊已抵達「小香港」，並成功帶回了急需的補給。此時，赤柱正在透過魚雷艇接收彈藥補給。

118. Meanwhile the situation to the North was causing me considerable anxiety. The composite company of 5/7 Rajput Regt. much reduced in numbers and short of ammunition and food, had been forced to withdraw at about 0800 hours, exposing the right flank of the Middlesex Leighton Hill position held by Captain C. M. Man's " Z " Company. At 0922 hours he was holding on, though the enemy was infiltrating into the houses and streets around him. He had only forty men, with six machine guns. At 1000 hours the enemy attacked him strongly, and heavily shelled the Bowington area. At 1100 hours the bombardment again intensified and the positions of one machine gun platoon were completely destroyed. The guns, however, moved into the Lee Theatre to hold the North flank. At Fortress H.Q. fifty Royal Artillery and 2 Royal Scots personnel were collected and sent to reinforce 1 Middlesex Regt.

119. At 1000 hours 23rd December Commander East Infantry Brigade reported that a counter-attack on Stanley Mound had failed. The Royal Rifles of Canada had had heavy losses, the enemy were infiltrating and the Commanding Officer felt he must fall back. The Infantry Brigade was in the process of reconnoitering and organising three defensive positions in depth which were to be held to the last, the most northerly being well forward of Stanley Village. The Canadians felt that they could put up a better resistance on flatter ground, and on a narrower front, where communications would be simpler. The loss of the tactically important high ground was fully realised and very regrettable.

120. At 1000 hours the enemy were attacking Bennets Hill and bombing Aberdeen Dockyard, also A.A. positions in Victoria City.

121. At 1130 hours HQ 1 Middlesex Regt. was forced to withdraw to a prepared position. At noon the line ran: —South-east corner Race Course to (exclusive) Leighton Hill (sixty men of 5/7 Rajput Regt.)—Leighton Hill and northwards (by 1 Middlesex Regt) to pill box 55.

At about 1500 hours the enemy attacked, but was beaten off.

122. At 1330 hours 23rd December communication was re-established with HQ West Infantry Brigade at Magazine Gap and it was learnt that about 250 enemy were round St. Albert's Convent, that our troops on the Northern slopes of Mount Cameron were withdrawing²⁶ and that Magazine Gap and Wanchai Gap were being heavily bombed. The positions at every " gap " were unenviable, for the nature of the country was such that local defense was bound to be restricted and confined to the gap itself, thus providing an excellent target for the enemy air force, which did not fail to take due advantage of the opportunity. These positions were originally prepared for limiting any enemy exploitation after a South shore landing. At 1430 hours our line ran from Bennets Hill to Wanchai Gap, and a patrol of 2 Royal Scots was going out to Mount Cameron.

123. At 1645 hours 23rd December the last Army W/T set was knocked out by shell fire, and communications with the United Kingdom and Singapore ceased except that military messages could be and were transmitted by Royal Navy W/T.

124. At 1730 hours communication was reopened at HQ 2 Royal Scots at Wanchai Gap, who reported that they were holding the western slopes of Mount Cameron.

125. With difficulty eight ammunition lorries had been collected and organized, and during the night six of these managed, with the help of an armored car of the HKVDC, to get to the Ordnance- Depot at Little Hong Kong and obtain some badly wanted gun and mortar ammunition. There were unfortunately no hand grenades there (they were in the other Reserve Depot at The Ridge), for these were now urgently needed in the street fighting which was developing in the area North of the Race Course.

118. 同時，北方的情況令我憂心忡忡。5/7拉吉普團的混合連隊人數大幅減少，彈藥和食物短缺，於8點左右被迫撤退，暴露了C. M. Man上尉率領的“Z”連隊在米杜息士第一團禮頓山陣地的右翼。9點22分，儘管敵人正在滲透到他周圍的房屋和街道，他仍在堅守陣地。他只有40名士兵和6挺機槍。10點，敵人對他發動猛烈攻擊，並對寶靈頓地區進行了猛烈砲擊（编者按：亦作鵝頸區，舊稱寶靈城，是位於香港鵝頸山及東角之間一帶的地方）。11點，砲擊再次加劇，一個機槍排的陣地被徹底摧毀。然而，這些機槍還是轉移到了利舞台戲院（Lee Theatre），控制了北翼。在要塞指揮部，50名皇家砲兵和2名皇家蘇格蘭人被召集起來，並被派往增援米杜息士第1團。

119. 12月23日10:00，東部步兵旅指揮官報告，對赤柱山域的反攻失敗。加拿大皇家步槍隊損失慘重，敵軍正在滲透，指揮官認為必須撤退。步兵旅正在偵察並組織三個縱深防禦陣地，這些陣地將堅守到最後，最北端的陣地位於赤柱村前方很遠的地方。加拿大人認為，在地勢更平坦、戰線更狹窄、通訊更便捷的地方，他們可以進行更有效的抵抗。他們完全意識到失去戰術上重要的製高點，這令人深感遺憾。

120. 10:00，敵軍正在攻擊班納山，並轟炸香港仔造船廠，同時也轟炸了維多利亞城的防空陣地。

121. 11:30，米杜息士第一團指揮部被迫撤退至預備陣地。中午時分，戰線走向：- 東南角跑馬場至（僅此一處）萊頓山（5/7拉其普特團60人）- 萊頓山及北（由米杜息士1團控制）至55號碉堡。

約15:00，敵軍發動進攻，但被擊退。

122. 12月23日13:30，與位於馬已仙峽的西步兵旅指揮部重新建立聯繫，獲悉約250名敵軍在聖士提反書院附近，我軍在金馬倫山北坡的部隊正在撤退，馬已仙峽和灣仔峽遭到猛烈轟炸。每個「峽」的陣地都不樂觀，因為該地區的地形使得局部防禦必然受到限制，並局限於峽內，這為敵軍空軍提供了絕佳的攻擊目標，而敵軍空軍也抓住了這一機會。這些陣地最初是為了限制敵軍在南岸登陸後的任何利用而準備的。14:30，我們的防線從班納山延伸至灣仔峽，一支由兩輛皇家蘇格蘭人組成的巡邏隊正前往金馬倫山。

123. 12月23日16:45，陸軍最後一套無線電通訊線路被砲火擊毀，與英國和新加坡的通訊中斷，只有皇家海軍無線電通訊可以傳遞軍事訊息。

124. 17:30，位於灣仔峽的皇家蘇格蘭人第二總部（HQ 2 Royal Scots）恢復通訊，總部報告稱他們已控制住金馬倫山西坡。

125. 經過艱苦的努力，八輛彈藥卡車被收集並組織起來，其中六輛在夜間借助香港防衛軍（HKVDC）的一輛裝甲車，成功抵達位於「小香港」的軍械庫，獲取了一些急需的槍支和迫擊砲彈藥。不幸的是，那裡沒有手榴彈（它們在位於山脊的另一個預備倉庫），因為現在馬場以北地區正在發生的巷戰急需這些彈藥。

Part III-F

126. Morning (23/24th December) dispositions of West Infantry Brigade were—Brigade HQ Magazine Gap, HQ 2 Royal Scots and Winnipeg Grenadiers at Wanchai Gap, 2 Royal Scots still holding the West slopes of Mount Cameron and patrolling forward, Winnipeg Grenadiers holding down to Aberdeen Reservoir, Little Hong Kong area still holding out, 4 and 7 Companies HKVDC on the new line to which they had been moved (Mount Kellett to Mount Gough).

127.— (a) At about 0400 hours 24th December the Royal Rifles of Canada were back on a line across Stanley Peninsula from near pill box 27 on Taitam Bay, through St Stephens College buildings to West Bay, but the battalion required regrouping. A forward line had been formed through the Police Station manned by " B " and " D " companies 1 Middlesex Regiment, some H K.V.D.C., prison warders (enlisted as volunteers), and a few other personnel. The 1 Middlesex crews from the pill boxes in the area of Repulse Bay had been ordered to withdraw and had joined the Stanley Forces with all their machine guns, equipment and most of the small arms ammunition—a timely reinforcement and an excellent achievement. (b) Brigadier Wallis assured me that Stanley Force were in good heart and that he was confident that if the enemy attacked his three lines of defence they would suffer heavily. He confirmed that he had enough food, water and ammunition, and I ordered him to fight on and not to surrender as long as these conditions prevailed.

128. Information was received in the morning that the enemy held the central and southern portions of Mount Cameron, and that the Royal Scots were on the northern extremity. At 0915 hours the enemy had reinforced the northern portion of Mount Cameron where he was about 300 strong. The small party of Royal Marines (q v. para 117) was now patrolling the spurs South of Mount Parish in touch with the 5/7 Rajput Regt. who had collected hospital discharges, etc., and formed a third platoon which had been positioned on the Mount Parish spur. 129 Noon.— (a) One of the 6-in. Howitzers at Mount Austin was put out of action by bombing. (b) Two enemy launches on the West side of the Kowloon Peninsula were set on fire by our artillery.

130. At 1400 hours 24th December about 200 enemy were seen working North West, and an attack developed at about 1500 hours on Leighton Hill after a severe artillery and mortar bombardment, in addition to dive bombing. Attacked from three sides, the garrison was being rapidly surrounded when at 1645 hours it was authorized to escape, if it could, through the streets leading North West to Canal Road. The two officers and 40 other ranks did so, losing 25 per cent, casualties. A most determined and valuable resistance had been put up on this position (and q v. para. 118). These troops withdrew into and assisted the defensive area between Lee Theatre and the Canal Road, already occupied by the reinforcements mentioned in para. 118.

第三部分-F

126. 上午（12月23/24日），西部步兵旅的部署如下：旅部駐紮在馬加奇峽，第二皇家蘇格蘭團和溫尼伯擲彈兵團駐紮在灣仔峽，第二皇家蘇格蘭團仍守衛金馬倫山西坡並向前巡邏，溫尼伯擲彈兵團駐紮在灣仔峽，第二皇家蘇格蘭團仍守衛金馬倫山西坡並向前巡邏，溫尼伯兵團和防衛到香港仔地區沿著「小香港」地區（連山地區（連山地區）沿高萊地區的防禦線沿第7）。

127. (a) 12月24日凌晨4點左右，加拿大皇家步槍隊已從大潭灣27號碉堡附近穿過赤柱半島，穿過聖士提反書院建築到達西灣，但該營需要重新集結。前線已在警察局形成，由米杜息士第一團的“B”連和“D”連、一些香港防衛軍特遣隊（HKVDC）、獄警（志願入伍）和其他一些人員駐守。來自淺水灣地區碉堡的米杜息士第一團的人員奉命撤退，並攜帶所有機槍、裝備和大部分輕武器彈藥加入了斯坦利部隊——這是一次及時的增援，也是一次輝煌的戰績。（b）華里士準將向我保證，赤柱部隊士氣高昂，他相信如果敵人攻擊他的三道防線，他們將遭受重創。他確認擁有足夠的食物、水和彈藥，我命令他繼續戰鬥，只要這些條件持續，就決不投降。

128. 上午收到情報，敵軍控制金馬倫山的中部和南部，皇家蘇格蘭團則位於最北端。9時15分，敵軍增援了金馬倫山北部，目前兵力約300人。皇家海軍陸戰隊（q v. para 117）的小隊正在帕里什山以南的山脊巡邏，與第五/第七拉其普特團保持聯繫。該團已接收了醫院的出院人員等，並組成了駐紮在巴里士山脊的第三排。中午12點29分——(a) 柯士甸山的一門6吋榴彈砲因轟炸而失效。（b）九龍半島西側的兩艘敵艦被我方砲火焚毀。

130. 12月24日14:00，約200名敵軍在西北方活動。約15:00，在猛烈的砲火和迫擊砲轟擊以及俯衝轟炸之後，禮頓山的攻擊開始。守軍遭到三面夾擊，迅速被包圍。16:45，守軍獲準撤離，如果可以的話，通過通往西北運河路的街道。兩名軍官和40名其他士兵成功撤離，傷亡率達25%。該陣地進行了極為堅決和寶貴的抵抗（參見第118段）。這些部隊撤退至利舞台和運河路之間的防禦區，並協助該區域，該區域已被第118段提到的增援部隊佔領。

131. This evening a convoy plus an armored car was again formed to obtain ammunition and bombs from Little Hong Kong. Accompanying the convoy were two trucks with reinforcements from 2 Royal Scots and 1 Middlesex Regt., plus two machine guns. It succeeded, though shot at repeatedly.

132 1730 hours 24th December.—The patrol of the Royal Marines ascertained that no enemy was on the road North East of Wanchai Gap, and that 2 Royal Scots were at the Gap. Posts were to be established on the spur.

133 At 1800 hours Morrison Hill was heavily shelled. Holding this feature were detachments of 1 Middlesex Regt. with seven machine guns. All guns were reported knocked out but the majority of the crews escaped, having been withdrawn to nearby cover ready to repel an attack. At 1900 hours a party of thirty clerks, spare signalers, military police, etc., was formed at Fortress H.Q. and went under Major R. E. Moody, D.A.A.G., to assist the Officer Commanding 1 Middlesex Regt. This party, with a few others collected on the spot, held Morrison Hill until the afternoon of 25th December. The enemy now had three guns in action on the water front near the Peninsular Hotel, Kowloon, and another battery at Tai Hang. At about 1900 hours a large fire broke out on the water front near the China Fleet Club, hindering certain forward movements.

134 At about 2200 hours reports from Aberdeen and Shouson Hill indicated a general move of the enemy from Mount Nicholson Mount Cameron area northwards towards the Race Course A possible intention, I considered, might be to turn West and join in the drive along the North face of the island, possibly with the left flank along the line of the " gaps " and the right flank just clear of Wanchai This X would strike a weak place where I had only the Royal Marines patrolling. In hand were less than a dozen men at H.Q. of 2/14 Punjab Regt. unless I drew on the two companies in positions covering Government House, Command H.Q., R.N Yard, Military Hospital, i.e., our last stand.

135. Night 24/25th December—Between 2200 and 2300 hours the Central District of Victoria came under a 3-in. Mortar bombardment— including the R N. Yard, Victoria Barracks, and Fortress H.Q. Communications were not affected The direction of the enemy advance on Wanchai made it possible that the enemy might use the A R.P. tunnels for infiltration, and wardens were warned accordingly. The most important tunnels concerned were those under Mount Parish. 136 At 2300 hours all units were sent such seasonal greetings as were possible from H.E. The Governor and from Fortress H.Q. 137. Around midnight the enemy attacked in the area South of Wanchai Gap and effected a slight penetration.

131. 今晚，一支車隊和一輛裝甲車再次集結，前往「小香港」運送彈藥和炸彈。隨行的還有兩輛卡車，車上載有來自2個皇家蘇格蘭團和1個米杜息士第一團的增援部隊，以及兩挺機槍。儘管遭到反覆射擊，但最終還是成功了。

132 12月24日17:30 - 皇家海軍陸戰隊巡邏隊確認灣仔峽東北方向的道路上沒有敵人，且有2輛皇家蘇格蘭團駐紮在峽口。哨所將在山脊上設立。

133 18:00，最高遜山遭到猛烈砲擊。堅守這據點的是1個米杜息士第團的分隊，他們攜帶7挺機槍。據報道，所有機槍都被擊毀，但大多數機槍組成員逃脫，他們撤至附近的掩體，準備擊退進攻。19:00，一支由30名辦事員、備用通訊員、憲兵等組成的隊伍在要塞總部集合，在陸軍少校R. E. Moody（陸軍少校）的指揮下，協助米杜息士第一團指揮官指揮。這支隊伍與現場召集的其他幾名人員一起，堅守摩理臣山至12月25日下午。此時，敵軍在九龍半島酒店附近的海濱有三門火砲投入戰鬥，並在大坑有另一門砲台。大約19:00，灣仔中國海軍俱樂部附近的海濱發生大火，阻礙了部分前進行動。

134 約22:00，香港仔和壽臣山的報告顯示，敵軍正從最高遜山和金馬倫山地區向北向跑馬場推進。我認為，敵軍可能轉向西，加入沿島北面推進的敵軍，左翼可能沿著「缺口」一線前進，右翼剛好離開灣仔。這個X陣地將襲擊我方只有皇家海軍陸戰隊巡邏的薄弱地帶。除非我調動駐守總督府、指揮部、皇家海軍院、軍醫院（即我們的最後一道防線）的兩個連隊，否則旁遮普第14團第2團的指揮部將只有不到12人。

135. 12月24/25日夜間 - 22:00至23:00，維多利亞城中區遭受3吋火砲襲擊。迫擊砲轟擊 - 包括皇家海軍船塢、維多利亞兵營和堡壘總部。通訊未受影響。敵軍向灣仔推進的方向使得敵軍可能利用皇家海軍陸戰隊護衛隊（A.R. R.P.）的隧道進行滲透，因此警衛人員已收到相應警告。其中最重要的隧道是巴里士山（Mount Parish）下的隧道。136. 23:00，所有部隊都收到了總督閣下和堡壘總部的節日問候。

137. 午夜時分，敵軍在灣仔峽以南地區發動進攻，並略為突破。

138. At 0100 hours on Christmas Day Commander East Infantry Brigade reported a series of attacks on his positions at Stanley. The enemy had succeeded in getting behind some of the forward defended localities and were mopping up parties of H K.V.D.C. at Stanley Police Station. I again instructed him to hold out till the last.

139. The enemy continued pressure North of Aberdeen, reached the North slopes of Bennets Hill, and " dug in " there, at 0300 hours he was reported to be advancing again At this time only one of the two 4-5-in. Howitzers at the " Sanatorium " remained in action.

140. Wanchai —Before dawn 25th December a successful retaliation to the enemies - light infantry gun26 was carried out. A Bofors A.A. gun was taken to a position just South of Morrison Hill and vigorous short range fire silenced the enemy activity in the sports pavilions immediately South of Canal Road. Many calls had been made on the Bofors detachments during the last few days. Besides their continuous day role they had also performed night roles, e g., beach defence, replacing equipments disabled or knocked out, such as at Belchers Fort, in which area the infantry beach defences had been weakened by 95 per cent in order to find troops for counter-attack By 0700 hours anti-tank mines had been laid in the main approaches to Wanchai from the East but enemy house to house infiltrations continued to be reported even as far West as fee China Fleet Oub. This report I discounted, but awkward fighting was developing, for I was unable to employ suitably the available artillery in this street fighting, apart from the desire to escape causing innumerable civilian casualties in such a congested area. The Japanese on the other hand, with their overwhelming superiority of artillery and noted carelessness for loss of life, had no hesitation in putting down in such areas heavy concentrations, with mortars super-imposed, lasting half an hour, and with a rate of fire comparable to those of the Great War. At 0800 hours the enemy were on a front from the South end of Canal Road to the West arm of Causeway Bay, with snipers in houses further forward. At 0830 hours, 25th December, the Royal Navy contributed a further small reinforcement which was placed at the disposal of the Officer Commanding i Middlesex Regt. (Lieut -Colonel H. W. M. Stewart, O.B E., M C.) who thereupon put in hand the building up of a second line running North from the Mount Parish area —Wanchai Market, O'Brien Street—to the water front (" O'Brien Street Line " ").

141. At daylight our troops were still holding the eastern slopes of Bennets Hill.

142. At 0900 hours Major C. M Manners (q.v. paras. 84 and 90) and Mr. A L. Shields came across from the Japanese lines under a white flag. They had been told that they could talk freely. They informed me of their march with civilians of both sexes from Repulse Bay Hotel via Wong Nei Chong Gap to North point, of the " incredible " number of guns and troops seen during the last half of their " trek " and (in their opinion, not put forward by the Japanese) the uselessness of continuing the struggle. A special defence meeting was immediately called, where it was decided that there could be no talk of surrender The Japanese Commander sent one message —that their forces would not initiate active hostilities for three hours I conformed, including regretfully closing down on a promising counter-attack by Canadian troops on a large enemy " pocket " North-West of Bennets Hill. This impromptu " truce " was difficult to stage, for Japanese planes, operating from Canton, did not conform and bombed Stanley, Aberdeen and Mount Gough. Stanley was also shelled A constant service of launches was maintained over Kowloon Bay and Japanese artillery continued bombarding the Gaps.

138. 聖誕節凌晨1點，東部步兵旅指揮官報告稱，其在赤柱的陣地遭到一系列攻擊。敵軍已成功突破部分前緣防守區域，並正在掃蕩赤柱警署的HKVDC分隊。我再次指示他堅持到最後。

139. 敵軍繼續向香港仔北部推進，到達班納山北坡，並在那裡「挖掘戰壕」。凌晨3點，敵軍再次推進。此時，「療養院」的兩門4-5吋榴彈砲中，只有一門仍在戰鬥。

140. 灣仔 - 12月25日黎明前，輕步兵砲26號對敵軍進行了一次成功的反擊。一門博福斯防空砲。火砲被調至摩利臣山正南方向，猛烈的短程火力壓制了堅拿道南側運動場館內敵軍的活動。過去幾天，博福斯火砲分隊接到了許多任務。除了持續的日間任務外，他們還執行夜間任務，例如海灘防衛，更換被摧毀或損壞的裝備，例如在海岸防禦砲台，該地區的步兵海灘防禦被削弱了95%，以便找到反攻部隊。到7點，反戰車地雷已從東面埋設在通往灣仔的主要通道上，但敵軍仍在逐戶滲透，甚至遠至西邊的中國艦隊總部。我沒有理會這份報告，但戰鬥進展不順，因為我無法在這場巷戰中有效運用現有的火砲，除了想在如此擁擠的地區造成無數平民傷亡外。另一方面，日軍憑藉其壓倒性的砲火優勢和眾所周知的對人員傷亡的漠不關心，毫不猶豫地在這些地區集中火力，使用迫擊砲進行密集砲擊，持續了半小時，射速堪比第一次世界大戰時期。8時，敵軍已從堅拿道南端延伸至銅鑼灣西側，前方房屋內有狙擊手。12月25日8時30分，皇家海軍又增派了一支小規模的增援部隊，由米杜息士第團指揮官（中校H. W. M. Stewart，O.B. E.，M.C.）指揮。隨後，他著手修建了第二條防線，從教區山地區——灣仔街市、柯布連道向北延伸至海濱（「柯布連道防線」）。

141. 天亮時，我軍仍堅守著班納山東坡。

142. 上午9點，C. M. Manners少校（參見第84和90段）和A. L. Shields先生舉著白旗從日軍防線過來。他們被告知可以自由交談。他們告訴我，他們與男女平民一起從淺水灣酒店經黃泥涌峽向北角行進，在「跋涉」的後半段看到了「數量驚人的」槍支和部隊，以及（他們認為，並非日軍提出的）繼續戰鬥毫無意義。會議立即召開特別防禦會議，決定絕不談投降。日軍指揮官發出訊息，他們的部隊在三個小時內不會主動發動敵對行動。我服從了命令，包括遺憾地阻止了加拿大軍隊對班納山西北一個大型敵軍「口袋」發起的一次勢在必行的反攻。這項臨時的「停戰」協議難以達成，因為從廣州起飛的日軍飛機不服從命令，轟炸了赤柱、香港仔和歌賦山。赤柱也遭到砲擊。九龍灣上空持續不斷的砲火服務，日軍砲兵持續砲擊峽口。

143. At 1030 hours the Royal Marines patrol (q.v. para. 132) reported having established contact with 2 Royal Scots at Wanchai Gap. This patrol had meanwhile been increased by thirty all ranks of Fortress R.E. who were reserved for a minor operation that night, i.e., the mopping up of an enemy post on Stubbs Road. At mid-day Japanese artillery opened up punctually on a large scale, and later hand to hand fighting was reported by 5/7 Rajput Regt. on Mount Pariah, where a platoon was surrounded. Shortly afterwards Mount Parish fell into the enemy's hands, and an advance along Kennedy Road was threatened. This put Fortress HQ area, which had a garrison of only one platoon of 2/14 Punjab Regt., in jeopardy. More road blocks and anti-tank mines were put out. By 1300 hours, 25th December, the 2nd ("O'Brien Street") line was established, held by some 60-70 men of 1 Middlesex Regt., including small parties of Royal Navy, Royal Engineers, and 5/7 Rajput Regt. The enemy was now in the Wanchai A.R.P. tunnels (q.v. para. 135) but about noon an 18 pounder gun had arrived there, which, mounted in the main street, covered several of the exits. A number of rounds were fired at these exits, more as a deterrent than anything else. No casualties were observed to have been caused, and no enemy emerged.

144. Communications were increasingly difficult to maintain: between 00 and 1200 hours there were none to Stanley area, Wanchai Gap and Magazine Gap, nor to the 2 Royal Scots.

145. There were, at noon, only six guns of the mobile artillery left in action, with an average of 160 rounds per gun available.

146. At 1430 hours two officers and fifty other ranks of 2/14 Punjab Regt. reached the Officer Commanding 1 Middlesex Regt., who had given warnings several times that his men, though in good heart, were being slowly but surely overwhelmed. A further withdrawal was enforced from the Canal Road area, and the "O'Brien Street line" became the forward active line of defence HQ. 1 Middlesex Regt. withdrew to Murray Barracks.

147. Very heavy dive-bombing attacks were made in the Wanchai Gap area between 1400 and 1430 hours, and shortly afterwards this Gap was reported lost. Magazine Gap was similarly attacked and incendiaries were dropped most effectively, for the hillside was set on fire and field cables were burnt. A little later the Gap itself came under mortar and small arms fire, and Commander, West Infantry Brigade, reported that the area could not in his opinion be held for more than 24 hours at the most against a determined attack.

148. At 1450 hours the Officer Commanding 1 Middlesex Regt. reported that his forward positions were being shelled from both Kowloon and North Point and that Captain C M Man, the Officer Commanding "Z" Company, had telephoned "the line is breaking." Lt.-Colonel Stewart said 'he would try to form yet another line East of the R.N. Yard if necessary, i.e., just below, and to the North of, Fortress HQ. The "O'Brien Street line," if seriously attacked, could not hold out long—perhaps half an hour.

143. 10時30分，皇家海軍陸戰隊巡邏隊（詳見第132段）報告稱，在灣仔峽與兩支皇家蘇格蘭步兵團取得聯繫。同時，這支巡邏隊增加了30名要塞皇家步兵團各級人員，他們被保留用於當晚的一項小規模行動，即掃蕩司徒拔道的敵軍哨所。中午時分，日軍砲火準時大規模開火，隨後，巴里士山上的拉吉普第5/7團報告發生了肉搏戰，一個排被包圍。不久之後，巴里士山落入敵軍手中，僅堅尼地道的推進受到威脅。這使得要塞指揮部地區陷入危險，該區域僅有旁遮普第14團第2團的一個排駐守。更多的路障和反戰車地雷被埋設。12月25日下午1點，第二道（「柯布連道」）防線建立，由米杜息士第一團約60-70名士兵堅守，其中包括皇家海軍、皇家工兵和拉傑普特五團7團的少量士兵。敵軍此時已進入灣仔A.R.P.隧道（q.v. 第135段），但大約中午時分，一門18磅炮抵達該地，架設在主街上，掩護了幾個出口。砲火向這些出口發射，主要是為了威懾敵軍。沒有人員傷亡，也沒有敵人出現。

144. 通訊越來越難以維持：從凌晨12點到中午12點，赤柱地區、灣仔峽和馬己仙峽以及皇家蘇格蘭二團都斷絕了通訊。

145. 中午時分，機動砲兵只剩下六門火砲仍在作戰，平均每門火砲可發射160發砲彈。

146. 14:30，旁遮普第十四團第二營的兩名軍官和五十名其他士兵抵達米杜息士第一團指揮官處。指揮官曾多次警告說，他的士兵們雖然士氣高昂，但正緩慢而堅定地被擊敗。部隊進一步從運河路地區撤退，「柯布連道防線」成為前線主動防線。米杜息士第一團指揮部撤至默里兵營。

147. 14:00至14:30期間，灣仔峽地區遭受了非常猛烈的俯衝轟炸，不久之後，據報該峽已失守。馬己仙峽也遭到了類似的攻擊，燃燒彈被投擲效果顯著，因為山坡被點燃，野戰電纜也被燒毀。不久之後也遭到迫擊砲和輕武器的攻擊。西步兵旅指揮官報告說，他認為該地區最多無法在堅決的進攻下堅守超過24小時。

148. 14:50，米杜息士第一團指揮官報告說，他的前線陣地遭到來自九龍和北角的砲擊，「Z」連指揮官C M Man上尉報告說，「防線正在斷裂」。史都華中校表示，「如有必要，他將嘗試在皇家海軍院子以東，也就是要塞總部正下方和正北方向，再組成一條防線」。如果遭到嚴重攻擊，「柯布連道防線」將無法撐太久，可能只能撐半小時。

149 I had no communications with East Infantry Brigade HQ at Stanley and consequently had no information. As far as it was known, the force surrounded in Little Hong Kong Magazine area, was still holding out. Bennets Hill had been heavily attacked, had been completely surrounded and by 1500 hours had been forced to surrender. The Canadian line north of Bennets Hill had been forced to give ground.

150. This advance by the enemy along the line of Gaps, the possession of these Gaps by him, thus giving him an open line of advance to the Central District, the fall of Bennets Hill, the isolation of the forces in Stanley, the deployment by the enemy of such superior forces and armament, the exhaustion after sixteen days of continuous battle with no reliefs for any individuals, our vulnerability to unlimited air attack, the impossibility of obtaining more ammunition for the few mobile guns I had remaining, the serious water famine immediately impending—these were the factors which led to the inevitable conclusion, namely, that further fighting meant the useless slaughter of the remainder of the garrison, risked severe retaliation on the large civilian population and could not affect the final outcome. The enemy drive along the North shore was decisive. I asked Lt.-Colonel Stewart, the Officer Commanding 1 Middlesex Regt. how much longer in his considered opinion the men could hold the line now occupied He replied "one hour." The Commodore agreed with my conclusion. At 1515 hours I advised H.E. The Governor and C.-in-C. that no further useful military resistance was possible and I then ordered all Commanding Officers to break off the fighting and to capitulate to the nearest Japanese Commander, as and when the enemy advanced and opportunity offered.

149 我與位於赤柱的東部步兵旅總部沒有任何聯繫，因此沒有任何資訊。據了解，被包圍在「小香港」馬己仙地區的部隊仍在堅守。本班納山遭到猛烈攻擊，被完全包圍，並於下午3點被迫投降。班納山以北的加拿大防線被迫撤退。

150. 敵軍沿著缺口線推進，佔領了這些缺口，從而打開了通往中央區的進攻通道；班納山的陷落；赤柱的部隊被孤立；敵軍部署瞭如此優勢的兵力和武器裝備；連續戰鬥十六天，沒有任何人員得到換崗，我們精疲力竭；我方易受空襲的威脅；我方僅存的幾門機動火砲無法獲得更多彈藥；嚴重的缺水即將來臨，所有這些因素都導致了一個不可避免的結論：繼續戰鬥意味著對剩餘駐軍的無謂屠殺，有可能對大量平民進行嚴厲報復，並且不會影響最終結果。敵軍沿著北岸的推進是決定性的。我問米杜息士第一團團長史都華中校，他認為士兵還能堅守目前佔領的防線多久？他回答說：“一個小時。”準將同意我的結論。15時15分，我告知總督閣下和最高司令官，已無可能進行進一步有效的軍事抵抗，並命令所有指揮官停止戰鬥，並在敵人推進並有機會時向最近的日軍指揮官投降。



上圖：香港保衛戰的歷史現場鯉魚門海峽 圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室

Notes

日寇志之《失落的重光》

2 Running North East from Tsun Wan Wai to Pineapple Pass

3 Killing both the Company Commanders concerned.

4 Except that the Vehicular Ferry gave priority to all military vehicles and guns.

5 At noon in Prince Edward Road an ammunition convoy of 2 Royal Scots was attacked; fifth columnists were in dark grey uniform and armed with rifles.

6 Owing to shortness of time communications in the Devils Peak area were incomplete, but excellent work by Royal Signals provided efficient field cable circuits in time

7 Fifth columnists attacked the A A searchlight position at Sail Ki Wan this night

8 The Peak Observation Post was forced to move three times, for each location quickly came under heavy and accurate artillery fire in spite of every precaution for concealment. Treachery was certain but the source could not be ascertained.

9 Near the Police Station, Braemar.

10 It was subsequently ascertained that the Saiwan A A. position was heavily shelled at 2145 hours and Japanese troops rushed it at 2200 hours.

11 Lieut Carruthers was the sole survivor (HKVDC)

12 No evidence has been obtained as to what happened to this company It is believed to have reached Wong Nei Chong Gap at first light and to have been ambushed by superior Japanese forces, all remaining personnel being captured.

13 After the capitulation a Japanese Staff Officer informed me that the Japanese had suffered very heavy "casualties in this area.

14 Lt. Gen. Kitajama three weeks after the capitulation informed my Commander, Royal Artillery, of this fact Our defences in the Mount Cameron area also noticed that at one period the enemy artillery fire seemed far more efficient, every round going off, and no " blinds " as customary. A map of artillery dispositions was also shown to the Commander, Royal Artillery, with three regimental artillery areas marked, indicating the employment of the artillery of three divisions.

15 The " University Company " less a proportion of pillbox crews, total 45.

16 Kennedy Road—China Fleet Club Company

17 It was afterwards ascertained that these orders did not reach Colonel Kidd and the two companies which at this time were still operating in the area East of Tai Hang The spur was captured and occupied for some time but no trace of " D " Company 5/7 Rajput Regt. could be found.

18 This was the company referred to in para 63 (s) It was confirmed later that this company had earlier in the morning reached its objective successfully.

19 One company had lost one platoon in a counter attack.

20 These R.N. personnel had been manning the mine control station at Chung Am Kok.

21 The following message was issued to all units— " There are indications that Chinese forces are advancing towards the frontier to our aid All ranks must therefore hold their positions at all costs and look forward to only a few more days of strain."

22 Nevertheless later in the evening this company of Royal Scots moved forward from the northern end of Mount Nicholson and occupied a position on the right of " B " Company 2/14 Punjab Regt.—q.v. paras 71 and 76

23 Blacks Link—the track leading from Wong Nei Chong Gap to Wanchai Gap.

24 A demolition scheme had been fully prepared, but the area was over-run too quickly on the morning of 11th December Luckily this Depot was only half full

25 It was not practicable The women and children fell into the hands of the Japanese when the troops evacuated at midnight on 23/24th December.


26 It was not till some time later that this statement re withdrawal was found to be untrue. 26 This was mounted on balloon type tyres, was about 3" calibre, was very boldly handled, and produced most effective results, both material and moral. Each battalion had two.




上圖：香港重光後揭幕琦總督復職 圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室

註解

- 2 從東北方向荃灣圍到菠蘿壩
- 3 兩名相關連長遇難。
- 4 除車輛渡輪優先於所有軍用車輛和槍支外，其他車輛均在車輛渡輪上通行。
- 5 中午時分，在太子道，一支由兩名皇家蘇格蘭人組成的彈藥車隊遭到襲擊；第五縱隊身著深灰色制服，並配備步槍。
- 6 由於時間緊迫，魔鬼山地區的通訊不暢，但皇家信號部隊的出色工作及及時提供了高效的野戰電纜線路。
- 7 第五縱隊當晚襲擊了位於筲箕灣的AA探照燈陣地。
- 8 儘管採取了各種隱藏措施，山頂觀察哨仍被迫轉移三次，因為每個觀察哨都迅速遭到猛烈而精準的砲火襲擊。叛變是肯定的，但無法確定其來源。
- 9 寶馬山警署附近。
- 10 隨後確認，西灣A陣地於21:45遭到猛烈砲擊，日軍於22:00發動猛攻。
- 11 卡拉瑟斯中尉(Lieut Carruthers)是唯一倖存者（香港防衛軍 HKVDC）。
- 12 目前尚無證據顯示該連隊遭遇了什麼。據信，該連隊在拂曉時分抵達黃泥涌峽，並遭到優勢日軍的伏擊，所有剩餘人員均被俘。
- 13 投降後，一位日本參謀告訴我，日軍在該地區遭受了非常慘重的「傷亡」。
- 14 投降三週後，北山中將此事實告知了我的皇家砲兵司令。我們在金馬倫山地區的防禦工事也注意到，敵方砲火一度似乎更加高效，每發砲彈都轟擊到位，而且沒有像往常一樣設置「掩體」。皇家砲兵司令還收到了一張砲兵部署圖，上面標註了三個團級砲兵區域，顯示了三個師級砲兵的部署。
- 15 「大學連」減去部分碉堡人員，共45人。
- 16 堅尼地道 - 中國艦隊俱樂部連
- 17 事後查明，這些命令並未傳達給基德上校和當時仍在大坑以東地區作戰的兩個連。支線被佔領並佔領了一段時間，但「D」連卻不見蹤影。找到了拉吉普團5/7的部隊。
- 18 這就是第63段(s)提到的連隊。後來證實，該連隊在當天清晨成功達成目標。
- 19 一個連隊在一次反擊中損失了一個排。
- 20 這些皇家海軍人員一直在忠安角的地雷控制站執勤。
- 21 向所有部隊發出了以下信息：“有跡象表明，中國軍隊正在向邊境推進，支援我方。因此，所有軍官必須不惜一切代價堅守陣地，並預計接下來只需承受幾天的緊張局勢。”
- 22 儘管如此，當晚晚些時候，這支皇家蘇格蘭連隊從最高遜山北端前進，佔據了旁遮普團14/2 “B”連右側的陣地 參見第71段和第76段。
- 23 布萊克斯連 - 從黃泥涌峽通往灣仔峽的小路。
- 24 一項爆破計劃已經做好了充分的準備。



上圖：中區大會堂紀念花園門上的說明牌以紀念英靈 圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室




上圖：莫德庇少將撰寫的1941年12月8日至25日 香港戰役 背面 圖片來源：延陵科學綜合室藏

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